

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

The Prague Spring:
Could It Have Been Saved?

Fall 1991

\$6.50

TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRACY

De Klerk Can Handle the Transition

Peter J. Duignan

The ANC Poses a Threat

Michael Radu

Libertarian Foreign Policy: A Debate

Doug Bandow / James Robbins

Why Third World Space Systems Matter

Thomas G. Mahnken

Will Trade Change Beijing or Taipei?

Dennis Van Vranken Hickey

Foreign Policy Research Institute

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE



Founded in 1955, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) is an independent, publicly supported, nonprofit organization devoted to the public dissemination of scholarly research affecting the national interests of the United States. As a catalyst for the exchange of ideas, FPRI seeks to influence the climate in which American foreign policy is made. Research is conducted by the FPRI staff, supplemented by the work of Fellows and Associate Scholars.

The Institute publishes *FPRI Books* — full-length, scholarly treatments of topical international issues written by the FPRI staff, its Fellows, and Associate Scholars. The Institute also publishes *Agora*, a journal of Romanian culture and politics.

Major programs of the Institute include the Asia Program and the Middle East Council. Each year, the Institute sponsors a competition for the *Thornton D. Hooper Fellowship in International Affairs*; the Hooper Fellow spends a year in residence at FPRI conducting research.

FPRI administers the Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education, which includes among its activities the *Inter-University Seminar on Foreign Affairs*, for scholars and the interested public; *Global Classroom* and *Weekend Academy*, for secondary and elementary school teachers; *Where Business and Politics Meet*, for business leaders; *Wisdom of the Ages*, an intergenerational seminar on public affairs; and the *Internship Program*, for students contemplating a career in international affairs.

Contributions to the Institute are tax-deductible.

DIRECTOR

Daniel Pipes

Robert A. Fox

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Frederick S. Hammer

Kenneth D. Hill

Ronald S. Lauder

Leslie Lenkowsky

David Luterhand

Martin Meyerson

Ronald J. Naples

Irene E. Nunn

Daniel Pipes

Edward M. Snider

George P. Steele

Robert Strausz-Hupé

Robert I. Tuteur

Marvin Wachman

David V. Wachs

Daniel W. Weil

Richard S. Williamson

Albert J. Wood

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

John Gilray Christy

Chairman

Bruce H. Hooper

Vice Chairman

W.W. Keen Butcher

Treasurer

BOARD OF ADVISORS

James Courter

Midge Decter

David Eisenhower

Erwin A. Glikes

Samuel P. Huntington

John F. Lehman

Bernard Lewis

William H. McNeill

Martin Peretz

Donald H. Rumsfeld

James R. Thompson

Richard Thornburgh

R. James Woolsey

Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 35
Number 4
Fall 1991

ARTICLES

Towards South African Democracy

- | | | |
|---|------------------|-----|
| De Klerk Can Handle the Transition | Peter J. Duignan | 483 |
| ANC-Inspired Violence Poses a Threat | Michael Radu | 499 |

Will Inter-China Trade Change Taiwan or the Mainland?

Dennis Van Vranken Hickey 517

Foreign Policy and Limited Government

- | | | |
|--|---------------|-----|
| Towards a Muscular Libertarianism | James Robbins | 533 |
| Keep the Troops and the Money
at Home | Doug Bandow | 549 |

Why Third World Space Systems Matter

Thomas G. Mahnken 563

SECTIONS

Documentation

- | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|-----|
| Could the Prague Spring Have Been Saved? | Jiří Valenta
and Jan Moravec | 581 |
|--|---------------------------------|-----|

Correspondence

- | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|-----|
| The Approaching Sack of Hong Kong | Mou-shih Ding | 603 |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|-----|

Brief Reviews

605

Book Review List, 605 • World Politics, 607 • War Studies, 610 • International Economics, 614 • The United States, 618 • Europe, 622 • The Soviet Union, 625 • The Middle East, 629 • East Asia, 632

Index

635

Note: This issue of *Orbis* went to press before the attempted Soviet coup of August 19, 1991.

— The Editors

Editor
PATRICK CLAWSON

Managing Editor
ROGER S. DONWAY
Manuscript Editor
VIRGINIA L. MONTIJO
Assistant Editor
JAMES F. SMITH
Circulation Manager
THELMA PROSSER

Book Review Editor
DANIEL PIPES
Contributing Editors
BRUCE BERKOWITZ
ADAM GARFINKLE
KEVIN J. McNAMARA
MICHAEL RADU
VLADIMIR TISMANEANU

BOARD OF EDITORS

KENNETH ADELMAN
*Institute for Contemporary
Studies*

PAUL BALARAN
Ford Foundation

ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN
National Defense University

RICHARD BERNSTEIN
The New York Times

RICHARD K. BETTS
Columbia University

HENRY S. BIENEN
Princeton University

ADDA B. BOZEMAN
Sarah Lawrence College

PAUL BRACKEN
Yale University

ELIOT A. COHEN
*The School of Advanced
International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University*

STEPHEN P. COHEN
*University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign*

RICHARD V. L. COOPER
Coopers & Lybrand

ARTHUR CYR
*Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations*

PETER DUIGNAN
The Hoover Institution

MARK FALCOFF
*American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research*

ALTON FRYE
Council on Foreign Relations

ALEXANDER GEORGE
Stanford University

COLIN S. GRAY
*National Institute for
Public Policy*

PAUL HOLLANDER
*University of Massachusetts
at Amherst*

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ
Rutgers University

MARTIN INDYK
*The Washington Institute
for Near East Policy*

CHALMERS JOHNSON
*University of California,
San Diego*

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER
The Washington Post

ROBERT S. LEIKEN
*The Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University*

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK
*Center for Strategic & International
Studies*

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
*The School of Advanced
International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University*

KENNETH MAXWELL
Council on Foreign Relations

WALTER A. McDUGALL
University of Pennsylvania

STEPHANIE G. NEUMAN
Columbia University

WILLIAM E. ODOM
Hudson Institute

RICHARD PIPES
Harvard University

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO
*University of California
at Berkeley*

RICHARD F. STAAR
The Hoover Institution

MARC TRACHTENBERG
University of Pennsylvania

JIRÍ VALENTA
University of Miami

GEORGE WEIGEL
*Ethics and Public Policy
Center*

W. BRUCE WEINROD
Washington, D.C.

SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR.
*Woodrow Wilson Interna-
tional Center for Scholars*

Editorial Assistants: Carmel Gerber, Robert T. Kitterman, Justin Pearlman

De Klerk Can Handle the Transition

by Peter J. Duignan

Predicting the future of a country in transition is always a risky endeavor, and today's South Africa is no exception. Some commentators have pointed to the violent clashes among black groups as evidence that a post-apartheid South Africa is destined to descend into racial, factional, and economic chaos. But even though the turmoil of radical social and political change is breeding uncertainty and anxiety about the future, several reasons for cautious optimism stand out: despite black on black violence and the radical demands of groups like the African National Congress (ANC), there are moderate elements among South Africa's blacks who will work with the government to effect a peaceful transition; South Africa has a strong economic base on which to build; and, perhaps most important, the government of President F.W. de Klerk is being careful not to let the reform process spin out of control.

The 1990s, therefore, can be prosperous and peaceful for all peoples in South Africa if apartheid is ended, pragmatism and free enterprise win out, and real power sharing with blacks takes place by peaceful negotiations.

Controlling the Reform Process

South African president Frederik de Klerk sees himself as the leader of all the people of South Africa, not just of the whites. Frustrated for years by former president P.W. Botha's slow pace of reform and unwillingness to share power with blacks, de Klerk has dedicated his efforts to ending all aspects of apartheid, and is now negotiating for a constitutional form of power sharing.

De Klerk's National party was — and is — an authoritarian institution, and when Botha was its leader, he was able to block additional reform after 1986. But other party leaders increasingly came to recognize the need to end apartheid and to get the economy moving once again. For example, business groups had long called for economic and political changes; with Botha gone, the National party was more free to pursue such reforms. When National party members chose de Klerk to succeed Botha as party leader in 1989, they voted, in effect, for more reforms and an end to Botha's efforts to exclude blacks from politics. De Klerk's 1987 speech on the need to negotiate with urban blacks and

Peter J. Duignan is Lillick Curator and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He has authored or edited over thirty-five volumes on colonialism in Africa and politics in South Africa. His most recent book, co-authored with Lewis Gann, is *Hope for South Africa* (Hoover Institution Press, 1991).

dismantle apartheid had left no doubt about his personal convictions, and had also attracted the more liberal Afrikaners.

Neither sanctions nor the ineffective armed struggle of the ANC provided the impulse that led to the release of Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders, the end of the legal system of apartheid, and the present moves toward negotiated power sharing. Rather, the white electorate gave de Klerk a mandate for change in the September 1989 election.¹ Almost 70 percent of the white electorate voted either to support a program of cautious reform (the National party, 48 percent) or to end apartheid entirely (the Democratic party, 22 percent). Only about 30 percent of the whites, supporting the Conservative party, voted for no reforms and a return to apartheid. This mandate has enabled de Klerk to step up reforms and to promise to negotiate with blacks.

De Klerk is a lawyer with a strong sense of justice; he is religious — a member of a liberal wing of the Dutch Reformed church, which rejected the theories of Biblical justification for apartheid. He sees the need to reconcile all the peoples of South Africa. As *The Wall Street Journal* noted,

He wants to hold the moral high ground, he wants to act as the peace keeper between whites and blacks, and he wants to get things done now. Soon after election, De Klerk allowed the first legal opposition marches in 30 years. He scrapped the "Separate Amenities Act" and opened white-only beaches to all races. He dismantled the National Security Management system, an internal kind of CIA-DOD, and returned power to elected officials. He forced the ANC to suspend its "armed struggle." And on February 1, 1991, he called on parliament to scrap the remaining racist laws.²

In his drive for a more just South Africa, de Klerk has lost many Afrikaners, previously loyal members of the National party. The National party has ceased to be the Afrikaners' party par excellence: it lost seventeen seats in the 1989 elections to conservative Afrikaner defections, and retained power only because it gained the support of English-speaking whites. In parliament, de Klerk's majority declined from eighty seats to twenty seats. However, aligned with the Democratic party, de Klerk has a solid majority, and he has successfully isolated the Afrikaner right wing.

The main white right-wing opposition group is led by a former Dutch Reformed church minister, newspaper editor, and cabinet official, Andries Treurnicht. His Conservative party captured over 30 percent of the vote in September 1989, and may have even more support now that de Klerk has begun negotiating with the ANC. The Conservative party is almost entirely Afrikaner, drawn from working or lower middle classes. Its members are farmers, workers, policemen, and the like. They are potentially a much more formidable revolutionary force than the ANC because they are heavily armed and well-trained.

¹ See L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *Hope for South Africa* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), pp. 15-18; see also Lawrence Schlemmer, "White Elections 1989: An Assessment," *South Africa Foundation Review*, September 1989, pp. 1-2.

² *The Wall Street Journal*, February 28, 1990.

The Right, however, remains splintered, and the Conservative party is outflanked by a handful of dedicated partisans of apartheid represented in bodies such as the *Herstigde Nasionale party* (Reformed National party). These groups argue that the National party has abandoned the Afrikaner working man in favor of Anglo-South African, Jewish, and big business interests. White vigilante groups — for example, the *Blanke Veiligheid* (White Security) in the Orange Free State, and the *Afrikaanse Weerstandsbeweging* (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) led by Eugene Terre'Blanche in the Transvaal — call for arming whites and forming white self-defense units. These groups use extra-parliamentary methods, intimidation, even murder. A white right-wing revolution, however, seems less likely now that the Conservatives have agreed to attend de Klerk's constitutional forum.

The debate today is no longer about whether reform should proceed; rather, it is over the pace of change and the form of power sharing.

Despite opposition from the Right and from fringe groups, de Klerk remains a strong Afrikaner leader, and he has also won significant support from English-speaking white South Africans. He is pragmatic and willing to compromise. With 70 percent of the white electorate behind him, he feels free to act boldly while remaining in full control of the government and dictating the pace of change. The control that de Klerk wields is a primary reason for hope in South Africa's future.

The debate today is no longer about whether reform should proceed; rather, it is over the pace of change and the form of power sharing. While there is no returning to apartheid for the large majority of whites who voted for de Klerk, the question of what new system will emerge remains unanswered. However, since whites retain a firm grip on the overwhelming power of the state, the black opposition must be prepared to compromise. Neither black anti-apartheid groups nor any external group can force radical change on the whites against their will, or pressure them to give up too much power and risk confiscation of property and the loss of civil rights. Unlike the Soviet Union, where Gorbachev can no longer fully control the transition process that he unleashed, de Klerk is being careful not to let the reform process spiral out of control.

The main protagonists in the reform process have sharply divergent views about the future shape of their country — the ANC and its ally, the South African Communist party (SACP), want one man/one vote in a highly centralized state; most whites want a federal system with a bill of rights and provisions for group rights. The Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom party, particularly powerful among rural people and labor migrants in the towns, likewise calls for a decen-

tralized form of government that would protect private property as well as the interests of particular ethnic groups. Similar views are voiced by the independent African churches, which are generally more conservative in their social attitudes and religious views than the mainline churches.

While de Klerk says he wants every individual to have the vote, he also calls for a system that protects minority rights and puts checks on black governance. Whites fear that the ANC's concept of a straight one man/one vote election could lead to nationalization of white property or black political dominance, if not oppression. Some fear another Algeria, Angola, or Mozambique — all states where white property was confiscated, and whites were expelled. De Klerk will bring his ideas for a bill of rights to the negotiating table, and will try to get them incorporated into a future South African constitution in some form. In any case, he is in full control of the negotiating process; he runs what is still an effective authoritarian state, and he will make no concessions that would jeopardize legitimate white, Indian, or Coloured rights.

The Shape of the New South Africa

The debate in South Africa these days is less over the legal pillars of apartheid — all racist laws were recently repealed — than about what kind of government a post-apartheid South Africa will have. In addition to the question of group rights versus simple majority rule, the debate at present involves the question of whether South Africa should be a politically centralized and economically socialist country (the position favored by the ANC-SACP), or whether it should adopt a federal system, bolstered by a capitalist economy (the approach preferred by most whites, Inkatha, and the black churches).

Although other black anti-apartheid organizations, such as the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) and the Pan African Congress (PAC), also continue to adhere to discredited socialist notions about the redistribution of wealth through nationalization and increased state control of industry, the ANC and SACP are by far the most influential advocates of socialism in South Africa. Even though many African states and most East European countries have rejected socialism in favor of market-oriented systems, the ANC and SACP continue to press for the nationalizing of land, mines, banks, and major industries in South Africa and for equality of benefits, in order to restructure society along the lines of so-called redistributive justice.

Such a program would all but guarantee dramatic deterioration in the South African economy, with the attendant social consequences. Nationalizing economic assets invariably weakens entrepreneurship, discourages exploration and investment, politicizes business, and leads to the misallocation of resources. To take one outstanding example: in South Africa, the mines are the most important source of taxes and foreign currency. If South Africa hopes to expand its economy to accommodate population growth and the rising expectations of the black majority, it must increase its mineral production; it would be folly to assume that nationalized mines would be able to fulfill this

task. The examples of Zambia and Zaire are illuminating: after nationalization, the productivity and output of the mines declined significantly, with the attendant loss of taxes, jobs, and income.³

Ironically, while South Africa's whites are often implicitly portrayed as champions of the free market when contrasted with the ANC and SACP, the South African economy under Afrikaner rule has actually become highly socialized — with a large bureaucracy, an oppressive regulatory system, and hundreds of state-owned industries, known as parastatals. State socialism began during World War II and accelerated when the Afrikaners came to power in 1948. The arms embargo of 1976 further spurred the move to parastatals. The state has become a major entrepreneur, with interests in a great variety of industries — nuclear, engineering, chemicals, transport, power, arms, and the like. While parastatal organizations in South Africa have worked far more effectively and with less graft than in the rest of Africa, they still cost too much, account for too much of the GNP (about 25 percent), employ too many people (40 percent of educated Afrikaners), and are subsidized by tax payers.⁴ Above all, they discourage foreign investors and diminish South Africa's creditworthiness. Inflation — running at over 30 percent between 1985 and 1990 — has also been a problem for South Africa, as has the associated deterioration in the value of the currency from .78 rand to the dollar in 1980 to 2.79 rand to the dollar in April 1991.

Sanctions further encouraged state interference in the economy, by forcing South Africa to resort to import substitution — that is, producing itself what it was prevented from importing. The government imposed high tariffs, exchange controls, import licenses, and other heavy-handed rules designed to promote the products of local firms, including many parastatals. Now that sanctions are being removed, the South African economy will have to be restructured. Protective walls for import-substitution industries will have to be removed; excessive protection is expensive and makes industries uncompetitive. However, local firms, led by the parastatals, are reluctant to abandon their protected niches.

South Africa enjoys a widespread international image as an economically successful country, but that image grew increasingly inaccurate in the 1980s. Disinvestment and the decline of new investment led the government to protect and subsidize key industries. The oil-from-coal industry and the arms industry have consumed vast amounts of government money. The decline of

³ For the problems of mineral production in Zambia, see, for example, Cristopher Colclough, "The Economy of Zambia," in *Africa South of the Sahara 1991* (London: Europa Publications, 1991), pp. 1100-1102. For the downward trend in Zaire, see Diana Hubbard, "Economy [of Zaire]," *Africa South of the Sahara 1991*, p. 1080. See also country studies of Zambia and Zaire in *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, quarterly and annual (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990, 1991).

⁴ See Lawrence Schlemmer et al., "South Africa's Ideological Football, Development, Quality of Life, and Socio-Economic Reform," in *South Africa at the End of the Eighties* (Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand, 1989), p. 173. For a general critique of statism in Africa, written by an Afrikaner nationalist devoted to private enterprise, see A.D. Wassenaar, *Squandered Assets* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1991).

gold prices and of the rand, inflation, and unemployment hurt growth, and, for much of the eighties, South Africa experienced zero growth or even contraction. The task for de Klerk and the National party, therefore, is not only to fend off ANC demands for a command economy, but also to dismantle much of the socialist apparatus that has already taken root in South Africa.

Admittedly, the country has recently made some steps toward privatization — for instance, through the Temporary Removal of Restrictions on Economic Activities (Deregulation) Act of 1986. The government has promised to privatize the Iron and Steel Corporation, electricity supplies, and the railways. But South Africa is still a partially socialist state, and privatization needs to be speeded up in the future. At the time of this writing, in mid-1991, no major parastatal has yet been privatized. Opposition to privatization remains strong, not only among those whites who have a vested interest in the current arrangement, but also among black intellectuals, who widely look to the expansion rather than the contraction of state enterprise.

The ANC naturally opposes the government's efforts at privatization. (Indeed, none of the black political parties in South Africa wishes to abolish the system of state ownership — except Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom party. Efforts to sell parastatals and reduce the government bureaucracy have been opposed by the ANC-SACP coalition, not only because these parties see the state as playing a central role in managing the economy, but also because they want the parastatals to remain after blacks have come to power to provide a source of jobs for political allies.

The contrasting views held by the ANC and advocates of the free market in the South African business community found expression at a series of meetings of business leaders and ANC officials in 1989-1991. Discussions between the liberal Consultative Business Movement (a private-enterprise-oriented business group) and the ANC have quietly taken place for three years. Each side has discussed its position, and although no specific proposals have emerged, it was hoped that the foundation had been laid for continued negotiations. The two sides remain far apart, however, agreeing only on the most general principles, such as the need for growth, investment, and confidence building in South Africa, and a restructuring of the economy to attain a fairer distribution of wealth.⁵ The American journalist John Battersby reported on one of these meetings:

The ANC position was [and still is] that: "economic growth should be based on a redistribution of wealth, income and investment; mines, banks and monopoly industries should be nationalized; privatization of parastatals must end and ones privatized should be renationalized; subsidized housing, health and education will boost living standards and productivity; jobs should be created through labor-intensive industrial expansion; the state should direct the redistribution of wealth in income and investment."⁶

⁵ See Gann and Duignan, *Hope for South Africa*, pp. 32-33.

⁶ *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 31, 1990.

Although the ANC and SACP have inched slightly away from their demands for a fully centralized socialist system, it has not been enough to reassure businessmen and entrepreneurs. Western bankers run for cover when they hear the words “nationalize the economy,” and there is little hope for substantial foreign investment in South Africa if the ANC and its allies gain the upper hand and continue to insist on state control of the economy.

Fortunately, de Klerk’s government seems firmly committed to a mixed economy, and will not concede nationalization and renationalization to black radicals. If groups such as the ANC do not give in on this point, they are not likely to gain power. Meanwhile, de Klerk is trying to build up countervailing forces to state socialism among local governments, private industry, and both white and black businessmen, so that no matter who is in charge, private enterprise will dominate the economy and private property will be protected.

Without question, the key to de Klerk’s efforts to secure South Africa’s future is the abolition of apartheid laws and the admission of black South Africans to a share of power, while safeguarding property rights and group rights. But South Africa must also reduce its bureaucracy, diminish the role of the state in the economy, privatize state-controlled industries, phase out exchange controls, stabilize the value of its currency, and end subsidies to inefficient industries. With the formal end of apartheid, all of the United States’s 1986 sanctions against South Africa were lifted on July 10, 1991, meaning that all restrictions on exports (coal, uranium, Krugerrands, iron, steel, agricultural products, clothing) and imports (oil, advanced technology, sales to government) will be abolished, and disinvestment will end (the European Community already lifted its sanctions in mid-1990). The expansion of trade should create more jobs, hopefully contributing to a reduction in violence and crime among unemployed youth, and provide more funds for housing, schools, and medical care. Obviously, the politicized and undereducated black youth of the 1980s will have to be trained for jobs; even the ANC — long a proponent of “liberation before education” — has begun to counsel black youths to return to school. But fortunately, the massive rebuilding needed in urban townships could provide work for five hundred thousand or more youths, and the development of the neglected homelands should provide employment for several hundreds of thousands more.

Tensions among Blacks

Although blacks outnumber whites five to one, blacks are badly divided, and black on black violence has slowed progress towards black governance. There are eleven black ethnic groups in South Africa, but the division between the Xhosa-dominated ANC and Chief Buthelezi’s Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom party is doing the most to delay power sharing. The basic reason for this rift is that the ANC is unwilling to significantly modify its strategy and ideology, or to build a coalition movement. The ANC remains politically doctrinaire, and wants to dominate negotiations with de Klerk in order to form the first

black government in South Africa. The ANC sees Inkatha as a threat to its potential dominance of a post-apartheid black majority government. Advocating a federal system with a weak central government and a free market economy, Buthelezi opposes much of what the ANC stands for, and South Africa's 7.4 million Zulus — his power base — form the country's largest black ethnic community.

Not only is a divided black polity unlikely to gain power, but a black-white coalition that excludes the ANC could take shape.

The churches also are more moderate and are more willing to negotiate with the government than the ANC, SACP, PAC, or AZAPO. Churchmen, such as Bishop Desmond Tutu, the Reverend Allan Boesak, and the Catholic bishops call for an end of sanctions and violence, and for the formation of black coalition groups.⁷ All this is to the good and reduces the influence of the ANC, which will have to disassociate itself from the SACP and its discredited ideology of socialism before moderate blacks, especially South Africa's five to six million evangelical Christians, will support it. Church-led moderate groups could easily come to peaceful agreements with de Klerk and his government. De Klerk has, in fact, made overtures to a number of church leaders.

The various black organizations remain relatively weak — subject to financial and organizational weaknesses, and beset by internal dissensions, black on black rivalries, and violence. The ANC remains the strongest group, but it is losing support because of its intimidation tactics and occasional calls for a return to armed struggle; this decline in support is noticeable among all groups except young radicals and old militants. De Klerk has specifically called on the ANC to stop intimidation and undemocratic mass actions, and warned he would strengthen the security system to stop violence and intimidation.⁸

Furthermore, the ANC is becoming an increasingly schizophrenic organization, internally divided into a radical and a moderate wing. The trial of Winnie Mandela, on charges of complicity in murder, has brought this division into stark relief. Winnie Mandela stands with the young radicals and the militants who are willing to use any means — including murder and intimidation — to gain power. Her faction represents the militancy that causes many whites to fear for the future of democracy and justice in a new South Africa. Despite increased government flexibility, the radicals have been using intimidation, creating underground cells, and infiltrating ANC guerillas into South Africa.⁹

⁷ See, for example, *This Week in South Africa: News Highlights from the South African Media*, February, March, and April 1991 issues. See also Peter Duignan, "The Future of South Africa," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, May 15, 1990, pp. 470-72; and Allan A. Boesak, "South Africa Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, May 15, 1990, pp. 464-68.

⁸ See *This Week in South Africa*, April, May, and June 1991 issues for newspaper accounts of de Klerk's pronouncements concerning the ANC.

⁹ See Francis Fukuyama, "The Next South Africa," *The National Interest*, Summer 1991, pp. 13-28.

There are, however, moderates in the ANC — such as ANC president Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and many of the union leaders, including the new ANC general secretary, Matamela Ramaphosa — who trust in peaceful negotiations to win black rule. They are willing to compromise and to wait for a democratic South Africa, and they oppose the policies of intimidation. It is with the ANC moderates that the government has made a deal, and de Klerk hopes to involve them in the transition to black governance.

The white government is currently allowing the ANC and other blacks to become involved in all areas of government through joint management committees. This not only serves as a training program, but also builds consensus for governmental acts and locks black leaders into formal cooperation with the government. In problem areas, such as social welfare benefits, the ANC refuses to take joint responsibility, and calls for immediate racial parity. But, as in previous disagreements, the ANC is likely to back down in order to continue the process of black empowerment — and to avoid its own marginalization. Not only is a divided black polity unlikely to gain power, but a black-white coalition that excludes the ANC could take shape. Although de Klerk has made an effort to keep the ANC involved in the reform process, he has alternatives. If the ANC proves unacceptably disruptive, the white government can turn to the Zulus and other conservative blacks, Indians, and Coloureds to win a majority of seats in parliament. Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom party is fighting the ANC for parity of esteem and political influence, and Buthelezi is more supportive of de Klerk. If Inkatha were to enter into a coalition with the now-multiracial National party, this white-black coalition could deny the ANC a majority in future elections. The ANC leadership therefore will have to compromise.¹⁰ In fact, the recent ANC leadership elections in early July 1991, brought a number of moderate black leaders to the fore to replace some of the older leaders.

Black on black violence, however, casts a cloud over much of the progress that has been made, and remains the greatest obstacle to a peaceful transfer of power in South Africa. It threatens to divide Zulu and Xhosa peoples irrevocably in post-apartheid South Africa. Mass killings have become common, disrupting urban life and the economy, while making whites fearful for a future when power will be wielded by blacks who seem incapable of cooperating peacefully among themselves. The best hope for a successful negotiated transfer of power from whites to blacks would be a united coalition of black groups with a common platform, although such a coalition would still have to find a way to control its youth, who now constitute over 50 percent of the black population. If black factions remain divided, whites will probably bring only moderate blacks into the government, and more radical groups like the ANC will risk isolation. In fact, the ANC is likely to split before allowing itself to be excluded from power for the sins of its radical wing, and its moderates would

¹⁰ *This Week in South Africa*, April, May, and June 1991 issues; see also Fukuyama "The Next South Africa."

add additional strength to a black-white coalition. The ANC radical wing, strong as it is, could not undermine a black-white coalition government. The radicals failed in their armed struggle against a beleaguered white minority government from outside, and they are most likely to fail from within as well against a government with substantial black, Coloured, and Indian support.

In a recent survey done by the Human Sciences Research Council, President de Klerk and ANC president Nelson Mandela are the two most acceptable leaders among all South Africans. De Klerk, however, has broader support among the entire population than Mandela. The findings give Mandela 45 percent of the black vote, but only 1 percent of Coloureds, 5 percent of Indians, and 4 percent of whites. De Klerk received 51 percent of the white vote, 66 percent among Coloureds, 48 percent among Indians, and 25 percent among blacks.¹¹ So even in a one man/one vote election, de Klerk might become president of South Africa.

Politics in the New South Africa

Since coming to power in 1989, de Klerk has striven to maintain control of the reform process; he has undercut the ANC by meeting most of its demands, moving to end apartheid and negotiate power sharing. As long as whites remain in charge of the process, power will be voluntarily surrendered rather than seized; the result should be a peaceful transfer of power to the black majority, but with specific protection for whites, Indians, and Coloureds, and assurances that private enterprise and a market system will operate.

Recently, de Klerk once again seized the initiative from the ANC. ANC leaders wanted to delay a constitutional conference until they won further concessions, but de Klerk preempted their objections by setting an early date. The ANC also wanted the constitutional assembly to be elected by universal suffrage; de Klerk rejected this idea as well, and instead called for a multiparty conference to draft a new constitution and establish an interim government. (Ironically, Mandela was the first to call for an all-party conference — on January 8, 1991 — but de Klerk seized on the idea and made it his own.) De Klerk also announced that he would not cede all power to an interim group, but wanted a transitional arrangement whereby party leaders would have a say in legislative and executive decisions.

Such a multiparty constitutional conference now has the support of all relevant parties except AZAPO and PAC. Even Treurnicht's Conservative party agreed to attend the forum; Treurnicht told his supporters that the Conservatives had to attend or become irrelevant in future politics.¹² The ANC postured at first, threatening to "return to the era of bombs" if the government did not meet all its demands by April 30.¹³ This threat was criticized by many, including

¹¹ *This Week in South Africa*, April 1-6, 1991.

¹² *This Week in South Africa*, January 21-25, 1991.

¹³ *This Week in South Africa*, February 1-5, 1991.

many moderate blacks and black church leaders, who regularly chastise the ANC for refusing to foreswear violence, for not cooperating with other black opposition groups, and for continuing to call for sanctions against South Africa.

In a speech before parliament on February 1, 1991, de Klerk again outflanked his black political opponents, and may have paved the way for joint rule and interracial nation building under a new constitution. This speech, entitled "Manifesto for the New South Africa," sets forth democratic principles of the rule of law, a bill of rights, justice, universal suffrage, and a free market economic system. The manifesto seems aimed to counter the ANC's Freedom Charter, and will serve as the basis for a national debate about the new government and constitutional system. Some political analysts, such as Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, now say that the ANC has been outmaneuvered and has effectively lost the battle for a transition strategy.¹⁴

South Africa's Economic Strength

There will be far-reaching economic changes in South Africa in the 1990s. Blacks will continue to move into managerial and administrative positions, and the balance of power within South Africa will gradually shift in their favor, both socially and demographically. Wages for employed blacks will continue to rise, while the "informal sector" of the economy will continue to grow, providing a basic livelihood for those officially classified as unemployed. The South African sociologist Lawrence Schlemmer estimates that there are over 650,000 unrecorded, unlicensed, and nontaxed businesses in the informal sector. They sell items such as fruit, vegetables, clothes, building materials, and soft drinks; they work as hawkers, mechanics, welders, builders, and the like; and they run small businesses including service stations, repair shops, and car washes. An estimated 40 percent of the households in Durban derive their income from the informal sector. In South Africa as a whole, as much as 30 percent of blacks' incomes are derived from the informal sector.¹⁵

There will be an increasing dichotomy between blacks with relatively well-paid positions in the mainstream and those who have to eke out a living outside the formal sector or in Third World-like homelands. The next few years will probably witness a steadily rising demand for redistribution of wealth through political means. Sanctions against South Africa are being lifted — even the United States's Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986 has become inoperable, as all of its conditions will have been met — and trade and investment should reinvigorate the South African economy.

Whatever their political assumptions, demographers agree that by the year 2000, South Africa will have a population of perhaps fifty million, vastly

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Wilva Botha, "Durban's Urgent Challenge: The People Coming Over the Hills," *The Condenser*, 1988, p. 8. See also Gann and Duignan, *Hope for South Africa*, p. 55; and Giliomee and Schlemmer, *From Apartheid to Nation Building*.

larger than today's thirty-one million.¹⁶ This population will be heavily concentrated in existing urban areas. The Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging complex may become a gigantic conurbation containing nearly as many people as the whole of South Africa during the 1950s. There will be new cities in places such as Saldanha and Richards Bay. The proportion of whites to blacks will be somewhat reduced (from under one in five to one in six or seven); nevertheless, every ethnic segment of the population will have grown extensively. The populations of neighboring countries inextricably linked to South Africa — Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, and Namibia — will also swell. How will those people make a living? Much will depend on South Africa's economic growth and domestic politics. But South Africa does have a solid economic base on which to build, and if peace and reform prevail, the prospects are bright for both South Africa and the whole southern African region to which it is tied.

Demographers agree that by the year 2000, South Africa will have a population of perhaps fifty million, vastly larger than today's thirty-one million.

South Africa's resources. Although the world has become increasingly concerned about the long-term provision of fuel and ores, South Africa is in the fortunate position of being less dependent on imported fuels than most other countries. South Africa relies on domestically mined coal for about 75 percent of its energy needs. Coal production is expected to expand greatly, from 175 million tons to between 230 and 250 millions tons per annum by the year 2000.¹⁷ And economists foresee a tremendous increase in the production of other base minerals, such as chrome, iron ore, manganese, vanadium, asbestos, fluorspar, and phosphates. South Africa possesses about a quarter of the world's uranium resources and has made considerable advances in nuclear technology; a five thousand-ton uranium enrichment plant was commissioned in 1984. Hence, the energy picture seems reasonably secure, especially if one counts the new gas fields of Mossel Bay.

The relative importance of the gold industry is likely to decline, although the downward trend could be delayed by a long-term rise in gold prices. But, given the importance of gold in South Africa's export economy, South Africans will have to make major readjustments as the country's gold resources become exhausted, investing in alternative export industries. In 1974, the value of South Africa's gold production amounted to 81 percent of its merchandise export; in 1989, it was about 40 percent. In 1991, 20 percent of the gold mines were being shut down because they were uneconomical to run.¹⁸

¹⁶ Leo Katzen, "South Africa's Economy" in *Africa South of the Sahara 1989* (London: Europa Publications, 1988), p. 935. See also Gann and Duignan, *Hope for South Africa*, p. 61.

¹⁷ See Schlemmer et al., *South Africa at the End of the Eighties*, p. 213. See also Peter Duignan, "The Future of South Africa," *The World and I*, December 1989, p. 116.

¹⁸ See *This Week in South Africa*, May and June 1991 issues.

The country's agricultural future is harder to delineate. For the time being, South Africans not only have enough to eat, but also are able to export food to their neighbors. Farming methods might improve through increased mechanization and fertilization, improved planning, and use of better seeds. But the fate of agriculture will depend on that of the cities. Unless industries create more jobs in the cities and the new homeland towns for those displaced, the homelands cannot adopt better agricultural methods that use much less labor than at present.

South Africa may be faced with a severe shortage of water, if existing catchment, storage, and transportation techniques remain basically unchanged; rainfall continues to be the major water source; and subterranean water sources remain relatively insignificant. In 1974, South Africa had more water than it needed, but the 1980s saw drought conditions prevail at times. By the turn of the century, the country may experience a water deficit amounting to 30 percent of demand. If that deficit cannot be met, South Africa will be unable to supply all its own food. Cereal and oil crops may run up deficits of about 20 percent by 1995 and around 50 percent by 2000.¹⁹ Although such estimates are a cause for great concern, a water shortage in South Africa would probably not produce the disastrous effects that droughts have wrought upon other African countries of lesser means; South Africa could cope with a water shortage by undertaking major desalinization projects, cutting back its water consumption, and making major modifications in certain farming practices. In any case, these long-range climatological forecasts remain highly speculative.

Southern Africa. South Africa forms the cornerstone of a wider system of southern African states. South African railways, harbors, and airports play a key role in the commerce of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho, all of which are landlocked countries. Namibia is heavily dependent on its connections with South Africa, which supplies it with export markets, marketing facilities, price stability, and relatively high quality, low-priced imports. South Africa's neighbors draw to a considerable extent on its capital, know-how, and technical services; they need its ports and rails for their imports and exports. This dependence may diminish in the future thanks to the efforts of the southern African states grouped in the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)²⁰ and of aid donors, but it is not likely to disappear.

South Africa's economic influence extends to states in the SADCC and beyond, including some that have taken a militantly anti-South Africa stand. Zaire's and Zambia's reliance on South African supplies and transport has increased, for example, despite their public criticism. Even Mozambique needs South African help in a variety of fields, especially in selling its electric power and developing ports and railways.

¹⁹ Schlemmer et al., *South Africa at the End of the Eighties*, p. 202. See also Duignan, "The Future of South Africa," pp. 116-17.

²⁰ The members of the SADCC are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Namibia.

South Africa benefits from these ties with its neighbors, as well. For example, it had a trade surplus of 3 billion rand with them in 1990, and in recent years, South Africa has earned almost \$350 million annually in transport fees from the region.²¹ A policy must be found that promotes mutually beneficial interactions among the states of southern Africa. South Africa's leaders appear to see the value of political changes that maximize cooperation with their neighbors, and de Klerk has repeatedly spoken in favor of regional cooperation.

For the next decade at least, South Africa's SADCC neighbors will remain economically and logistically dependent on it. In all likelihood, South Africa will remain the economic giant of the continent well into the twenty-first century, and will therefore continue to influence the economies of all countries in southern Africa. If the South African economy were to suffer or collapse as a result of internal unrest, the adjoining countries would suffer in equal measure. Therefore, even if further reforms and power sharing must come to South Africa before the surrounding states will be able to cooperate fully with Pretoria for their mutual benefit, southern African leaders must realize that they have a stake in supporting South Africa. If racial politics impels them to undermine Pretoria, this will be done at the expense of their own countries' economies and prosperity.

Any common-market arrangement will benefit South Africa more than the other southern African states, for South Africa would naturally gain the largest share of investment. The SADCC offers possibilities for balanced regional growth — if only peace could break out in this region, which has been plagued by wars (in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia) and other forms of scattered violence (in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Zaire, and other places).

The benefits of balanced, peaceful interaction in southern Africa are many. Other southern African states could get South African goods that are suited for their economies at competitive prices, and could export more to a prosperous South Africa. The region could share in South Africa's technology and specialized research in fields such as agriculture, education, mining, and machinery. All the region's economies would benefit from South Africa's ability to attract foreign investment and multinationals. South Africa provides a large market and a good trade infrastructure for the entire region. South Africa's railways and harbors offer an efficient outlet to overseas markets, and its air transport is well suited for regional service.

Conclusion

There are basically three possible scenarios for South Africa's future. Optimists say that whites will share power with blacks, but will maintain near-

²¹ The Economist Intelligence Unit, *South Africa* (London: The Economist, 1991), pp. 49-50. See also Duignan, "The Future of South Africa," p. 115; and Peter L. Berger and Bobby Godsell, eds., *A Future South Africa: Visions, Strategies, and Realities* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1988), pp. 157-59.

parity of power with a divided black polity for the foreseeable future. This racial power sharing will limit the ability of the ANC and other radical forces to socialize the economy and push for redistribution of wealth. The return of investment and a reopening of markets will gradually modernize the whole country, bringing rural blacks slowly into the developed world. Whites will have to accept some decline in their living standards as welfare benefits are more equitably shared with blacks. A black middle class will emerge, equal in status and wealth to the whites, although the majority of blacks, for some time to come, will remain in transition from Third World to developed world conditions. And, even though they will be better off than before in terms of jobs, wages, and social benefits, their per capita income will remain comparable to that of a middle-income country, such as Mexico.

A second possibility would be that a post-apartheid South Africa would approximate the Latin American experience of economic decline resulting from government mismanagement, redistribution of wealth, inflation, and high unemployment. The last and most disturbing scenario for South Africa's future resembles a fragmented, war-torn Mozambique or Lebanon, with ethnic, political, and social groups fighting against each other or against radical black dominance.²²

The optimistic scenario faces harrowing difficulties, but it does not depend just on de Klerk. Most whites are committed to ending apartheid and power sharing. Even if de Klerk fails, others will seek to work out a solution. Although successful, nonviolent dismantlings of entrenched regimes are rare, South Africans have shown they can pull it off. They pressured whites in Rhodesia to seek accommodation with black rebels, and they engineered the peaceful transition to independence of Namibia, their "fifth province," reaching a moderate settlement with black Marxists. Zimbabwe and Namibia have been conflict-free for ten years and two years, respectively, and their economies have prospered. In both states, whites have chosen to remain after blacks assumed power; all this provides grounds to be optimistic about the ability of South African whites to find solutions.

If blacks win power in South Africa, that power will be limited by a constitution and a bill of rights, and by the fact that no single black group is likely to win an overwhelming majority of votes in an election. Power in South Africa will be given to moderates, both black and white. The armed struggle failed; terrorism failed. Only peaceful negotiations have done away with apartheid, only compromise and cooperation will bring blacks to power, and only economic moderation can restore the economy to its earlier high rates of growth.

De Klerk clearly intends to be in charge until a black government comes to power. He seems capable of maintaining control and extracting concessions from black leaders. He is determined to preserve minority rights in a constitutional system with a bill of rights and an independent judiciary. By fully

²² For an analysis of the three options facing South Africa, see Fukuyama, "The Next South Africa."

privatizing the economy, he hopes to weaken the large, over-regulating bureaucracy that ties it down, and establish countervailing forces to limit any black successor government. By ending apartheid, he is eliminating the main obstacle to South Africa's integration into the world economy and into potentially beneficial regional arrangements. Certainly, whites will have to surrender not only some political power, but also some land and property — hard sacrifices, but far less costly than bloody repression and a ruined economy.

In any event, the chances that an armed revolution will take place in South Africa in this century now seem remote. At worst, if certain black groups are unhappy with the form of power sharing that is offered, South Africans may once again have to face more of the low-intensity guerrilla action and terrorism to which they have grown accustomed.

Hopefully, the threat of a socialist black government that seeks to nationalize the economy and suppress dissent will be avoided, and a prosperous South Africa will emerge from the ruins of apartheid. De Klerk has outlined a reasonable program for reform, and, because his government is keeping a firm hand on the transition process, he has a good chance of achieving his goals. If he succeeds, the whole of southern Africa stands to prosper, for South Africa is the economic dynamo for the region. De Klerk's government is doing everything possible to insure that there will be no political takeover in South Africa.

The United States's role in the transition from apartheid is limited but important. Firstly, now that Washington has done away with its anti-apartheid law of 1986, Americans must begin to trade with and invest in South Africa. Foreign investment is crucial for achieving the 4 or 5 percent annual growth rate that South Africa will need to provide jobs for the unemployed and revenues for the government. After years of disinvestment and boycotts, Americans must begin to think in terms of investment and trade. Secondly, Washington should apply whatever pressure and influence it can bring to bear on the ANC to break with the Communist party, adopt free market approaches, and reject the failed socialist model of redistributive justice. Those in Congress who yearn for an immediate ANC takeover should seriously consider the tragic effects of radical takeovers elsewhere. Thirdly, as a federal, constitutional republic with a bill of rights protecting a multiracial, multi-ethnic population, the United States has much to teach a South Africa struggling to become a just, democratic society.

ANC-Inspired Violence Poses a Threat

by Michael Radu

South Africa is going through a violent, uncertain, and often puzzling process of change that confuses South Africans and foreigners alike. On the one hand, a growing consensus exists that apartheid is dead, or at the very least dying; on the other, the political and economic stability of the country is more precarious than ever.

South African president F.W. de Klerk has repeatedly referred to South Africa as a "developing country,"¹ a potentially radical reassessment of a country whose white government has for decades defined itself as Western, Christian, and European. De Klerk may now be acknowledging a turn toward the "Africanization" of South Africa. Whether de Klerk's definition of South Africa as a developing country represents a sober recognition of an increasingly obvious reality, or merely a rhetorical flourish, however, is largely immaterial; without question, today's South Africa has little in common with the South Africa of even a few years ago. South Africa's political landscape is today characterized by three major and often contradictory trends. The first is a tendency among non-blacks to coalesce around the ruling National party; the second is the growing political and ideological division among black organizations; and the third is the heightened level of black intra-ethnic strife.

Race and Politics

The first trend is the most interesting yet least noticed: the change in the political expression of interracial relations. Before the 1984 Constitution, which gave the franchise and separate parliament chambers to Coloureds² and Indians,³ the situation could be fairly characterized as whites against everybody

¹ "De Klerk Announces New Development Program," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa* (hereafter FBIS, SA), April 30, 1991, from Johannesburg South Africa Press Agency (SAPA), April 29, 1991.

² The Coloureds, numbering over three million, are the descendants of white men and Malay, Khoi (Hottentot), and black women. With the exception of a minority of Moslems, the Coloureds are basically darker-skinned Afrikaners: Afrikaans-speaking Calvinists. The large majority of them live in the Western Cape, and they make up 60 percent of the population of Cape Town, the country's second-largest city.

³ The one million Asians, virtually all descendants of laborers on the Natal sugar plantations imported from British India during the last century, are still concentrated in Natal in general and in greater Durban in particular. Almost two-thirds are Hindu, and most of the others are Muslim.

Michael Radu, currently a resident scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, was a lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. He has edited or co-edited several books on Sub-Saharan Africa, the most recent being *The Dynamics of Soviet Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Holmes and Meier, 1991).

else. Since then, a situation has been emerging in which non-blacks — largely united behind de Klerk's National party — are aligned against the divided blacks. This trend is evident among all three non-black communities — whites, Coloureds, and Asians — and particularly among the first two.

Afrikaners. In the late 1970s, when P.W. Botha began a cycle of modest reforms, hardline white supporters of apartheid broke with the ruling National party and, under the leadership of Andries Treurnicht, founded the Conservative party. Paradoxically, it was opposition to Botha's rather lackadaisical reforms that elevated the Conservatives to the position of legal opposition in the 1987 elections, while the far more radical dismantling of apartheid under President F.W. de Klerk since 1990 has coincided with the Conservatives' decline. A March 1991 poll among whites had de Klerk with 53 percent support against 18 percent for Treurnicht, compared with 41 percent and 27 percent, respectively, in February 1990.⁴

Since Treurnicht's support came almost exclusively from Afrikaners, his decline suggests greater Afrikaner acceptance of reform and the dismantling of apartheid. The three main branches of the Dutch Reformed church, to which virtually all Afrikaners belong, have condemned apartheid as sin, as has the formerly secretive and still influential Broederbond, the Afrikaner elite's cultural association. Even rural Afrikaners, traditionally the most conservative sector, are no longer united against reform. The pro-de Klerk South African Agricultural Union has distanced itself from the smaller and more radical Transvaal Agricultural Union in the wake of the momentous Goedgenvonden events of May 1991, when Afrikaner farmers who were trying forcibly to remove black squatters from a white-owned farm in Goedgenvonden were fired upon by the police.⁵ Several of the Afrikaner farmers were wounded, and the very fact that de Klerk allowed the police to use potentially deadly force against them — just as he threatened to use police force during their "march on Pretoria" in January 1991 — suggests that he is certain of a strong majority of Afrikaner (or at least white) political support, and that he is committed to preserving law and order regardless of race or the political risks involved.

Afrikaners on the far right are becoming less of a threat to the National party government because they are leaderless, disorganized, and divided according to program, ideology, and personalities. The Right is divided among nationalists who advocate an Afrikaner state, or *Volkstaat* (the Boer State party, the Afrikaner Resistance Movement); supporters of old style apartheid (the Reformed National party); populists; and fringe Transvaal, Cape, or Orange Free State separatists, comprising some twenty small groups, none of which is well organized or has a charismatic leader. Even Treurnicht is a rather boring and ineffectual leader. The fiercely racist militant Eugene Terre'Blanche of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement may be more electrifying, but he is a poor organizer, and has lost much credibility as a result of his messy personal life.

⁴ "De Klerk Gaining in Polls; Treurnicht Falling," FBIS, SA, May 17, 1991, from *Beeld*, March 18, 1991.

⁵ *The Citizen*, May 16, 1991. See also *Business Day*, May 13, 1991.

White liberals. Like the Afrikaner right-wingers, the largely English-speaking liberals of the Democratic party have no credible program or leaders. Not only has de Klerk appropriated some aspects of their never-clear program, but he has also attracted some of their best politicians, most important ex-parliamentarian Harry Schwartz, who now serves as South Africa's ambassador to Washington. The collapse of the liberal white parties — the Democratic party as a whole is now more interested in figuring out how to join the National party rather than whether to do so — and the marginalization of the right wing have produced a concentration of political support among whites for the Nationalists and de Klerk.

Nelson Mandela himself admitted that the African National Congress has only scant support from non-blacks.

Coloureds. Also important is the growing desertion of the black cause by Coloureds. For years, Coloureds were associated with the cause of black rights, which was championed by such Coloured personalities as Allan Boesak, former president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. The community as a whole now seems to be moving toward rapprochement with the whites.

When the ruling Afrikaner-dominated National party announced in February 1991 that it would become a multiracial party, it immediately gained massive Coloured political support. In March, large numbers of Coloured voters in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area and in Soweto's Coloured suburbs spontaneously decided to join the National party.⁶ Soon afterward, thirty-six of the eighty-five members of the Coloured House of Representatives — most from opposition parties, but also some from the dominant Labor party — decided to join the National party.⁷ Even the Labor party's national secretary, Abe Williams, defected to the National party.⁸

Added to these defections is the adoption of a conciliatory stance toward the National party by the leader of the still-dominant Coloured Labor party, the Reverend Allan Hendrickse. Although Hendrickse remains bitter at the defectors, he is willing to accept the possibility of a coalition with the National party. Hendrickse is also becoming increasingly strident in his criticism of the African National Congress (ANC), which claims to lead anti-apartheid forces. Considering that few parliamentarians would risk their political futures by supporting the ruling, previously all-white party unless they were sure that their constituents approved of such a shift, the conclusion that Coloured voters are favorably inclined towards the Nationalists is inescapable. A June 1991 poll suggested that 49 percent of Coloureds supported the National party, 10 per-

⁶ "Coloreds in Transvaal Said to be Joining NP," FBIS, SA, May 17, 1991, from *Beeld*, March 8, 1991.

⁷ *The Citizen*, May 20, 1991; see also *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 3, 1991.

⁸ "LP National Secretary Resigns; Will Join NP," FBIS, SA, May 30, 1991, from Johannesburg SAPA, May 28, 1991.

cent favored the Labor party, and 9 percent backed the ANC. As for leaders, de Klerk received 53 percent support among Coloureds, compared with only 3 percent for ANC president Nelson Mandela.⁹

The explanation for this attitude, which seems to encompass the entire Coloured community, is that the Coloureds' cultural affinity with the Afrikaners — and their fear of black rule and of losing their relatively privileged economic status — makes race less relevant to them than ideology and self-interest. The marked lack of enthusiasm among Coloureds for the prospect of a black — presumably ANC — takeover is nothing new: in polls taken in 1987, 44 percent of Coloured respondents did not want a black leader of South Africa.¹⁰

Asians. The Asians, although divided by religion — with the Hindu majority more conservative and more professionally inclined (teachers, bankers, lawyers) than the Muslims — have a strong stake in a Nationalist-led system. Many Asians see the power of white South Africa as their protection against the sort of black racism that occurred during the Zulu pogroms of 1949 in Durban,¹¹ so they too offer little support for the type of change represented by the socialist ANC and its allies. Natal Indians in particular feel caught in the crossfire between Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi's Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom party on the one hand and the ANC and its local allies on the other. All indications are that, in free and secret elections, the majority of Asians would vote for the National party, as the sole guarantor against East Africa-style black racism against Indians,¹² an anticapitalist ANC regime, and a majority-rule government in which they would be totally submerged. At the ANC's July 1991 congress, Mandela himself admitted that the ANC has only scant support from non-blacks, and that those minorities "might have fears about the future."¹³

Black Divisions

Whereas non-black politics appear to be coalescing around the National party, black politics are witnessing a strong centrifugal trend, with ethnicity and ideology as the main causes of fragmentation, and escalating violence among blacks as the result.

Ethnicity. The role of ethnicity or, as the international media have misleadingly dubbed it, "tribalism,"¹⁴ in South Africa is as controversial as it is obvious. For the ANC and most liberal elites in South Africa and abroad, ethnic animosities — to the extent that they are acknowledged at all — are considered

⁹ *The Sunday Times*, June 16, 1991.

¹⁰ Willie Esterhuysen and Philip Nel, eds., *The ANC and Its Leaders* (Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers, 1990), pp. 76-77.

¹¹ *South Africa: Time Running Out*, The Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1981), p. 45.

¹² For an analysis of Indian reactions to the fall of apartheid, and of black-Indian racial incidents in Natal today, see *The Citizen*, June 18, 1991.

¹³ *The New York Times*, July 3, 1991.

¹⁴ An ethnic group is defined by language and culture, while a tribe is a social group tracing its ancestry to the same individuals. Thus, both Zulus and Xhosas, South Africa's two largest black ethnic groups, are divided into numerous, sometimes mutually hostile, tribes.

part of the poisonous inheritance of apartheid. Thus Mzala, a prominent South African Communist party (SACP) and ANC ideologue, claimed that “division of the oppressed people into ethnic groups” was an essential component of the white government’s political strategy.¹⁵ While apartheid did encourage the development of ethnic consciousness among various black groups, the implication that apartheid essentially created such ethnic divisions is absurd. The white South African government did not invent Zulus (currently numbering about seven million), Xhosas (five million), or the smaller ethnic groups, all of which have existed for many centuries, with their own languages, cultural characteristics, and often very different attitudes toward the presence of Europeans.

Nor has the government created the enmity that divides black ethnic groups. The Zulus appeared in history as aggressors against, and often destroyers of, smaller black peoples — a memory that is hard to forget among Xhosas, Sothos, and Tswanas in South Africa and among the Shona in Zimbabwe. Whether the widespread images of the Zulu as a born warrior and of the Xhosa as an intelligent schemer, shared by blacks and non-blacks alike, are in any sense justified is not the point; such attitudes exist and people act upon them. To deny the obvious, as the ANC and some other radical black parties do, is dangerous and unrealistic. Violence among black groups has deep historical roots and is not solely the product of government action.

The process of rapid black urbanization in South Africa has had a strong impact upon ethnic consciousness, inasmuch as urban blacks tend to be less ethnically parochial, but it has not had an equal impact on all black groups. The Zulus, Tswanas, and Vendas, for example, are far less urbanized than the Xhosas or South Sothos. The Zulus have maintained many of their traditions, including their monarchy, and remain concentrated in KwaZulu. The Xhosas are the most heavily urbanized, best educated, and most militant black people, but are also the most divided between rural and urban elements, and between the Ciskei and the Transkei sub-groups.

A recent influx of rural Transkei Xhosa migrants into Soweto and other townships in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area has resulted in what the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression, a nongovernmental group, called a “a surge in Xhosa nationalism.”¹⁶ In one manifestation of this, Transkei Xhosa squatters in an East Rand camp booed the ANC’s Chris Hani, himself a Transkei Xhosa, when he tried to mention Zulu contributions to the ANC, and drowned his speech with tribal songs. They also attacked a neighboring camp after hearing that Zulus might be living there. More important, Xhosas as a group tend to insist that the ANC is a Xhosa organization, and that Zulus are not welcome its leadership.¹⁷ This is ironic in light of ANC history, for even though the ANC is now dominated by Xhosas, many — perhaps a majority

¹⁵ Mzala, “The Bantustan System is at the Centre of Natal Violence,” *The African Communist*, no. 123, Fourth Quarter, 1990, p. 36.

¹⁶ *The Star*, May 21, 1991.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

— of the organization's founders were Zulus, as was its most prominent leader before Mandela, Nobel Peace Prize winner Chief Albert Luthuli.

The Zulus have always taken pride in their history and in their traditional domination of other ethnic groups, demographically as well as militarily. They strongly resent ANC attacks against them and their leaders, King Goodwill Zwelethini and Chief Buthelezi. Yet, ironically, it was only after years of cultivating Buthelezi as a potential ally that the then-exiled ANC leadership began in 1979 to attack him as a government stooge.¹⁸ Although the reasons for this change cannot be known with certainty, some evidence exists to support Buthelezi's claim that the ANC turned on him in frustration only after it realized that it could not control or manipulate him. For example, even Mzala, who has practically made a career of attacking Buthelezi, admits that in 1979 "the ANC still hoped that Chief Buthelezi could shoulder certain tasks given to him."¹⁹

In a recent interview, Buthelezi, admittedly ultra-sensitive to criticism of himself or his people, pointed out that the ANC has called for the dismantling of KwaZulu, which he fairly described as "the only autonomous state not created by the homeland policy."²⁰ He might also have pointed out the inconsistency in the present ANC position on homelands, or bantustans. The ANC has forged close links with bantustans, such as Transkei and Venda, both of which are led by ANC sympathizers and have accepted "independence" from Pretoria (a status that has received no international recognition outside South Africa); on the other hand, the ANC demands the abolition of KwaZulu (which rejected independence) and Bophuthatswana (whose leader is anti-ANC).

Ideology. Although most international attention is concentrated on the ANC-Inkatha conflict, owing to its radical and violent nature, other black groups play a role in the turmoil as well, and some, particularly the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), have the potential to expand their influence and increase their violent activities. Both of these groups are implicitly racist in their ideology, and have in fact broken with the ANC precisely because they could not accept the presence of whites in their membership or leadership.

PAC, the larger of the two, has constantly talked about armed struggle and still rallies its members with the slogan "one settler — one bullet," but so far such rhetoric is limited to words alone. PAC also advocates central economic planning, the nationalization of industry, and the redistribution of land at the expense of whites.²¹ Such programs and rhetoric, as well as the unwillingness of PAC and AZAPO to participate in negotiations with the government, are growing increasingly attractive to many radical black youths, and both groups are making inroads in the large but uncommitted mass of ANC supporters in the

¹⁸ Interview with Buthelezi, *Leadership*, March 1990, p. 74.

¹⁹ Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda* (London: Zed Books, 1988), p. 127.

²⁰ "Buthelezi on Relations with Government, ANC," FBIS, S4, May 23, 1991, from *Svenska Dagbladet*, May 19, 1991.

²¹ For a brief description, see Shelagh Gastrow, *Who's Who in South African Politics*, 3rd edition (London: Hans Zell Publishers), pp. 145-47.

Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area and the Transkei. Nevertheless, the ANC remains the key to understanding South Africa's black politics today and the roots of violence in that country.

Violence and the ANC

Violence, sometimes but not usually mindless and unfocused, is the main threat to the fabric of South Africa, particularly among the blacks. The number of people killed in factional, ethnic, or political violence has increased steadily since the beginning of 1990, when the de Klerk government legalized all anti-apartheid groups, released Nelson Mandela, and started dismantling discriminatory legislation.²² The lifting of the state of emergency was a necessary prerequisite for political freedom, but it also benefitted those whose main instrument of political expression is violence, as well as other assorted thugs and rabble rousers disguised as political activists.

The ANC blames the police and an undefined, sinister "third force" for the factional and ethnic violence that divides the blacks of South Africa, but there is little substantial evidence to support these claims.²³ It pressed for and obtained a lifting of the state of emergency that put a lid on the violence, and some prominent ANC leaders, such as Winnie Mandela, demanded that the police stay out of the townships altogether. Now, as the black casualty figures mount alarmingly, with ANC supporters suffering at least proportionately, ANC leaders have begun to complain about the absence of police presence and about the perceived inability or unwillingness of the government to halt the violence. If the ANC's original intention was to create a vacuum of law enforcement to be filled by the ANC's own forces, the idea seems to have backfired badly; the ANC's solution — the formation of "self-defense units" that are in fact vigilante militias under the control of the the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe — only serves to increase the anarchy.²⁴ (Umkhonto is also known as Mkhonto, the MK, or "Spear of the Nation," its meaning in Zulu.)

Furthermore, almost every other black anti-apartheid group — including AZAPO, Inkatha, and PAC — has claimed at one point or another to have been the target of deadly attacks by the ANC or its related groups. At the same time, there have been no indications of significant violence among the other major black groups: Inkatha against PAC, Inkatha against AZAPO, or PAC against AZAPO. Black victims of ANC violence have often made a claim that turns the ANC's theories of a government conspiracy on its head: namely, that the ANC wishes to portray itself as the only alternative to white rule, and is willing to resort to violent means to suppress its competitors. For example, AZAPO

²² According to government figures, 771 persons were killed during the first four months of 1991, compared to 754 for the same period of 1990. *The Citizen*, May 7, 1991.

²³ See, for example, ANC Department of Political Education, "Let the People Decide," January 1991, p. 24.

²⁴ "Malan Criticizes ANC Self-Defense Units," FBIS, SA, April 30, 1991, from Johannesburg Domestic Service, April 26, 1991; "Hani Says Self-Defense Units Will be Formed," FBIS, SA, May 17, 1991, from Johannesburg SAPA, May 16, 1991; ANC Department of Political Education, "Let the People Decide," p. 25.

claims that ANC or ANC-associated violence in Maokeng forced it out of that area. AZAPO's publicity secretary, Srint Moodley, claimed that the campaign of violence waged against his group by the ANC and its allies (including the murder of six AZAPO members in Bekkersdal in April 1990) was a result of the ANC's "intolerance of other opinions."²⁵ Furthermore, both Nelson Mandela and ANC National Executive Committee member Jacob Zuma have admitted that the ANC holds political prisoners, the former even expressing regret over the murders of some of them in camps in Angola. Despite a vague promise to free such prisoners, the organization still refuses to say how many there are and where they are being held.²⁶

Almost every other black anti-apartheid group has claimed at one point or another to have been the target of deadly attacks by the ANC or its related groups.

In 1991, the highly respected South African Institute of Race Relations, with impeccable anti-apartheid credentials that go back for decades, claimed that "at least a third of black urban residents" have been pressured to participate in "stayaways" or boycotts at some stage. Furthermore, "four out of every five people who supported AZAPO or Inkatha claimed to have been forced to take part in boycotts or stayaways," despite the fact that neither organization supports these forms of mass action.²⁷ Recognizing that only the ANC, and its allies, and front groups — including the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), the Civic Associations, the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), and the MDM's now defunct-predecessor, the United Democratic Front (UDF) — call for boycotts and stayaways, these figures suggest that ANC-related policy decisions resulted in the intimidation. Defensive reactions on the part of the intimidated fuel the resulting cycle of violence.²⁸ For example, the famous 1974 Soweto riots, in which violent gangs of Xhosa and unemployed youths enforced boycotts and strikes, were put down brutally not only by the police, but also by Zulu men who were prevented from reaching their jobs by what they saw as disrespectful and alien children.²⁹

ANC spokesmen from Nelson Mandela down have consistently blamed others — primarily Inkatha and the government — for the black on black violence, and never admit any direct responsibility for the ANC's share in it. While all impartial observers accept that there are unruly elements in the police, and that both Inkatha and the ANC are responsible for specific acts of violence, the latter's attitudes have contributed greatly to the creation of a culture of violence

²⁵ *South Africa Update*, IFP publication, May 15-31, 1991, p. 8.

²⁶ Phillip van Niekerk, "The Long Road Back," *Leadership*, March 1990, p. 34. See also *The Sunday Times*, June 2, 1991.

²⁷ *The Sunday Times*, May 19, 1991.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Africa Contemporary Record, 1976/1977* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1977), pp. B 792-93.

and lawlessness among black South Africans in general and the urban youth in particular. A number of reasons can be suggested for this.

The myth of armed struggle. The ANC has long glorified armed struggle, despite the MK's decades of ineffectiveness. When the MK has perpetrated acts of sheer terrorism, ANC leaders have avoided responsibility. For example, commenting on the 1985 bombing of a supermarket in the black township of Amanzimtoti that left four shoppers dead, Zuma stated that "the comrade who planted the bomb . . . knew it wasn't the movement's policy to kill civilians. But he was outraged by the killing of innocent people during a SADF raid into Lesotho, and he acted on the spur of the moment."³⁰

Even more serious is the ambiguity in the ANC's position regarding armed struggle itself. Although Mandela and de Klerk reached an agreement — the "Pretoria Minute"³¹ — on August 6, 1990, in which the ANC promised to suspend armed struggle, MK recruiting continues openly in South Africa, training of new cadres still takes place in Transkei, and the establishment of an MK underground leadership continues unabated.³² Clearly the ANC's commitment to peaceful negotiations is ambiguous, and the activities mentioned above constitute, at the very least, an insurance policy in case negotiations fail.³³ Similarly, while calling for the banning of Zulu traditional weapons, the ANC refuses to give up its own prodigious arms caches and claims a right to "self-defense" units.³⁴ MK leader Hani has stated that "it would be wrong to say that there is no possibility of going back to the armed struggle."³⁵

The urban youth. Another example of ambiguity on the part of the ANC leadership concerns its attitude toward the most violent, often criminal element of the organization: the urban youth. When asked about complaints by older ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) members regarding unruly behavior by pro-ANC youths, Chris Hani sharply countered that "[w]e must refuse to mourn every day about the indiscipline of the youth . . . Their contribution outweighs [their] indiscipline . . . youth militancy must be seen as a challenge, not an irritation."³⁶

The ANC's policy of "liberation before education," which condoned the pulling of children from school to participate in mass action against the government, surely played a role in the creation of a generation of uneducated, unmanageable, and radically politicized young people in the townships. While the ANC has recently reconsidered this position, the effects of this unfortunate policy will persist among the youth for years to come.

³⁰ Niekerk, "The Long Road Back," p. 33.

³¹ The text of this document, which laid down ground rules for negotiations with the government, can be found in *Southern Africa Record*, no. 59/60, 1990, pp. 133-37.

³² Author's interview with police officials, Pretoria, February 1991. See also "ANC Urges Women to Join Military Wing," FBIS, SA, April 30, 1991, from *The Star*, April 26, 1991.

³³ Howard Barrell, *The ANC's Armed Struggle* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 69.

³⁴ *The Citizen*, May 20, 1991; *Sowetan*, May 20, 1991. See also the ANC Programme of Action, December 6, 1990, in *South African Update*, December 1990, p. 15.

³⁵ "Chris Hani on ANC Leadership Negotiations," FBIS, SA, May 2, 1991, from *New Era*, March/April/May 1991, pp. 8-11.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

Law and revolution. The ANC also seems to be having difficulties formulating a consistent position on the status of the existing legal system and the independent judiciary in South Africa. Nowhere was that better demonstrated than by the baffling array of conflicting attitudes expressed by its leaders and supporters vis-à-vis the trial of Winnie Mandela on criminal charges.

Bishop Desmond Tutu expressed his sympathy for Mrs. Mandela, but also stated his faith in the legal system, as did the ANC leadership itself, when it decided to refrain from comment until her appeal is decided.³⁷ Similarly, Nelson Mandela, the husband of the defendant and a trained lawyer, refuses to comment until the appeal is resolved — an implicit acceptance of the validity of the judicial process.³⁸ On the other hand, the ANC's Radio Freedom, stationed in Addis Ababa, proclaimed Winnie a "victim . . . who has been unlawfully tried and found guilty by an apartheid court."³⁹ And Chris Hani announced that, once in power, the ANC would immediately release her from jail.⁴⁰

ANC supporters of Winnie Mandela were also accused of kidnapping and intimidating witnesses prior to and during the trial. Two witnesses simply disappeared, and two codefendants, who could have testified for the prosecution, were spirited out of the country and obligingly jailed by the Zambian government after making damaging statements about Mrs. Mandela to the press.⁴¹ Such shady activities led some jaded Sowetans to dub the ANC "Xhosa Nostra."⁴² While contradictory reactions to Winnie Mandela's six-year sentence as an accessory to kidnapping to some extent simply reflect the mixed image she has among South Africa's blacks — she is admired for her heroism, but criticized for her penchant for luxury and preference for violent solutions — they also suggest confusion within the ANC about what constitutes impartial justice.

The ANC in Confusion

The ANC calls itself a national, multi-ethnic, multiracial, and democratic movement. But two facts about the ANC leadership suggest that its true orientation is more ideologically extreme and ethnically parochial than it claims. Firstly, without exception, all non-black members of the NEC are leading South African Communist party members. Joe Slovo and Ronnie Kasrils among the whites, Mac Maharaj, Billy Nair, and Essop Pahad among Indians, and Reginald September among Coloureds are the most prominent examples.⁴³ Secondly, apart from SACP members, the ANC leadership is an all black, overwhelmingly Xhosa group, its claims to the contrary notwithstanding.⁴⁴

³⁷ "ANC to Leave Case to Courts," FBIS, SA, May 15, 1991, from Johannesburg SAPA, May 14, 1991.

³⁸ *The Sunday Star*, May 19, 1991.

³⁹ Ibid. Interestingly, just about every Soweto resident interviewed by the author in February 1991 considered Winnie Mandela guilty of murder, although she was never officially accused of that offense.

⁴⁰ *The Star*, April 25, 1991; *Business Day*, April 25, 1991.

⁴¹ *The Sunday Times*, June 2, 1991.

⁴² Author's interviews in Soweto, February 1991.

⁴³ *The African Communist*, no. 123, Fourth Quarter 1990, pp. 15-19. All those listed are members and leaders of either The Congress of South African Trade Unions, the ANC, or both.

⁴⁴ For details, see the relevant entries in Gastrow, *Who's Who in South African Politics*.

Once unbanned, the ANC expected a massive show of support, which never materialized. The organization proclaimed that it would have one million members in 1990; in fact, it had three hundred thousand at most.⁴⁵ In free elections, the ANC would get most, but by no means all, Xhosa votes, the votes of many Tswanas and others who fear Zulu dominance, those urban black youths who do not prefer PAC or AZAPO, and the few communists of all races and ages. On the other hand, it would lose virtually all white votes, the votes of most Coloureds and Indians, Zulus, and some other fence-sitting blacks, particularly older ones and those belonging to conservative African churches. A conservative estimate of the number of those likely to vote against the ANC suggests that they form a significant majority of South Africa's population.⁴⁶ And since its claims to being multiracial, multi-ethnic, and democratic are increasingly being called into question, the ANC can only expect to see a decline in its popular support; indeed, a *Sunday Times* poll suggests that ANC support is already nil among whites and less than 10 percent among Coloureds.⁴⁷ Present trends and attitudes suggest that the ANC would lose a free election now, and with it see all its ambitious claims to non-white leadership delegitimized.

The ANC's Communist Party Ties

The ANC is badly divided along generational lines between older and revered figures like Oliver Tambo, Alfred Nzo, and Nelson Mandela, and younger, more militant, and often openly communist leaders, such as Chris Hani, Thabo Mbeki, and Peter Mokaba — all articulate politicians in their forties, and all members of the SACP. Despite the mythical, almost heroic aura surrounding him, Mandela has, since his release from prison, revealed his feet of clay, not least as a result of his public appreciation for Libya, Nicaragua, and Cuba. In this, however, he merely reflects the ANC's decades-long attraction to anti-Western, anticapitalist, and antidemocratic governments and groups, an attraction that does not seem to have diminished with the collapse of Marxist ideologies in Eastern Europe.

Few ANC leaders would deny that substantial ties exist between the ANC and the Communists. Indeed, as late as January 1991, the ANC's National Executive Committee stated that "we further reinforce our alliance with the South African Communist Party and Cosatu, and defeat the hostile efforts to drive wedges among the member organizations of this alliance."⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Pauline Baker, "South Africa: Old Myths and New Realities," *Current History*, May 1991, p. 233.

⁴⁶ Whites, Coloureds, Indians, and Zulus together number about sixteen million; the largest African denomination, the conservative Zion Christian church, alone numbers some three million adherents (mostly Pedi, Venda, and Shangaan), and an estimated 25 percent of all blacks belong to such independent churches. *Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa* (Pretoria: The Government Printer, 1986), pp. 782-83.

⁴⁷ *The Sunday Times*, June 16, 1991.

⁴⁸ NEC's statement on the seventy-ninth anniversary of the ANC, "Year of Mass Action for the Transfer of Power to the People," p. 24.

Throughout its seven decades of existence, the SACP has been slavishly loyal to Moscow.⁴⁹ It followed every turn in Soviet policies, purged leaders and members when this was in fashion under Stalin, and supported all shifts in Moscow attitudes, including perestroika and glasnost. The depth of the SACP's commitment to democratic reform, however, is suspect. While SACP general secretary Joe Slovo has accepted some guilt for the party's Stalinist past and has acknowledged the need for change, other prominent leaders are less convinced.⁵⁰ Thus, Harry Gwala, a Communist party member since 1942 and now the top ANC leader in the Midlands area of Natal, openly rebuked Slovo in the pages of the party's theoretical journal, *The African Communist*. Gwala approvingly quotes Stalin, accuses Slovo of dealing "rather harshly" with the Soviet dictator's accomplishments, and disapproves of the growing tide of anti-Stalinism by stating "it is very easy for us living in our time . . . to apportion blame for all that was done in the past."⁵¹

Although sometimes presented as a democratic opening within the SACP, such debates illustrate little more than differences in opinion between a sophisticated Leninist like Slovo and an uncritical one like Gwala. Other evidence strongly suggests the unrepentantly Marxist-Leninist orientation of the SACP, notably the 1989 Constitution and Rules of the South African Communist Party, published in South Africa in October 1990. They define the SACP as "the leading political force of South Africa's working class and its vanguard in the struggle for national liberation, socialism and peace in our time," which aims to end "the system of capitalist exploitation and establish a socialist republic based on common ownership of the means of production."⁵²

Even more important, the party retains its "Leninist principles of democratic centralism,"⁵³ and conspiratorial attitudes: "no member shall, without the permission of the Central Committee, directly or indirectly divulge the fact of his or her membership of the Party or the identity of any other member to any unauthorized person."⁵⁴ On July 29, 1990, the SACP announced a partial list of its Interim Leadership Group.⁵⁵ Not surprisingly, the list included many ANC leaders. It also left blank spots, thus suggesting that party leaders whose names were not made public are active in other organizations but, for public relations purposes, prefer that their names not be divulged.

When one considers how much the ANC loses from its SACP ties, it is fair to question why the ANC clings so stubbornly to its embarrassing ally. For example, de Klerk has declared that he is prepared to form a coalition with the

⁴⁹ See Henry R. Pike, *A History of Communism in South Africa* (Pretoria: Sigma Press, 1985).

⁵⁰ Joe Slovo, "Has Socialism Failed?" *Umsebenzi*, July 1990.

⁵¹ Harry Gwala, "Let Us Look at History in the Round," *The African Communist*, no. 123, Fourth Quarter, 1990, p. 41-43. For an excellent analysis of the debate inside the SACP, see Allan Fine, "The Life and Soul of the Party," and "COSATU and the SACP: Who's 'Manipulating' Whom?" *Business Day*, May 15, 1991, p. 8.

⁵² *The Path to Power: Programme of the South African Communist Party* (Johannesburg, 1990), p. 60.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁵⁵ *The African Communist*, no. 123, Fourth Quarter, 1990, pp. 15-19.

ANC if the latter sheds its communist ties;⁵⁶ Allan Boesak suggested that the dramatic loss of ANC support among Coloureds is a result of the organization's perceived communist ties and militaristic style;⁵⁷ and Desmond Tutu has expressed unhappiness with the ANC-SACP alliance.

The reasons for the ANC's unwillingness to abandon the SACP are not confined to the considerable overlap in the political and economic beliefs of the two organizations, although that is a part of it. There are also the issues of the interpenetration of the ANC leadership with the leadership of the SACP, and of the SACP's long tradition of organizational prowess, demonstrated by its ability to bring out as many supporters as the ANC did in 1990; the latter attribute is important to the ANC, given the ANC's own inability to mobilize the kind of support it had expected.⁵⁸

Of the eight most popular newly elected ANC National Executive Committee members, at least six are or were until recently South African Communist party leaders.

The ANC's determination to cling to its communist ties and Leninist leadership style was again demonstrated at the Durban conference of July, 1991, where the ANC elected its new leaders. Except for the opening and concluding sessions, the media was banned; issues such as the influence of Marxism-Leninism, the role of violence, and the type of economy envisioned by the ANC were avoided.

The largest number of votes in the NEC election went to Chris Hani, followed by his personal rival, fellow SACP member Thabo Mbeki; in fact, of the eight most popular newly elected NEC members, at least six are or were until recently SACP leaders.⁵⁹ Although ideological differences, personal rivalries, and ethnicity make them less of an homogeneous group than one might at first think, the age, popularity, and charisma of leaders such as Hani, Mbeki, and fellow NEC members Pallo Jordan and Patrick Lekota suggest that they represent the ANC's future. Indeed, once the surviving ANC elder statesmen are gone, the alternatives for their successors will be limited to young Leninists, albeit of various shades.

African Marxism-Leninism has of late proven to be a rather flimsy and opportunistic phenomenon, but nothing in ANC recent history suggests that it has learned from the failures of Africa's sad experience. Even if the ANC leadership wanted to moderate its policies, the pressure from its constituents may prove irresistible: from uneducated, unemployable, and often criminal urban

⁵⁶ See, for example, "De Klerk Reiterates Anti-Communist Position," FBIS, SA, May 3, 1991, from Johannesburg SAPA, May 2, 1991.

⁵⁷ *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 3, 1991.

⁵⁸ Pauline Baker, "South Africa: Old Myths and New Realities," *Current History*, May 1991, pp. 200-32.

⁵⁹ These include Hani, Mbeki, Joe Slovo, Ahmed Kathrada, Ronnie Kasrils, and Harry Gwala; see *Business Day*, July 8, 1991.

youths demanding instant solutions to complex problems; from would-be black bureaucrats waiting to replace the equally numerous — and inefficient — Afrikaner ones currently in positions of power; and from the utopian socialist leadership of black unions.

If the ANC reaches power via elections, an increasingly unlikely but still plausible scenario, South Africa will likely repeat sub-Saharan Africa's tragic experiments with statism, socialism, and authoritarianism: a flush of triumphalism, followed by economic ruin, internal convulsion, and the begging bowl at international lending institutions and Western governments. Such a scenario would be disastrous not only for South Africa itself, but for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, since South Africa is the only indigenous source of technological know-how, capital, and efficiently functioning services south of the Maghreb.

International and U.S. Responses

The attitude of the industrialized world in general, and of the European Community, United States, and Japan particularly, can have considerable influence on the course of future events in South Africa. The record so far is clear; the European Community (EC) — often led by Britain — is better informed and less emotional than the United States in dealing with both Pretoria and the ANC, and more independent than Japan. The EC was the first to recognize that economic sanctions against South Africa mean long term turbulence, violence, and economic collapse, and to discard the ANC's strictly political calls for continuing sanctions. Tokyo apparently believes that the future of South Africa is a marginal issue, not worth provoking more Japan bashing in the United States.

The influence of minor powers that are more favorably inclined toward sanctions — including the Scandinavian countries, Australia, and Canada — can be largely discounted. Although the Scandinavians have been, along with the Dutch, the ANC's main noncommunist financiers and are still prominent among that group's international supporters, the size and impact of Scandinavian support for the ANC are still quite limited. As for Canada and Australia, allegedly idealistic reasons for following the ANC line on sanctions take on a more self-serving aspect when one considers that sanctions remove South Africa as an effective international competitor in coal, iron, and rare minerals markets.

In the United States, the debate over South Africa became a surrogate battlefield for domestic conflicts over civil rights, political correctness, and the role of government in general, thus distorting the real issues at stake. The Bush administration long hesitated to take a stand against the sanctions imposed under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, fearing a backlash from the civil rights lobby. When the administration finally lifted the sanctions in July 1991, it became clear that its fears of Congressional criticism were overstated. Although traditional ANC supporters, such as the Congressional Black Caucus

and TransAfrica, did indeed protest loudly, their protests were ineffectual, and the lifting of U.S. sanctions — coming on the heels of South Africa's readmission to the Olympics after a hiatus of thirty years — has strengthened de Klerk's hand.

After years in which the ANC's uncritical supporters in Washington determined U.S. policy on South Africa by default, actual U.S. long-term interests in that country — such as the establishment of democratic and free market institutions there — have perhaps come to the fore once again. The lifting of sanctions is, and should be, only a first step toward a reassessment of U.S. policy toward South Africa. If the government in Pretoria is not taken over by statist and socialists, economic aid should be provided, at least in the short run. More important, private investment has to be encouraged, as well as massive training and education programs for South Africa's blacks. Most important, in the short run, aid to alternative black organizations such as Inkatha that espouse programs more acceptable to the United States should be increased, allowing them to compete with the ANC.

Conclusion

One of South Africa's best known citizens, Christiaan Barnard, the first surgeon to perform a heart transplant, is now asking for political asylum because, as he puts it, he does not want to live in a Lebanon-type situation. And such a situation is a clear possibility for South Africa, particularly if the ANC or the SACP becomes the party in charge. The ANC currently offers the prospect of a return to a barely disguised Marxist-Leninist system that has been rejected from Mongolia to Albania. The attempt to implement such a system would certainly be unacceptable not only to South Africa's whites, but to most non-whites as well.

Despite the recent trend toward democratization and free markets in sub-Saharan Africa, post-apartheid South Africa is still more free and open than most countries on the continent. A free press, highly politicized unions, and even parties seeking the overthrow of the government by force are all free to operate. For those who approve of the sadly familiar sub-Saharan African political experience of one-party, anticapitalist states driven by corruption and bankrupt ideologies, the ANC remains the best hope. For those whose interest is a truly democratic, capitalist, and multi-ethnic South Africa, the ANC is a substantial obstacle.

CONTEMPORARY and CLASSIC VIEWS

Political Science from PENGUIN USA

STALIN: Breaker of Nations

Robert Conquest

Viking cloth 0-670-84089-0 \$25.00

FUTUREHYPE

The Tyranny of Prophecy

Max Dublin

Dutton cloth 0-525-24968-0 \$21.95

**GRASS ROOTS: One Year in the
Life of the New Hampshire
Presidential Primary**

Dayton Duncan

Viking cloth 0-670-81851-8 \$22.95

Penguin paper available Jan. 1992

0-14-010369-4 \$10.95

THE DEMOCRACY TRAP

**The Perils of
the Post-Cold War World**

Graham Fuller

Introduction by Francis Fukuyama

Dutton cloth available Jan. 1992

0-525-93371-9 \$19.95

NATIVE AMERICAN

**TESTIMONY: A Chronicle of
Indian and White Relations
from Prophecy to the Present,
1492-1992**

Edited by Peter Nabokov

Foreword by Vine Deloria, Jr.

Viking cloth available Dec. 1991

0-670-83704-0 \$25.00

METTERNICH

The First European

Desmond Seward

Viking cloth available Dec. 1991

0-670-82600-6 \$22.95

THE RIDDLE OF POWER

**Presidential Leadership
from Truman to Bush**

Robert Shogan

Dutton cloth 0-525-24956-7 \$21.95

THE BOOK OF STRATAGEMS

Harro von Senger

Edited and Translated by

Myron B. Gubitz

Viking cloth available Dec. 1991

0-670-83962-0 \$24.95

OPENING ARGUMENTS

A Young Lawyer's First Case:

United States vs. Oliver North

Jeffrey Toobin

Viking cloth 0-670-83703-2 \$22.95

Penguin paper available Feb. 1992

0-14-016770-6 \$10.95

**LONG DAY'S JOURNEY INTO
WAR: December 7, 1941**

Stanley Weintraub

Dutton cloth 0-525-93344-1 \$26.95

NEW IN PAPERBACK

RISE TO GLOBALISM

American Foreign Policy Since 1938

Sixth Revised Edition

Stephen E. Ambrose

Penguin paper 0-14-014770-5 \$9.95

WHAT HAPPENED WHEN

A Chronology of

Life and Events in America

Gorton Carruth

Signet paper 0-451-16902-6 \$6.95

THE EYES ON THE PRIZE

**READER: Documents, Speeches,
and Firsthand Accounts from the
Black Freedom Struggle, 1954-1990**

Edited by Clayborne Carson,

David J. Garrow, Gerald Gill,

Vincent Harding, and Darlene

Clark Hine

Penguin paper available Nov. 1991

0-14-015403-5 \$14.95

THE GERMANS

With a new Afterword by

the Author Gordon A. Craig

Meridian paper 0-452-01085-3 \$10.95

GORBACHEV

Heretic In the Kremlin

Dusko Doder and Louise Branson

Penguin paper 0-14-011535-8 \$9.95

**GETTING TO YES: Negotiating
Agreement Without Giving In**

Revised Edition

Roger Fisher and William Ury

Penguin paper available Dec. 1991

0-14-015735-2 \$9.95

THE REBIRTH OF HISTORY

**Eastern Europe
in the Age of Democracy**

Misha Glenny

Penguin paper 0-14-014394-7 \$9.95

MY SON'S STORY

Nadine Gordimer

Penguin paper 0-14-015975-4 \$9.95

STRATEGY

Second Revised Edition

B.H. Liddell Hart

Meridian paper 0-452-01071-3 \$11.95

KISS THE BOYS GOODBYE

How the United States Betrayed

Its Own POWs in Vietnam

Monika Jensen-Stevenson

and William Stevenson

Plume paper 0-452-26671-8 \$10.95

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Text Edition

John Keegan

Penguin paper available Dec. 1991

0-14-015387-X \$11.95

TO "HERLAND" AND BEYOND

The Life and Work of

Charlotte Perkins Gilman

Ann J. Lane

Meridian paper available Nov. 1991

0-452-01080-2 \$12.95

CRY OF THE PEOPLE

The Struggle for Human Rights

in Latin America—The Catholic

Church in Conflict with U.S. Policy

Penny Lernoux,

With a new Introduction by George Black

Penguin paper 0-14-015385-3 \$9.95

CASEY: The Lives and Secrets of

William J. Casey:

From the OSS to the CIA

Joseph E. Persico

Penguin paper available Oct. 1991

0-14-011314-2 \$14.95

A NEW VIEW OF SOCIETY

AND OTHER WRITINGS

Robert Owen

Edited with an Introduction by

Gregory Claeys

Penguin Classic 0-14-043348-1 \$9.95

OVERDRAWN

The Bailout of American Savings

Michael A. Robinson

Plume paper available Nov. 1991

0-452-26695-5 \$10.95

AS I SAW IT

Dean Rusk as told to Richard Rusk

Edited by Daniel S. Papp

Penguin paper 0-14-015391-8 \$14.95

THE CONQUEST OF PARADISE

Christopher Columbus

and the Columbian Legacy

Kirkpatrick Sale

Plume paper 0-452-26669-6 \$12.95

SECRET DOSSIER: The Hidden

Agenda Behind the Gulf War

Pierre Salinger and Eric Laurent

Penguin paper 0-14-015969-X \$9.95

THE ACTING PRESIDENT

Bob Schieffer and Gary Paul Gates

Dutton paper 0-525-48579-1 \$9.95

AN UNSOCIAL SOCIALIST

Bernard Shaw

Virago paper 0-14-016217-8 \$7.95

POST-WAR BRITAIN

A Political History

Second Edition

Alan Sked and Chris Cook

Penguin paper 0-14-013750-5 \$9.95

AMERICA ENTERS THE WORLD

A People's History of the

Progressive Era and World War I

Page Smith

Penguin paper 0-14-012263-X \$16.95

CHINA: The Search for

Social Justice and Democracy

Ranbir Vohra

Penguin paper available Nov. 1991

0-14-013373-9 \$8.95

A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE

Settling Accounts with Torturers

Lawrence Weschler

Penguin paper available Nov. 1991

0-14-015844-8 \$9.95

PENGUIN USA

Academic Marketing Department

375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014-3657

For those who prefer knowledge over opinion

READ **THE WORLD TODAY**

Send for a free sample issue with no obligation to subscribe

THE WORLD TODAY, established in 1945, is the monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London. It is a unique magazine of international politics. It covers the broad issues alongside the small ones. It covers the politics of countries that are not in the headlines today, but could be there tomorrow. It opens up questions for the scholar and fills in gaps for the general reader. And it takes a balanced point of view. The experts seem to agree.

'THE WORLD TODAY is thoroughly researched and clearly written. It provides valuable background information and its choice of subjects is catholic and intelligent.'

Rupert Pennant-Rea, Editor of The Economist

'THE WORLD TODAY is topical, to the point, a good halfway house between daily and weekly press and academic journals. I read it for useful background and insights.'

Andrew Knight, Chief Executive of The Daily Telegraph

'THE WORLD TODAY taps the best available expertise on international subjects. I recommend it to anyone who wants a greater depth and specialist expertise on a range of topics of current interest.'

John Tusa, Managing Director, BBC External Services

SEE FOR YOURSELF:

Read
THE WORLD TODAY
by filling in the
coupon for
your free
sample issue

THE WORLD TODAY

The World Today
10 St James's Square
London SW1Y 4LE

Please send me a free sample issue.

Name

Address

Country

Subscription rates:

UK Institutional £27 Individual £22 Student £17

US Institutional \$65 Individual \$43 Student \$28

Europe and elsewhere Institutional £33 Individual £28 Student £25

Written by the experts. Read by the experts.

Will Inter-China Trade Change Taiwan or the Mainland?

by Dennis Van Vranken Hickey

For decades after the division of China in June 1949, the Nationalist (Kuomintang) government of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan was opposed to any steps toward rapprochement with the communist government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. Nevertheless, in the 1980s, commerce with the mainland grew significantly. By the beginning of the 1990s, bilateral trade had surged to nearly \$4 billion per year,¹ and Taiwanese investment in the mainland had climbed to over \$2 billion.

What has been driving this explosive growth in commerce? How is such trade affecting politics within the two countries, and how might it affect the political relations between them? Finally, how might the changing Chinese political-economic situation affect American policies toward the two countries? To answer these questions, one must begin by examining both the current state of inter-China economic exchange and the organizations established to cope with it.

Indirect Trade and Investment

Trade. Direct trade across the Taiwan Strait is forbidden under ROC law, in keeping with Taiwan's long-standing policy of no official contacts, no negotiations, and no compromises with the PRC. Indirect trade, however, is now permitted, and usually occurs via Hong Kong. Direct trade — estimated at about 10 percent of total trade — also takes place, despite the laws against it.

Commerce first began to accelerate after the PRC enacted its open door policies in the early 1980s. In 1987, trade received further encouragement when Taipei enacted a law enabling persons in Taiwan to visit relatives on the mainland. Under the pretext of visiting family members, thousands of Taiwanese businessmen flocked to the mainland. Trade received another boost in August 1988, when Taiwan's Board of Foreign Trade (BOFT) approved the importation of certain types of raw materials from the mainland "under the condition that they would not affect national security and the interest of local businessmen."² By late 1990, the number of items allowed into Taiwan had grown

¹ All figures are given in U.S. dollars.

² *China News*, February 13, 1990.

Dennis Van Vranken Hickey is a foreign policy analyst and assistant professor in the political science department at Southwest Missouri State University in Springfield, Missouri.

to include over 150 commodities. Imports consisted largely of dried fish, herbal medicine, and tobacco. By contrast, over 70 percent of Taiwan's exports consisted of "silkbblend and synthetic textiles, machinery equipment, plastic materials, and electronic components such as tape recorders, video recorders and televisions."³

By 1989, the PRC had become Taiwan's fifth largest trading partner, and Taiwan ranked sixth on the mainland's list. From the PRC's perspective, trade with the island provided 4.9 percent of imports and 4.4 percent of exports. Taiwanese authorities estimate that trade with the PRC provides 1.3 percent of their country's imports and 4.6 percent of exports.⁴ Nevertheless, Taiwan's exports to the mainland are approximately five times its imports from it, and Beijing's trade deficit with Taipei now represents almost one-third of its total trade deficit.⁵

The growth rate of indirect trade between Taiwan and the PRC slowed briefly after the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 4, 1989. Taiwan's trade to the mainland in 1989 posted only a 29 percent rise over 1988, compared with a growth rate in 1988 of approximately 100 percent over 1987.⁶ BOFT authorities attributed the slowdown to after-effects of the massacre, and to China's austerity program.⁷

But trade rebounded in 1990. Predictions that commerce would not exceed \$4 billion for the year proved to be inaccurate.⁸ On February 21, 1991, Taiwanese officials announced that trade in 1990 between Taiwan and mainland China via Hong Kong increased 16 percent to \$4.04 billion, up from the previous high of \$3.48 billion in 1989. Furthermore, Taiwan posted a \$2.53 billion surplus in its trade with the mainland.⁹ Authorities attributed an extraordinary year-end surge in commerce to Beijing's decision in late 1990 to relax policies designed to curb imports.

Investment. Until recently, Taiwan prohibited all investment in the mainland, both indirect and direct, and the magnitude of investment was nearly impossible to quantify. Fearful of prosecution for violating the ban on commercial ventures, many companies chose to incorporate in different countries or used non-Taiwanese names to reduce the chance of detection. At the same time, foreign investors disguised their operations as Taiwanese to qualify for the favorable terms of trade reserved only for such businesses.

Yet, according to some estimates, as many as ten thousand Taiwanese companies began operations on the mainland in the last ten years, most of them

³ *The Free China Journal*, August 23, 1990.

⁴ See Chung Chin, "Trade across the Straits," *The Free China Review*, January 1991, p. 40. Trade figures are estimates, and represent only indirect trade via Hong Kong; as much as 25 percent of trade may currently flow through Japan, Singapore, and other countries.

⁵ See Chung, "Trade across the Straits," p. 40.

⁶ Trade data provided courtesy of Charles Chen, director, Coordinating Council for North American Affairs (Taiwan's consulate), San Francisco, California.

⁷ *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, December 21, 1989.

⁸ See, for example, *The China Post*, December 15, 1990.

⁹ *The China Post*, February 22, 1991.

through Hong Kong-based companies.¹⁰ Most of these are situated in Fujian (Fukien) and Guangdong (Kwangtung) provinces.¹¹ The Xiamen (Amoy) special economic zone in Fujian province has proved especially popular with investors because its people speak the same dialect as native Taiwanese.

The majority of the industries relocating to the Chinese mainland are what the Taiwanese government refers to as “sunset industries” — low-tech, labor intensive enterprises, such as footwear and textile manufacturers — seeking to escape Taiwan’s labor shortage and surging production costs. The exodus of Taiwan’s umbrella industry provides an example: authorities estimate that over 70 percent of Taiwan’s umbrella manufacturing has moved to China.¹²

The impact of the Tiananmen Square Massacre upon Taiwanese investment proved to be marginal. PRC authorities reassured investors that Beijing had no intention of altering economic or trade relations with Taiwan. Rumors that the PRC was adopting “tight measures” toward Taiwanese businesses in an effort to drive them off the mainland and nationalize their operations were denied emphatically.¹³ Officials pledged that Taiwan’s entrepreneurs would “enjoy full autonomy over the production, management, sales and other aspects of their firms and even be granted more preferential terms than foreign investors.”¹⁴ In February 1990, Chinese premier Li Peng declared that “further efforts, such as raising efficiency, offering more favorable tax rates and providing more skilled workers and technicians, should be made to create a better climate for investors from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau.”¹⁵

Finally, in an effort to gain a modicum of control over mainland ventures, Taiwan authorities decided to permit indirect investment. In October 1990, Taiwan’s Economics Ministry issued guidelines governing indirect investment and released a list of over three thousand items that Taiwanese businessmen would be allowed to produce on the mainland.¹⁶ These commodities accounted for nearly 50 percent of all custom classification categories, but were chiefly low-tech items, such as plastics, foodstuffs, footwear, and apparel.¹⁷ Investment remains indirect in the sense that Taiwanese businessmen first must set up subsidiaries in third countries (usually Hong Kong, Tokyo, or Singapore), then proceed from there to the mainland.

The new guidelines also offered companies operating on the mainland exemption from prosecution if they registered their indirect investment projects with Taiwan’s government. In April 1991, after the deadline for reporting such

¹⁰ *The South China Morning Post*, February 24, 1990.

¹¹ The PRC favors the Pinyin system of transliteration, while the ROC prefers the Wade-Giles system. The first, nonparenthetical spelling represents the Pinyin spelling.

¹² *The Free China Journal*, April 30, 1990.

¹³ *The China Daily*, November 27, 1989.

¹⁴ *The China Daily*, November 2, 1989.

¹⁵ Quoted in *The China Daily*, February 28, 1990.

¹⁶ See *The China Post*, October 8, 1990.

¹⁷ See Chung, “Trade across the Straits,” p. 44.

ventures had passed, Taiwanese authorities revealed that over 2,500 investors who had been operating illegally had registered with the Ministry of Economic Affairs.¹⁸ In April, too, Taiwan's Economics Ministry announced that Taiwanese investments in the mainland stood at more than \$2 billion.¹⁹

Henceforth, the Taipei government will also help businesses comply with the new law. Last April, the semi-official Taipei Trade Center (operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Economic Affairs) established an office in Hong Kong to help Taiwanese entrepreneurs already operating on the mainland set up Hong Kong subsidiaries that could conduct their business indirectly.²⁰

Investments or joint ventures that compromise Taiwan's national security or economic development remain prohibited. Plans by Taiwanese tycoon Wang Yung-ching's Formosa Plastics Group to build a \$7 billion naptha cracking plant on the mainland caused an uproar in Taipei. Despite threats from the ROC government, the proposed venture was scrapped only after government officials pledged to provide "necessary assistance" to Wang to encourage him to set up his plant in Taiwan.²¹

Looking ahead, Taiwanese authorities have indicated that direct investment might be approved if Beijing accedes to three conditions, outlined by President Lee Teng-hui during his 1990 inaugural address: the PRC must promote economic and political modernization, renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and cease its attempts to isolate Taiwan in the international community. These conditions, however, are unlikely to be met.

Nevertheless, Ben Kwong, a Hong Kong-based securities analyst, estimates that "Taiwanese manufacturing interests . . . [are] expected to overtake Hong Kong as the number one foreign investor within three years."²² According to PRC statistics, Taiwan has already replaced the United States and Japan as the largest investor in the Chinese mainland.²³

Economic Diplomacy

Following long-standing government policy, Taiwan does not communicate directly with the PRC. The burgeoning growth in trade, investment, and travel across the Taiwan Strait, however, has necessitated the creation of problem-solving mechanisms to resolve the many difficulties that accompany these exchanges. Taiwan has established a variety of semi-official and ostensibly private organizations for this purpose. Premier Hau Pei-tsun contends that "with these organizations in place, from now on we shall move forward, step by

¹⁸ *The China Post*, April 10, 1991.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *The Free China Journal*, April 10, 1991.

²¹ *The Free China Journal*, August 6, 1990.

²² Quoted in *The South China Morning Post*, May 20, 1990.

²³ *The Free China Journal*, May 10, 1991.

step, in a planned way, cautiously, yet of our own accord and initiative, while always safeguarding the interests of the 20 million people in Taiwan.”²⁴

Mainland Affairs Task Force. In August 1988, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan (Cabinet) responded to the rise in economic exchanges that followed the lifting of travel restrictions to the mainland by establishing the Mainland Affairs Task Force (MATF). Over the next two years, the organization coordinated the diverse functions of departments, ministries, and commissions that were handling mainland issues. Among other things, it helped draft laws and regulations that would introduce order into the many contacts between Taiwan and the mainland. Business concerns represented only a part of the MATF’s task. The organization also helped develop guidelines so that Taiwan’s athletes could participate in international sporting events on the mainland, and it assisted Taiwanese soldiers stranded on the mainland since 1949.

According to PRC statistics, Taiwan has already replaced the United States and Japan as the largest investor in the Chinese mainland.

Despite this, the Taipei government drew criticism from the Taiwanese public for failing to adjust policies, laws, and regulations in a timely fashion.²⁵ The need for more formal organizations to handle Taiwan/mainland affairs was underscored following the October 1990 plane crash at the Pai Yun airport in Canton, when relatives of Taiwanese crash victims faced overwhelming obstacles in obtaining information and compensation from Beijing.

National Unification Council and Mainland Affairs Council. In October 1990, two new government organizations were established to provide more effective relations with the mainland. The National Unification Council (NUC) was created by the Office of the President, with President Lee Teng-hui as its director general. Merely an advisory body, the NUC was to “guide the development of relations between people across the Taiwan Strait and reach the goal of a unified China as soon as possible.”²⁶ Later that month, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan approved creation of the ministerial-level Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), which took over the responsibilities of the MATF. The organization’s chairman, Vice Premier Shih Chi-yang, announced that the MAC would “map out, formulate, and implement” Taiwan’s policy toward the mainland.²⁷ Ma Ying-jeou, vice chairman of the Council, explained that the body had five specific functions: “policy research, policy formulation, policy coordination, and policy review, plus certain functions in the process of policy imple-

²⁴ *The Free China Journal*, December 20, 1990.

²⁵ Amy Lo, “Strait Talk,” p. 8.

²⁶ *The China Post*, October 8, 1990.

²⁷ *The China Post*, October 19, 1990.

mentation.”²⁸ Perhaps most significant, the MAC was charged with assisting the development of nominally a private foundation — the Straits Exchanges Foundation — to mediate legal, trade, and other disputes.

Straits Exchanges Foundation. In November 1990, the Straits Exchanges Foundation (SEF), also known as the Foundation for Exchanges Across the Taiwan Straits (FEATS), was created to act as an intermediary between authorities in Taipei and Beijing. Ostensibly private, the foundation was set up as a corporate body to avoid violating government policy, and over 50 percent of SEF's initial funding came from private sources; but the remainder was supplied by the government. Eventually, Taiwan hopes, it will be able to open SEF offices in Hong Kong and major cities throughout the PRC. In April 1991, an eighteen-member SEF delegation journeyed to Beijing for five days of talks with communist authorities, covering topics from smuggling and illegal immigration to direct trade and investment. These negotiations were fraught with symbolism, for they represented the first time that a liaison group from Taiwan, though only a quasi-official one, had traveled to Beijing to negotiate and establish communication channels with mainland authorities.

Motivations for Trade and Investment

PRC motivations. For Beijing, the unification of China is a primary political objective. In 1979, PRC officials called for the establishment of “the three links” with Taiwan (direct mail, direct air and shipping services, and direct trade) and the “four exchanges” with Taiwan (relatives and tourists, academic groups, cultural groups, and sports representatives). PRC leaders view these measures as the first steps toward unification.

Taiwan's indirect trade and investment in the mainland is considered a precursor to the three links. PRC authorities assume that economic ties will lead ultimately to negotiations and then unification under Beijing's “One-Country-Two Systems” formula. Under this arrangement, the regime in Beijing would be the sovereign government.

Political aspirations aside, Beijing has had good reason to lure Taiwanese investors to the mainland. In order to meet the ambitious goals of its “four modernizations” campaign (the modernization of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense), the PRC requires investment, technology, know-how, and hard currency. Economic exchanges with Taiwan provide these. Furthermore, when Taiwan firms begin operations on the mainland, they provide employment for thousands of workers who might otherwise burden or threaten the stability of the regime.

Economic ties with Taiwan have proved more resilient in the face of political shocks than those with the West or Japan. The Tiananmen Massacre of June 1989 led Western countries and Japan to impose economic sanctions and

²⁸ Amy Lo, “Imagination Linked with Decisiveness,” *The Free China Review*, January 1991, p. 26.

to suspend or postpone loans and assistance. Perhaps most damaging, however, were the losses that ensued when frightened Western businessmen voluntarily chose to limit or reduce their operations in China. Taiwanese businesses allegedly rushed to fill the vacuum created by the exodus of American, Japanese, and European firms. According to some accounts, Taiwanese investment in the PRC helped offset the economic embargo imposed on Beijing.²⁹ Although sensitive to such charges, Taiwanese officials concede that Taiwanese investments in the mainland more than quadrupled Peking's foreign currency reserves in the months after June 1989, and greatly assisted China's economic development.³⁰

Taiwan's motivations. Like their counterparts on the mainland, Taiwan's leaders profess an intense desire to unify China. However, they seek to unite the nation under Kuomintang (KMT) terms.

Taiwan's economic opening to the mainland could be considered a sophisticated Kuomintang strategy aimed at achieving the unification of China.

Taiwan's economic opening to the mainland could be considered a sophisticated KMT strategy aimed at achieving the unification of China. Business people, tourists, and other visitors serve as emissaries who spread the word of Taiwan's success throughout China. Moreover, the swarms of wealthy Taiwanese, brandishing fat wallets, camcorders, and gifts for relatives, provide eloquent living testimony to the benefits of the free market system.

Some Taiwanese believe that increased trade and investment will facilitate unification by transforming the mainland's economic and political system. According to this view, prolonged exposure to market-economy benefits and the "Taiwan experience" will undermine mainland communism and enable the KMT to return. P.K. Chiang, Taiwan's vice minister of the Ministry of Economic Affairs explains: "We hope our current indirect investments in the mainland will spur economic liberalization and thus help to improve the people's livelihood there. As conditions improve, democratization can be advocated."³¹ Liu Yuen-chi, a Taiwanese entrepreneur with operations in the PRC, agrees. According to Liu, "we are trying to introduce the concept of private enterprise in China . . . [I]n ten years, China is going to look more and more like Taiwan."³²

Others contend that current restrictions on trade might be employed as bargaining chips in future negotiations with Beijing. C.V. Chen, secretary-gen-

²⁹ See Lincoln Kaye, "Business Booms across the Taiwan Strait: Netting a Quick Profit," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 16, 1989, p. 68.

³⁰ *The Free China Journal*, July 5, 1990.

³¹ Amy Lo, "Strait Talk," p. 10.

³² *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, August 13, 1990.

eral of the SEF, believes that "Taiwan's formidable commercial strength is its principal bargaining tool in any future talks with Peking."³³ Taipei could seek to establish a link between political reform in mainland China and ROC policy toward Taiwanese concessions on economic policies.

Important domestic political interests are also served by Taipei's decision to facilitate economic exchanges with mainland China. The development of trade and investment guidelines, and intermediary organizations, has quieted domestic critics who charge that the government lacks a coherent mainland policy. Perhaps more significant, the new policies satisfy the pressing needs of an important local constituency — the owners of small and medium businesses who must move operations out of Taiwan in order to remain competitive.

The mainland also represents a potentially vast market for Taiwanese goods. Frustrated by growing protectionism in some Western nations, notably the United States, businesses have pressured Taiwan's government to permit trade with the mainland. Finally, trade with the mainland could eventually provide Taiwan with a bountiful source of coal, crude oil, cotton, and other raw materials that are important to the island's continued economic growth.

But Taiwanese authorities are well aware of the dangers associated with trade dependence. Sheu Ko-sheng, director-general of the BOFT, has cautioned that "if Taiwan's economy becomes too reliant on mainland business, the Communists could manipulate markets."³⁴ Ma Ying-jeou, chairman of the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission of the Executive Yuan and vice chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, warns that the PRC is "cultivating a constituency in Taiwan . . . [T]hese people will certainly speak for the mainland — at least as far as their investment is concerned."³⁵ Consequently, Taiwanese authorities are presently formulating a warning system to monitor dependence on mainland trade, and the BOFT is prepared to rein in this trade should this be deemed necessary.³⁶

For its part, Beijing is aware of Taiwan's attempts to transform the mainland. Mainland officials scoff at all attempts to "peddle the Taiwan experience" and accuse KMT officials of harboring "absurd illusions."³⁷ They contend that the KMT is following an historical pattern:

The Taiwan authorities are staking on a change of the socialist system on the mainland and attempting to give impetus to this change. This is a dangerous step. One of the basic lessons which the KMT should have learnt from their rule of the mainland was their mistaken estimates based on their own wishful thinking. They overestimated themselves and underestimated their opponents.³⁸

³³ Julian Baum, "Strait Expectations," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 6, 1991, p. 40.

³⁴ *Free China Journal*, April 30, 1990.

³⁵ Author's interview with Ma Ying-jeou, arranged by Paul Kuo-bao Chang, executive editor of *The Free China Journal*, February 16, 1990.

³⁶ *The China Post*, October 5, 1990.

³⁷ See Li Jianquan, "More on 'One Country, Two Governments'," *Beijing Review*, July 2-8, 1990, p. 19; and *The China Post*, February 7, 1991.

³⁸ Li Jianquan, "Comment on 'One Country, Two Regions,'" *Beijing Review*, November 12-18, 1990, p. 20.

Authorities vow that “the mainland people will never accept [Taiwan’s] kind of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ that are divorced from China’s national conditions and would lead China to become a political and economic appendage of the West.”³⁹

Future Prospects

The outlook for sustained growth in links between Taiwan and the PRC appears favorable. According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “economic ties between Taiwan and China are increasing at a remarkable rate . . . [and] the economic value of commercial ties is likely to grow over time despite political tensions across the strait.”⁴⁰ Trade via Hong Kong rose to \$1.1 billion in the first quarter of 1991, an increase of 37.5 percent compared with the same period in 1990. Business leaders speculate that constraints on indirect commercial relations will ease progressively, and that legalization of direct trade and investment is only a matter of time. Economists calculate that direct trade, which would cut transport costs by as much as 20 percent, would double commerce within a year or two.⁴¹

Despite these optimistic forecasts, however, a slowdown in commerce is still possible. In late 1990, Kao Chang, an economist at Taiwan’s prestigious Chung-Hua Institute for Economic Research, reported that investors were becoming increasingly cautious about Beijing’s “capricious policies.” He also noted that approximately 40 percent of Taiwanese business ventures on the mainland had failed — a higher ratio than in any other country for Taiwanese investors. Kao reported that businessmen complained of difficulties with remittances, currency exchange, local government red tape, and inadequate infrastructure.⁴²

Numerous other obstacles confront Taiwanese enterprises investing in mainland China:

There are many impediments to the development of Taiwan enterprises in the mainland, such as the lack of hardware, raw materials, energy, and funds. The long-term legal guarantees are not yet in place, and management personnel is second rate. The costs of bribing mainland officials and others is burdensome, and remittances and deliveries are made more costly because by law they must go to and from Taiwan via third parties.⁴³

Other problems include low productivity, inattention to quality control, too few Taiwanese managers and technicians willing to work in such backward

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, *The Chinese Economy in 1989 and 1990: Trying to Revive Growth While Maintaining Social Stability*, report to the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security of the Joint Economic Committee (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, June 1990), p. 23.

⁴¹ Julian Baum, “Strait Expectations,” p. 40.

⁴² *The Free China Journal*, September 13, 1990.

⁴³ Chung, “Trade Across The Straits,” pp. 43-44.

conditions, and the fierce price competition among Taiwanese businessmen. All of these factors have raised overhead and reduced profit margins.

Investors had hoped that, with similar language, culture, and customs, they could circumvent such difficulties. In some cases, they succeeded. In other instances, however, they failed. Taiwan officials acknowledge that some businessmen may opt to retreat from the mainland: "We believe that our businessmen basically are profit oriented — they will go where the profit is. When they see no profit, they will come back by their choice."⁴⁴ Thus, Taiwanese investors, reacting to failures, could withdraw from the PRC in large numbers.

Radical shifts in PRC government policies provide another source of possible difficulties. Taiwan's businessmen have not been able to surmount political uncertainties associated with investment on the mainland. An example is provided by PRC premier Li Peng's intimation that Taiwan's sunset industries might become less welcome in the PRC:

There are some people in Taiwan who want to move their sunset industries onto the mainland. We say publicly that we do not welcome such industries. We welcome high-technology industries, we welcome industries that are export-oriented and will promote an outward looking economy.⁴⁵

Foreign observers were at first baffled by this reversal in policy, but now attribute it to domestic politics. Exports from those coastal provinces favored by Taiwanese investment are greater than exports from other parts of China, causing living standards to rise disproportionately. Domestic political problems resulting from uneven prosperity may lead Beijing to curtail some business ventures or channel investment elsewhere. Chinese officials are attempting to convince investors to move inland in search of "easier and better bargains."⁴⁶

Taiwanese investment in the mainland is contributing to China's trade surplus with the United States. A case in point is China's footwear industry. Investment has enabled the PRC to become America's largest footwear supplier and helped its exports to soar 18.1 percent in 1990.⁴⁷ Should the PRC be forced to reduce significantly its textile exports to the United States, Beijing may require Taiwanese operations to bear the brunt of the burden.

Many other problems could adversely affect the growth in Taiwan-PRC trade and investment. These include measures adopted to reduce economic dependence, the deflection of Taiwanese investment to Eastern Europe, the PRC's continuing trade deficit with Taiwan, and problems associated with the lack of credible legal guarantees to protect commerce.

⁴⁴ Author's interview with Chang Shallyen, director general of KMT Overseas Affairs Department and vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, February 15, 1990.

⁴⁵ Quoted in *The China Post*, October 10, 1990.

⁴⁶ Tai Ming Cheung, "The Taiwan Beachhead," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 15, 1990, p. 77.

⁴⁷ *The China Post*, January 30, 1991.

Implications for U.S. Policy

American officials welcome the relaxation of tensions across the Taiwan Strait. During his recent visit to Taiwan, former president Gerald R. Ford carried a message from President George Bush:

We in the United States, from the President on down, are encouraged by the kind of development we see here [in Taiwan], in the liberalization of the political system, the broadening of economic efforts and the improving relationship between Taiwan and mainland China.⁴⁸

Members of the legislative branch share this optimism. Senator Malcomb Wallop (Republican of Wyoming) contends that the emerging détente between Taiwan and the PRC “facilitates America’s task of balancing our relationship with Taipei and Beijing.”⁴⁹

Ironically, recent developments also hold the potential to complicate American policy and may lead ultimately to strains in U.S.-PRC relations. Tensions over the issue of American arms sales to Taiwan have increased. Moreover, the exodus of Taiwan’s “sunset industries” to the mainland is contributing to differences over trade issues.

The arms sales issue. The PRC is exerting pressure upon the United States to reduce or curtail military support for Taiwan, and it is attempting to use its new relationship with Taiwan as a wedge to gain additional leverage. Communist authorities contend that the relaxation of tension across the Taiwan Strait reduces Taipei’s need for U.S. arms. The issue has the potential to become a major dispute between Washington and Beijing.

The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which outlines the nature of U.S.-Taiwanese ties after the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations, lays down U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan. According to Section 2 of the TRA, it is the policy of the United States “to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” Section 3 states that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defensive services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”⁵⁰

PRC officials have long insisted that the TRA constitutes “gross interference” in China’s internal affairs. They find the arms sales clause in Section 3 to be especially irksome. According to Beijing’s view, the United States, not Taiwan, stands in the way of a peaceful reunification of China. Authorities insist that the supply of American weapons creates a climate encouraging Taiwan’s refusal to enter into reunification negotiations.

⁴⁸ Quoted in *The Free China Journal*, May 14, 1991.

⁴⁹ “President Lee Teng-Hui’s Inauguration,” *Congressional Record*, 101st Cong., 2d sess., May 17, 1990, p. S 6397.

⁵⁰ For a text of the act, see *China: U.S. Policy Since 1945* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1980), pp. 343-45.

Although the PRC claims that it seeks a peaceful unification of China, it has repeatedly refused to renounce the use of force to take Taiwan. Communist officials have outlined conditions under which force would be employed: if Taiwan declares independence from China; if Taiwan descends into turmoil; if Taiwan is occupied by a foreign power; if Taiwan acquires nuclear weapons; or if Taiwan persistently refuses to reunify with the mainland.⁵¹ As recently as December 1990, mainland officials reportedly met to discuss military measures that might be directed against the island.⁵²

Although the PRC claims that it seeks a peaceful unification of China, it has repeatedly refused to renounce the use of force to take Taiwan.

At the same time that tensions across the Strait have eased, Beijing has sought to upgrade its military capabilities. Although the PRC's military build-up may not be motivated by a desire to threaten Taiwan, it undermines the defensive capabilities of Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC nevertheless. In March 1991, PRC finance minister Wang Bingqian revealed that military spending would rise 12 percent during the year.⁵³ This announcement followed an increase in military outlays last year of 15.5 percent. Perhaps most worrisome to Taipei, Beijing has negotiated the purchase of a squadron of twenty-four advanced Su-27 combat aircraft from the Soviet Union. The new Soviet aircraft are superior to anything possessed by China's East Asian rivals. Taiwan's defense minister, Chen Li-an, has admitted candidly that the fighters are "something worth worrying about,"⁵⁴ and the people of Taiwan share his concern. A recent Gallup opinion poll of the island's residents found that over 83 percent of respondents believe the government should continue to strengthen its defense capabilities.⁵⁵ Consequently, Taiwan has renewed efforts to purchase F-16's and other advanced fighter aircraft from the United States.

American officials are keenly aware of the PRC's military build-up. The Bush administration has quietly paved the way for the transfer of sophisticated new military equipment and technology to Taiwan. In a move the Taiwanese press has trumpeted as "unprecedented" and "a breakthrough," the United States agreed to sell advanced AH-1W Supercobra attack helicopters to Taiwan.⁵⁶ Taipei is also preparing American engines for their fighter planes and advanced electronic-warfare technology for their naval frigates.⁵⁷ Xiao Houde,

⁵¹ See Guo-cang Huan, "Taiwan: A View from Beijing," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1985, p. 1068. For a more recent list of conditions, see *The Free China Journal*, December 13, 1990.

⁵² *The New York Times*, February 10, 1991.

⁵³ *The New York Times*, March 27, 1991.

⁵⁴ *The China Post*, October 30, 1990.

⁵⁵ *The China Post*, April 8, 1991.

⁵⁶ *The China Post*, October 27, 1990.

⁵⁷ *The Los Angeles Times*, December 22, 1990.

counselor at the Chinese embassy in Washington, has protested that, given the current state of Taiwan-Mainland relations, the helicopter sale is unwarranted: "The tension across the Taiwan Straits has been much decreased. So we wonder why, at this time, the U.S. still provides Taiwan with such advanced weaponry. We think this is not conducive to peace and stability in the region."⁵⁸

Despite the relaxation of tensions, American arms sales and technology transfers to Taiwan will continue. U.S. officials are determined to comply with the provisions of the TRA. Moreover, the Bush administration has no plans to sponsor legislation to amend, revise, or revoke the TRA. Natale Bellocchi, head of the American Institute in Taiwan — America's unofficial embassy — underscored the American position during a recent address in Taipei:

Over the last 10 years of this changing Taiwan, our relationship has remained solidly based on the Taiwan Relations Act. Under this Act, we have expanded cultural and economic relationships, and maintained our commitment to provide adequate military supplies (to the ROC) for defensive purposes. The broad parameters of this structure have served us well and are likely to remain for some time to come.⁵⁹

Economic issues. As noted above, Taiwanese investment has enabled China to become a top supplier of footwear, textiles, and other low-tech products to the United States. This flood of goods, however, is becoming a major source of friction. According to the U.S. government's accounting procedures, America suffers an alarming trade deficit with the PRC. In March 1991, the U.S. trade deficit with China was second only to its deficit with Japan. Officials estimate that it could reach \$15 billion in 1991.⁶⁰

Voices in Washington have charged that the PRC is pushing exports and discouraging imports in an effort to achieve a favorable balance of trade with the United States. A substantial portion of this surplus, however, may also be attributed to the thousands of Taiwanese corporations that have set up operations on the mainland. A statement by the PRC's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade referred to the role that Taiwanese and other companies play in the growth of Chinese exports to the United States:

Thanks to the country's opening policy and low labor cost, quite a number of businessmen from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the U.S. have moved their labor-intensive industries to the coastal regions of the Chinese mainland, and the greater part of their products are sold to the U.S. market.⁶¹

Some Western business leaders agree. In mid-1990, Robert C. Broadfoot, managing director of the Hong Kong-based Economic Risk Consultancy, noted that Taiwan's and Hong Kong's production shifts to the PRC

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ *The Free China Journal*, December 24, 1990.

⁶⁰ *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 21, 1991.

⁶¹ *The China Daily*, May 11, 1991.

could result in an increasing trade surplus for China, and provoke protectionist sentiment in the United States.⁶²

Taiwanese investment in the mainland may also be contributing to other disputes in U.S.-PRC economic relations. In December 1990, the U.S. cut the PRC's garment and textile quota sharply. The U.S. Customs Service charged that Chinese exporters were evading quota limits by shipping products with fraudulent country-of-origin certification. Since many of the falsely marked goods originated in Guangdong province, where many of the textile factories are run by businesses based in Hong Kong, Taiwanese complicity is suspected.⁶³ In any case, the accusation strengthened the chorus of voices in Washington calling for an end to China's most-favored-nation trade status. If such retaliation occurred, it would cost the PRC billions of dollars in foreign exchange.

Conclusion

Is the growth in economic ties between Taiwan and the PRC paving the way for the unification of China?

Both Taipei and Beijing agree that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it. Both claim to look forward to the eventual unification of the country. But their respective opinions about the conditions for unification differ substantially. Beijing promotes "one country-two systems," a formula similar to the one developed for Hong Kong after 1997. Taiwan insists that, as a precondition for unification discussions, the mainland must "implement political democracy and a free economic system, renounce the use of military force in the Taiwan Strait, and not interfere with our development of foreign relations."⁶⁴ Taipei also rejects Beijing's proposal insofar as it relegates Taiwan to the status of a provincial government.

What effect increasing economic exchanges will have on these fundamental dichotomies is not clear. Trade and investment could lead to improved relations, but they could also lead to poorer relations. At present, improvement seems more likely. Public opinion polls in Taiwan reveal that 66 percent of the island's population favor opening direct sea and air links with the mainland. Almost 60 percent believe that the PRC's influence over Taiwan will continue to grow in coming years.⁶⁵ On the other hand, sentiments expressed by Taiwanese who have traveled to the mainland do not always support the idea that economic and cultural relations will lead to political unification. Surveys have found that visitors are appalled by the mainland's social problems and back-

⁶² Robert C. Broadfoot, "The Impact of Pre-Taiwan Ties on Hong Kong," *The China Business Review*, September-October 1990, p. 38.

⁶³ Carl Goldstein, "China Needles U.S.," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 24, 1991, p. 34.

⁶⁴ See "Inauguration of Administration of Republic of China," *Congressional Record*, 101st Cong., 2d sess., May 23, 1990, H 2950.

⁶⁵ *The China Post*, October 15, 1990.

ward living conditions, and often return with lower expectations for political reconciliation between Taipei and Beijing.⁶⁶ Economic exchanges notwithstanding, therefore, a sudden resolution of the unification issue is improbable.

Yet commerce is surely drawing Taiwan and the PRC closer together. Already, it has generated a restructuring in relations between Taipei and Beijing. For the first time in over forty years, a formal channel for government-to-government communication has been established, though it is an indirect one. Intermediary organizations are helping to ensure that such conflicts as will inevitably arise over economic and other issues can be resolved peacefully through arbitration. In addition, these new organizations may boost social and cultural programs. Ultimately, the intermediary institutions could even become avenues for negotiating the unification issue. This development may complicate American policy in certain ways, but it will bode well for the Chinese.

⁶⁶ Julian Baum, "Nice place to visit . . .," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 18, 1990, p. 32.

Previous Award Recipients

Aaron L. Friedberg
The Weary Titan
Princeton University Press

Stephen M. Walt
The Origins of Alliances
Cornell University Press

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.
The Army and Vietnam
The Johns Hopkins University Press

Bruce G. Blair
Strategic Command and Control
Brookings Institution

Barry R. Posen
The Sources of Military Doctrine
Cornell University Press

John J. Mearsheimer
Conventional Deterrence
Cornell University Press



Announcing the 1992 Edgar S. Furniss Jr. National Security Book Award

A \$1,000 cash prize will be awarded to the author of a book published in 1991 that makes an exceptional contribution to the study of national security or the role of the military in society. The award, which commemorates the first director of the Mershon Center, is restricted to **the author's first published book**. Nominations by authors, publishers, or third parties must be made by February 28, 1992.

For more information, contact:

Don Lair
Mershon Center
The Ohio State University
199 West 10th Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201-2399
614-292-1681



Towards a Muscular Libertarianism

by James Robbins

For the classical liberal, state power is justified only as a means to a higher end: defending the liberty of the citizenry. To achieve this end, classical liberals agree, government must be limited; and free, uncoerced interaction must become the means of resolving disputes and distributing wealth. The preferred economic system derived from this theory is *laissez-faire* capitalism; the most widely accepted form of government is a democratic republic.

But though classical liberals agree more or less about the state's structure and domestic duties, its role as the external defender of life, liberty, and property is subject to much greater dispute. Classical liberal philosophy does not enjoin the state from all international action, of course. But to observe that the state may act offers no guidance as to how it should act. That is the province of foreign policy.

Certain classical liberals — neutralists — believe that the principles of classical liberalism entail a foreign-policy role for Washington that is narrowly defensive, limited to protecting the liberties of Americans from direct threats only. (Today, neutralists are often called isolationists, but that label was coined as a way of discrediting neutralists by exaggeration. The term was denounced by “adherents of moderate reserve” until “the bravado of an extremist minority” led to its adoption by neutralists.¹)

Opposed to the neutralists are other classical liberals — activists — who take a more expansive approach to foreign policy. Activists believe that classical liberalism is an internationalist ideology that Washington should promote vigorously, by itself and in conjunction with the rest of the free world.

Yet such a policy must be justified, under classical liberalism, as any activity of government must be justified: by the end of government. And neutralists therefore have quite properly put the burden of proof in this dispute upon the activists. But they have also gone further. In addition to demanding a justification for activism, neutralists have raised objections to specific formulations of an activist foreign policy. These objections include: the American isolationist tradition, the tactical difficulties of implementing an activist policy,

¹ Albert K. Weinberg, “The Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolation,” *American Political Science Review*, April 1940, pp. 539-47.

James Robbins, an assistant editor of *Liberty* magazine, recently received his Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. His writings have appeared in *The Wall Street Journal* and other publications.

the domestic harm caused by intervention abroad, and the superfluity of intervention if — as many classical liberals assume — the spread of liberalism is inevitable. To answer the neutralist, then, the activist must first provide a justification for his approach and then respond to the objections against it.

Justifying Activism

Classical liberal activists agree with neutralists that foreigners and foreign states are not our responsibility. Doug Bandow makes the point vividly in his discussion of South Korea. No country has an absolute claim on American friendship, nor may a foreign state legitimately make demands of the United States. Americans are not obligated to free the globe, especially at great expense and inconvenience. Such a policy amounts to slavery for Americans in the name of freedom for the rest of the world. In this spirit, Virginia Postrel has asked why any American should be obligated to pay for democracy in, for example, Zaire.²

If the United States can promote political and economic freedom, doing so may well serve the cause of peace, which is indisputably a state purpose.

The brief answer to Postrel's question is: if the United States can promote political and economic freedom, doing so may well serve the cause of peace, which is indisputably a state purpose. Politically and economically free states are the least warlike, and examples of liberal states actually exchanging blows are few. Politically free states face restraints from their own citizens on the arbitrary use of force; it is much easier for a dictator, unaccountable to the public, to engage in foreign adventures than it is for a democratically elected leader to do so. But liberal political mechanisms are not the only, or even the primary, mechanisms of peace.

The humane ethic underlying and fostering classical liberalism is the most important brake on conflict. The same impulse that leads men and societies to replace coercion with exchange in their domestic economic relations simultaneously prompts them to substitute trade for force internationally. Conversely, the waning of the spirit of liberal capitalism — the spirit of rational self-interest — can unleash the irrational passions leading to war. Thus, before 1914, a rising tide of economic nationalism and national imperialism broke down the European liberal system into armed camps maneuvering for advantage in neomercantilist empires, which contributed greatly to the outbreak of the First World War.

Because liberal states are more peaceful than illiberal ones, the proliferation of liberal states leads to less conflict in the international realm. Thus, the

² *Reason*, March 1991, pp. 25-26.

overall goal of American foreign policy should be to promote, by properly adapted means, the creation and survival of liberal societies and governments throughout the world. The distinction between societies and governments is important, however. A state may have a government with liberal mechanisms, and yet its society may lack a liberal spirit. Weimar Germany is an example. In such cases, there is no reason to expect the state will have a special predilection for either peace or stability. Nevertheless, so long as liberal governmental mechanisms exist to some degree, it is usually best that no overt interference take place and that the society be allowed to evolve on its own. In extreme circumstances, however, it may be worthwhile to impose liberal governmental mechanisms on a fundamentally illiberal society, in the hope that people will grasp the benefits of such institutions and come to adopt a liberal spirit. The experience of the United States with postwar Germany and Japan is instructive in this regard.

Standards for Activism

Once the link between classical liberalism and peace is recognized, U.S. policy should follow these broad guidelines:

- If U.S. interests are threatened directly, through a possible armed attack on the American homeland, a major threat to citizens or property abroad, or similar circumstances, then state action is mandatory, in proportion to the threat.
- If U.S. interests are not threatened directly, intervention is still permissible if the action under consideration will promote the cause of freedom, and if the United States has the capacity to take this action with a good chance of success.

These conditions would give American foreign policy a principled underpinning, sensitive to the cause of limited government and to liberal internationalism. The result would be a foreign policy that was normative without being utopian, and realistic without falling into amoral realism.

Critics of such principled internationalism point out that the United States cannot or will not right every wrong, the implication being that it is hypocritical to intervene for ideological purposes in some conflicts but not in others. This objection has been raised most recently by comparing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with the Soviet crackdown in the Baltic states. "Why hasn't the United States sent half a million troops to Lithuania?" detractors ask, implying that Washington's (or the U.N.'s) "response to aggression" is only a cover for state-interested motives.

But as Charles Krauthammer has pointed out, "legitimacy is a necessary; not a sufficient, condition for intervention."³ Internationalism must be

³ Charles Krauthammer, "The Poverty of Realism," *The New Republic*, February 17, 1986, p. 20.

both principled and prudent. Washington should not react uniformly to every case of aggression, but should discriminate between those cases in which action can make a positive difference and those in which it can not. Thus, the United States did not deploy to Lithuania because the consequences might have included a nuclear exchange, which would have served no discernible purpose, and certainly would not have advanced the cause of freedom.

Instruments of Policy

When setting down the guidelines for a foreign policy acceptable to classical liberalism, therefore, the means are as important as the ends. The use of certain means, in certain circumstances, would vitiate the ends sought; and insufficient means naturally lead to frustrated ends. The key is finding a correct balance of means to ends, not counting any means in or out, except in relation to policy goals.

Force. The most controversial tool, and the one most opposed by neutralists, is military force. But force, if used judiciously and in proportion to the threat or goal, is often an important aspect of an activist foreign policy. For the past forty years, it was in large part through strong, forward-based defenses that the Western world was protected and aggressors deterred. Moreover, military force is occasionally a useful instrument in the extension of freedom, as was shown in Grenada and Panama.

But the use of military force naturally raises the question of human costs, and it is often difficult to answer the question: How many 'body bags' should be tolerated to reach a policy goal? The liberation of Kuwait would certainly not have been worth hundreds of thousands of American lives, but the war was worth the sacrifices Americans actually made (and made voluntarily, thanks to our nonconscription army). This proportionality is demonstrated not only by the overwhelming national consensus on the outcome of the war, but also by comparison with past conflicts. Our goals were achieved with very few casualties, in absolute terms and when compared to the number of troops deployed.

Of course, it is difficult to balance the reality of death and the other horrors of war against the sometimes intangible benefits of foreign policy. Noting that soldiers volunteer to act for the state does not fully ameliorate the pain of their death and suffering, nor should it. Policy makers ought always to take into consideration the human costs of their policies. But the mere fact that there may be such costs cannot immobilize decision makers, lest they betray the trust of the citizens who have placed them in positions of responsibility. The number of prospective casualties is an important element in assessing options during crisis situations, but it is not the only element. The costs of failing to act, or of taking insufficient action, must also be weighed. One must ask: how many fewer 'body bags' will there be if the United States intervenes now rather than later? For example, how many fewer French soldiers would have died had

France marched on Berlin when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, instead of waiting to be attacked years later?

Allies. Alliances, another important instrument for reaching foreign policy ends, come in many forms — military and civil, bilateral and multilateral, and so forth. As long as an alliance is useful, goal-oriented, based on mutually reciprocal support, and does not outlive its usefulness, it can help preserve and extend the liberal order.

The costs of failing to act must also be weighed. One must ask: how many fewer ‘body bags’ will there be if the United States intervenes now rather than later?

Alliances, however, are much maligned by neutralists because they usually involve force commitments, are often costly, and might enmesh the United States in situations in which there is no compelling U.S. interest, or which might worsen the American position in the world. Activists suggest that the problem is not alliances per se, but alliances that are inappropriate. Poorly conceived alliances, or those superseded by events, ought to be reconsidered. International agreements, such as arms control accords, should be subjected to the same sort of scrutiny. Where they have outlived their usefulness, they should be renounced. The ABM Treaty is a fine example of an agreement that has been rendered otiose by technological advances, changes in strategy, and the political revolution of the late 1980s.

Intelligence agencies. The use of intelligence agencies for foreign-policy ends is controversial, primarily because government accountability is low, and the potential for domestic abuse is high. Yet such agencies often are the first line of defense against aggression.

There are many gradations of intelligence activity, from the relatively unobtrusive passive collection of electronic signals to human intelligence operations inside other countries. In extreme circumstances, sabotage, kidnapping, and assassination are included. A free society can condone such activities, particularly the most violent of the activities, only in extraordinary circumstances. But overall, good intelligence work contributes markedly to national security, and has the salutary practical effect of preventing situations from becoming so serious that force is necessary. Even the simple act of transporting a dictator out of his destabilized country can promote peaceful democratic change, as was demonstrated in the Philippines and Haiti. And the relationship of these points to Operation Desert Storm is obvious. Removing Saddam Husayn directly would probably have obviated the need for the use of military force.

Aid. Whether activist or neutralist, classical liberals tend to agree that the principal problem with foreign aid is that it goes directly from government to government, and thus tends to promote statism, socialism, corruption (diver-

sion of funds), and unhealthy economic developments. If state-sponsored foreign aid is to exist at all, it ought to go directly to the people it is intended to help, and not serve as an employment agency for bureaucrats. Reducing barriers to private international aid would be sensible — certainly more sensible than encouraging banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission to loan money to governments of less-developed countries, which then squander the money in senseless, ineffectual state-run projects, and contribute to the debt crisis in the United States. The link between state management and economic failure is understood intuitively by classical liberals of all stripes.⁴

Entangling Alliances

Against such justifications of an activist policy, neutralist classical liberals commonly protest that activism violates the “isolationist tradition” of the United States. Obviously, this is an America-centered argument; Europeans in the classical liberal tradition, lacking broad oceans between themselves and their neighbors, looked to international cooperation, not to self-imposed isolation, as the preferred alternative to war.⁵

That said, isolationism undoubtedly makes a strong appeal to Americans. For many years, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans rendered isolation a physical reality and thus a habit of thought. Moreover, the country was founded by people who, in large measure, defined themselves by contrast to European statesmen. As a consequence, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that early American foreign policy consisted “more in abstaining than acting.”⁶

But noninvolvement existed only as a prudential, not a creedal, policy. Before the twentieth century, the United States had fewer reasons to act. U.S. overseas economic interests were indirectly protected by the *Pax Britannica*. When Americans policy makers thought they needed to take action, they did so. International cooperation began with the Revolution, during which the Continentals were allied with France, Spain, and the Netherlands.⁷ Washington’s Farewell Address — famous for warning against entangling alliances — was directed in large part against one specific alliance, namely, the alliance with France that Jeffersonians were thought to be contemplating.⁸

Under Jefferson, of course, America purchased the Louisiana territory, an arguably unconstitutional bit of activism that was nevertheless a foreign

⁴ See, for example, Doug Bandow, “The U.S. Role in Promoting Third World Development,” in *U.S. Aid to the Developing World: A Free Market Agenda* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1985), pp. vii–xxxii.

⁵ See A.J.P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers: Dissent Over Foreign Policy, 1792–1939* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1958). See also Ludwig von Mises, *Omnipotent Government: The Rise of the Total State and Total War* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1944); and Friedrich Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1944).

⁶ Alexis de Tocqueville, vol. 1 of *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), p. 243.

⁷ Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1957), pp. 206–56.

⁸ Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc., 1955), pp. 80–82.

policy triumph. Had America's prototypical liberal not been expansionist-minded and willing to involve himself with the foreign powers that owned the rest of the continent, America today would terminate at the Mississippi.

As a matter of fact, Jefferson looked forward to a day when Americans would bring democracy and the English language to the entire hemisphere.⁹ The Monroe Doctrine, formulated by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams to prevent European intervention in the Western Hemisphere, is a nineteenth-century policy that neutralists often claim as their own. They take it to imply the United States would not stray from this hemisphere. Yet, contemporaries of the doctrine sometimes asserted it was interventionist, because it committed the United States to defending far-flung Latin America.¹⁰

The tragedy of interwar isolation was that very little exertion would have done a great deal of good.

In the nineteenth century, the United States also used force overseas in places as far away as the Falkland Islands, Equatorial Africa, and China. Troops were dispatched in pursuit of pirates, to punish locals for offenses against American trade, to avenge the murder of American seamen, and to free hostages. The tempo of such activism increased with the Spanish American War and the subsequent presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, culminating with President Wilson's utopian involvement in the First World War. The true isolationist period of American history dawned as a reaction to this. The United States had asserted itself as a world power, its geographical remoteness had been lessened through new technologies, and the free world was facing growing threats, especially from the newly powerful forces of communism, fascism, Japanese militarism, and nazism. The need for action was acute, but the willingness of the country to act had hit bottom. Weary of European troubles, Americans retreated from world affairs in 1919, maintaining a low-key presence through war-debt negotiations, arms and conflict control agreements (such as the Kellogg-Briand Treaty and the Washington Naval Agreement), and numerous, traditional small-scale interventions. Immigration restrictions were passed, as was the disastrous Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act, illustrating two illiberal tendencies that often seem to accompany neutralism: nativism and economic nationalism. (Although the logic of neutralism does not inexorably lead to such tendencies, it does tend to foster a perception of the United States as a unique community that must be closed off from corrupting foreign influences, be they political, social, or economic. This tendency was evident in the Progressive movement, and found a voice in William Jennings Bryan. It has recently reappeared in some of the speeches of Representative Richard Gephardt (Democrat of Missouri) and the writings of Patrick Buchanan.)

⁹ Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, Jr., *American National Security Policy* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 47.

¹⁰ Bailey, *A Diplomatic History*, pp. 183-86.

The tragedy of interwar isolation was that very little exertion would have done a great deal of good. The prospect of American intervention in Europe, or even of diplomatic support, might have urged the liberal European states to a more forceful effort against the growing threats they faced.

In sum, America's isolationist tradition can mean one of two things. Firstly, it can refer to the interwar era of appeasement. In this form, isolationism sought to manage conflict, but in fact did nothing to halt aggression in Europe or elsewhere. Alternatively, America's isolationist tradition can simply mean that the United States in the nineteenth century was not often allied with European powers or directly involved in their wars. But this was a tradition arrived at by default. The United States had little reason to enter European conflicts. Wherever and whenever the United States felt its interests were threatened, it did intervene. Thus, this tradition might better be termed "freedom of action."¹¹

Of course, many past American interventions would not qualify as just under the guidelines laid out earlier in this article, nor is their enumeration meant to be a justification for activism. Rather, the purpose here is to show that arguments stemming from a neutralist tradition *per se* are fraught with difficulties.

Tactical Blunders

A second common objection to foreign policy activism is that it backfires, leaving Washington in a situation worse than if it had taken no action. To this it may be said that, obviously, some foreign policy initiatives fail. But some succeed, and that should not be ignored. The early Reagan administration provides useful examples on each side: intervention in the Lebanese conflict, and the invasion of Grenada. The former was a failure, the latter a major success.

Lebanon. Since 1975, Lebanon had been in a state of civil war as various ethnic, religious, and political groups contended for power. Syria and Israel used the conflict to further their own designs, Syria shifting support to keep any single group from becoming too powerful (thus ensuring Syrian influence), and Israel pommeling the PLO, which was based in southern Lebanon. This objective led Israel to invade Lebanon in June 1982, and, with Syrian forces already present, fears arose of a new Arab-Israeli conflict.

In August 1982, the United States joined France and Italy in a Multinational Force (MNF), with the mission of evacuating the PLO army from Beirut, in order to prevent a destructive, house-to-house battle with the Israelis. The MNF ferried PLO fighters onto ships and dispersed them (solving another problem at the same time). By September 14 the MNF had left, with its mission accomplished.

But the situation did not stabilize, and a week later the MNF returned. Its new mission was unclear, however. President Reagan said it would "give a kind of support and stability while the Lebanese government seeks to reunite its

¹¹ Weinberg, "The Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolation."

people.”¹² Worse still, this second MNF lacked the firepower to be militarily effective, and, since it was now taking sides, it and other American targets came under attack, the two worst attacks being the bombings of the American Embassy in April and of the Marine barracks in October. These bombings led to escalation as air and naval forces were brought to bear, yet it was escalation without purpose or effect. Eventually, West Beirut was cut off from the airport, negating the MNF's one clear mission. With an election year looming and criticism increasing, President Reagan withdrew the troops on February 26, 1984.

The policy behind the U.S. intervention in Lebanon had no clear goal, and no discernible American interests were involved.

The intervention in Lebanon thus turned into a fiasco. The policy behind it had no clear goal, and no discernible American interests were involved. It should never have taken place.

Grenada. But mere days after the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, the Reagan administration enjoyed a foreign policy triumph, Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada.

In 1979, the island of Grenada had fallen victim to a Cuban-backed coup, and a socialistic People's Revolutionary Government immediately began to integrate the country into a growing Caribbean socialist alliance. The most alarming development was the construction of an airstrip on the island, capable of basing high-performance military aircraft, though the ostensible purpose was to promote tourism. On October 19, 1983, a struggle within the government led to the violent deaths of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and his followers, who were succeeded by an even more hard-line faction. The island seemed to be in chaos, and so arose an additional danger — the threat of harm to U.S. medical students studying on the island. With the possibility of a new hostage crisis looming, and with Lebanon-bound Marines in the area, President Reagan hastily assembled an invasion force and unleashed it on Grenada. Within days the socialist government had been removed and the students rescued.

The invasion of Grenada illustrated three marks of a successful military intervention. The first is a clearly defined, legitimate interest, or multiple interests. In this case, state interests were served by diminishing the strategic threat of an anti-U.S. Caribbean alliance. Moreover, U.S. citizens were rescued from danger, a primary state function. Finally, the cause of freedom was advanced by the liberation of the Grenadian people from an oppressive socialist regime.

The second mark of a successful military intervention is a definite mission. In the case of Grenada, this was the direct and complete excision of the People's Revolutionary Government, and the rescue of the students.

¹² *The New York Times*, September 29, 1982.

The third mark is the effective use of forces proportional to the mission. In Grenada, no more force was used than was necessary to accomplish U.S. objectives, and as a result, there were few U.S. and civilian casualties and little destruction of property. The use of too much force in a military action can have negative consequences on the people that the United States is trying to free, thus making them less amenable to the liberalism that the United States represents. On the other hand, indecisive or inept use of force often results in the failure of an operation.

In sum, where the Lebanese intervention met none of the conditions for a satisfactory military intervention, Urgent Fury met them all, and this was reflected in the favorable outcome of the operation. When these three elements (clear, legitimate interests; a well-defined mission; and the use of an appropriate force level) are present, classical liberals should have no tactical objections to state action.

War versus Freedom

Neutralists, however, raise an important series of criticisms based not on foreign policy activism *per se*, but on the effects it may have at home. According to this thesis, activism has extremely negative consequences for constitutional arrangements and the domestic freedoms they protect. As one popular formulation has it: war is the health of the state.¹³

Basically, there are three forms of harm to domestic freedom that foreign-policy activism may cause. The first is direct: in the heat of events, government may unnecessarily encroach on citizens' freedom in an effort to achieve its goals. The internment of Japanese-Americans after Pearl Harbor was such a case. Secondly, government may use an emergency as an excuse to assume powers that are unrelated to the crisis, but that it nevertheless wants. Some examples of this would be President Nixon's excesses in the name of national security. Thirdly, temporary emergency powers that the government (legitimately) assumes to deal with a crisis may become entrenched. The sweeping powers to intervene in the economy assumed by Congress and the executive branch during both world wars are the most persistent cases. During major crises, any or all of the three dynamics mentioned above may come into play, and they may do so through any of the three branches of the U.S. government.

The executive branch. The chief culprit has certainly been the executive branch. Some presidents and presidential advisors are predisposed to wield unconstitutional power, and wars simply give them excuses to do what they wanted in the first place. For example, some members of the Roosevelt War Cabinet wanted to maintain wartime rationing and price controls, seeing them as a model for what could be accomplished in peacetime. In this case, the

¹³ See Randolph S. Bourne, *War and the Intellectuals* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964), particularly essay seven, "The State."

advent of the Truman administration, and the unwillingness of the American people to continue to make sacrifices in peacetime, stymied their plans.

But even without such predispositions, the executive branch is by far the one most likely to disrupt constitutional arrangements. Its centralized apparatus and relative unity of decision — the chief reasons for giving the president primary foreign-policy responsibility — also facilitate its ability to over-reach itself.

The legislative branch. In principle, Congress has the ability to check executive power, yet in times of national crisis, the legislature is often swept away by events and follows the president's lead. This accounts for the rise of the "Imperial Presidency" during the Vietnam period — a silent Congress relinquished its responsibility to guard against executive abuses.

But Congress does not have to await executive action to participate in abuses. It can commit them on its own. For example, though the suppression of dissent during and after the World Wars was carried out by the executive branch, Congress passed the Espionage Act (1917) and the Smith Act (1940) under which it was conducted. In fact, Congress is as capable of starting a war as the executive. The War Hawks in the 1812 Congress were as willing as the president to go to war with England, if not more so. The Spanish-American War was pushed on the unwilling President McKinley by a hawkish legislature.

The judicial branch. When the president and Congress both refuse to protect the rights of the citizenry, the task falls to the courts. Like Congress, however, the Supreme Court has generally deferred to the executive, preferring not to second-guess actions taken during emergencies.¹⁴ The most notorious example of this is *Korematsu v. United States* (1944), in which the Court affirmed the internment of tens of thousands of Japanese-Americans by executive order during World War II. The Court justified this on the grounds of emergency, and stated that it could not, using hindsight, find the actions wrong for their time.

Speech restrictions have also been upheld in many cases, notably *Schenck v. United States* (1919) and *Gitlow v. New York* (1925). Rent control easily passed the Court's muster, even after World War II had ended, because "the war power does not necessarily end with the cessation of hostilities."¹⁵

Politics. If the internal checks and balances of government fail, one might think the people themselves could serve as the ultimate guardian of their rights. But the underlying flaw in this assumption is that the public mood is not always sympathetic to individual rights. During the Red Scare following the First World War, most of the public had no qualms whatsoever about the Palmer Raids and other anti-Bolshevist activity.¹⁶ And during Operation Desert Storm,

¹⁴For a discussion of these issues see Clinton Rossiter, *The Supreme Court and the Commander-in-Chief* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976).

¹⁵*Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.* (1948). One wonders if that power has yet lapsed and new challenges to rent control could be mounted.

¹⁶Robert K. Murray, *Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1955).

an opinion poll revealed that 63 percent of Americans thought it a “bad thing” for people to demonstrate against the conflict, and 31 percent would have supported a law banning antiwar demonstrations during wartime.¹⁷ Like Congress, the people will back almost any executive action if it produces favorable results, provided they know why it is being taken.

Protecting Freedom

The inflation of state power in a crisis, though it can go too far, is a natural and sometimes necessary reflex. Moreover, even though the United States has intervened with arms over 175 times in its history, most of these episodes had no long-term negative domestic consequences for freedom. Furthermore, rights abuses growing out of a war are in a sense the consequences of international and U.S. inaction that could have prevented that war. For example, had the United States taken action before Pearl Harbor, the Second World War — and hence the abuses associated with it — might never have come to pass. Perhaps no show of resolve from the United States could have prevented Hitler from attacking France once his strength had been built up, but the presence of an American expeditionary force might have changed the course of that battle, thus averting prolonged global conflict. And of course, if France and the other allies had marched on Berlin when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936, the Nazis would have been overthrown and the question of another world war in Europe would have been academic.

Still, the phenomenon that neutralists point to is real enough. Once a crisis is over, there are those who would retain the temporary powers, making the provisional permanent. Can anything be done to ensure emergencies do not produce permanent restrictions on freedom?

Because the executive is so often the source of abuses, some activists seek to solve the problem by shifting responsibility for foreign policy to the legislature. Congress is more sensitive to public opinion than the executive, says this reasoning, and will therefore be a better protector of the rights of the citizenry.

The difficulty with this is that, in peacetime, Congressional activism becomes meddlesome, and causes more trouble than good. During the 1970s, the War Powers Resolution, Congressional micromanagement of the defense establishment, reforms of the intelligence community, and a generally intrusive attitude left the United States with a confused foreign policy, and the era witnessed a steady erosion of U.S. international influence. Yet, when crises came (in Iran, Afghanistan, and Poland), Congress bowed to the executive.

Congress, by its nature, cannot lead in foreign policy, it can only prevent others from doing so to the detriment of the country. The executive needs room to pursue an active foreign policy while facing ultimate (but not immediate) Congressional oversight. The Iraq crisis provided a sound example of this

¹⁷ Gallup poll results reported in *The Boston Globe*, February 24, 1991.

arrangement in action. While the president was allowed to take the immediate action necessary to react to the crisis, ultimately Congress was asked to approve the previous troop deployment, and to give permission for further action, which it did on both counts.

In addition, it should be noted, the courts' record is not entirely bleak. During the Korean War, the Supreme Court distinguished itself in *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer* (1952) by ruling that the conflict gave President Truman no authority to seize the steel industry.

Nor is the political system itself, and the will of the voters, a completely unreliable check on politicians. Indeed, in the postwar era, presidents have learned that substantial foreign policy failures will do them in. The stalemate in Korea, for example, was an important factor in President Truman's decision not to run again. President Johnson's March 1968 speech announcing that he would not seek another term as president also reflected this dynamic.

Is Activism Needed?

A final objection to international activism holds that it is unnecessary, because the victory of classical liberalism is inevitable. Communist and other statist systems cannot prevail in the long term, so this argument says, because they are inefficient, uncompetitive, and nonproductive.

The argument arises by analogy from nineteenth-century *laissez faire* — if there is a political imbalance, it will correct itself, as economic imbalances do. The invisible hand will see to it that dictatorships do not last. In fact, some classical liberals have argued, confusingly, that state action to remove dictatorships is the same as economic interventionism, that it constitutes interference with the free workings of a marketplace. But preventative or defensive action by one state against another is clearly not the same as economic intervention; on the contrary, it is the international equivalent of protecting property rights.

Nevertheless, there is a grain of truth in the neutralist position as stated. Over the long term, a given dictatorship does tend to consume itself. The question for Western policy makers in the postwar era has been: What to do in the meantime? Should they wait for the inevitable collapse of Soviet (or Chinese, or Cuban, or Vietnamese) communism, or should they take steps to bring it about? The United States chose a policy that combined both elements, the policy called containment.

George F. Kennan's article, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," served as the basis for the more thoroughly developed and militarily oriented containment strategy spelled out in NSC-68 (1950).¹⁸ According to Kennan, the USSR's foreign policy was driven by a messianic ideology based on the assumption of a dialectical conflict between socialism and capitalism. He recommended that Moscow be faced with resolute resistance to its expansionism, and that the So-

¹⁸George F. Kennan (a.k.a. "X"), "Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, pp. 566-82.

viet system should be contained until its internal contradictions brought about reform or collapse. Hence, containment was a form of activism meant to hasten the decline predicted by classical liberal neutralists.

Under the circumstances, neutralist classical liberals opposed to U.S. cold war commitments are sometimes placed in the curious position of arguing that Stalin in fact had no designs on Western Europe and that containment was a mask for more insidious policies.¹⁹ This position is curious because it posits more “good nature” to the Soviet dictator than to their own imperfect but far superior government. It forsakes the classical liberal’s wariness of states, in proportion to their statism, in order to engage in anti-Americanism.

In any case, the foreign policy successes and failures of the cold war period need not be repeated here; suffice it to say that containment theory was overall a sound guide to policy, even if it was sometimes flawed in execution. These flaws became particularly noticeable when the policy was applied to the Third World, where the bipolar order created a troubling dynamic. The leaders of poor countries played the superpowers against each other for aid and favors, and, in this way, the United States was induced to support authoritarian regimes, sacrificing in the process the moral capital of its prodemocracy stance. Better, it was argued, that the United States maintain influence with an authoritarian regime, which might evolve towards democracy, than permit the state to slip into the Soviet camp of totalist states, from which it would never emerge. This “lesser of two evils” approach did produce some notable evolutionary successes (Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea) but also created a few major failures (Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Iran).

As containment wore on, however, the realist element in the policy began to overshadow the idealistic. The goal of undermining the Soviet system gave way to the pursuit of stability, primarily owing to an all-consuming desire to deter war, which arose with the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons and long-range delivery systems. Because a failure to deter no longer meant catastrophic world war but swift and total annihilation, the key to safety was seen in stasis, achieved through a joint U.S.-Soviet appreciation of the threat of destruction and through the gradual relaxation of tensions.

In these new circumstances, strategists argued, the Soviet Union could not be compelled to give up further imperialist objectives; it had to be persuaded to do so. At the same time, the United States had to give up its long-term goal of bringing about a collapse of the existing Soviet communist empire. This new attitude contributed to the most glaring failure of containment, the Vietnam War. While sound in its goal (containing communism), an overriding desire not to upset the great communist powers guaranteed that the war was poorly executed — so much so that its ends became confused and the American people lost faith in the United States’s international mission.²⁰ After the defeat in Viet-

¹⁹ See, for example, Sheldon Richman’s defense of cold war revisionism in “Against Intervention — A Reply to Stephen Cox,” *Liberty*, May 1990, pp. 32-34.

²⁰ See Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982).

nam came a series of communist victories in the 1970s, a rapid Soviet nuclear build-up, and the conviction among Soviet ideologists that the United States was in its final stages as a world power. Not until the Reagan administration was U.S. foreign policy brought back to its ideological roots, and then with telling effect.

Conclusion

The current debates over reducing U.S. commitments to various alliances overseas should not divert attention from the fact that they worked, which is why disbanding them can even be discussed. And this points to a counterfactual question the neutralists must address: would the United States be better off today had it never considered containment and returned to isolation after 1945?

The clear answer is no. Before 1989, critics of containment argued that U.S.-Soviet bipolarity was a fact to which the United States must adjust itself. Since 1989, they have argued that the Soviet collapse was inevitable and containment had nothing to do with it. Neither of these positions is tenable. Had the Soviet Union not been vigorously opposed by the West it is doubtful the revolutions of 1989 would have taken place. By preventing the Soviet Union from looting the rest of Europe and much of the world, the United States forced communism to face its internal contradictions. And even if we grant that liberalism would have triumphed eventually in Eastern Europe, containment has meant that there are millions of people who are free today, not in some distant utopian future.

Now published by the Johns Hopkins University Press
for the Center of International Studies

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Henry S. Bienen, Editor

Since 1948, **World Politics** has offered analytical and theoretical articles, research notes, and review articles in international relations, comparative politics, political theory, foreign policy, and modernization, as well as in history, geography, economics, military affairs, and sociology.

Under the editorial sponsorship of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, **World Politics** publishes original papers on the frontiers of research and scholarship. Current articles include "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," "Explaining Third World Alignment," and "The Security Problematic of the Third World."



Published quarterly in October, January, April, and July.

Please enter my subscription to **WORLD POLITICS**:

☐ \$20.00 individual ☐ \$40.00 institution

Subscribers in Canada and Mexico add \$4.75 postage; outside North America, add \$8.50.

Payment must be drawn on a U. S. bank or by international money order. Maryland residents add 5% sales tax. Toll-free number for charge orders only: 1-800-537-JHUP.

Payment Options:

☐ Check or money order payable to Johns Hopkins University Press

☐ Bill my ☐ VISA ☐ MasterCard Card # _____

Signature _____ Exp. Date _____

Name _____

Address _____

City/State/Zip _____



Send order with payment to: The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals
Publishing Division, 701 W. 40th St., Suite 275, Baltimore, MD 21211-2190.

EA1

Keep the Troops and the Money at Home

by Doug Bandow

We are living in exciting times, a world of dramatic change. Who would have believed, even three years ago, that the Berlin Wall would fall, Germany would be reunited, and most of Eastern Europe would have noncommunist governments? That the menace of aggressive Soviet communism would disappear? That the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would admit "I'm running out of villains. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung."¹

In this new world we need to reconsider the interventionist stance that has dominated U.S. foreign policy for nearly five decades. The United States will remain a global power, but the question persists: What kind of power is it to be? Should it continue to seek global hegemony, or should it go back to being, in Jeane Kirkpatrick's words, a "normal country"?

The Interventionist Outlook

The American military is today spread around the globe. After a mercifully short war in the Persian Gulf, the United States remains entangled in the affairs of the Kurds, risking a long-term presence in one of the world's most volatile regions. President Bush has said that 195,000 U.S. troops in Europe is the minimum required, despite the disappearance of any credible threat to the West and despite the ability of the prosperous European community — which includes two nuclear powers, Britain and France — to deter a resurgent USSR in the future. Indeed, the president does not foresee the arrival of the "utopian day," when all of America's soldiers might come home, for perhaps another hundred years.² The administration also seems committed to retaining at least 100,000 soldiers in East Asia. South Korea possesses ten times the GNP and twice the population of communist North Korea, yet the Pentagon recoils at proposals to withdraw U.S. forces from the South.

And many would like to further expand America's role as global policeman. Poland, for instance, wants U.S. defense guarantees extended to this

¹ *Newsweek*, April 22, 1991.

² *The New York Times*, December 5, 1989.

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C., and a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan.

former member of the Warsaw Pact.³ Early in 1990, some supporters of the Baltic states' campaign for independence urged the United States to extend diplomatic recognition to these states, and to launch a sealift or airlift to break the Soviet economic embargo.⁴ Conservative columnist Bruce Fein advocated intervention in Liberia's three-sided civil war.⁵ The Heritage Foundation proposed intervening militarily in Ethiopia to deliver food supplies.⁶ John Copper, of Rhodes College, has written of America's obligation to guarantee Taiwan's security.⁷ Heritage Foundation president Edwin Feulner cites such countries as Cuba as a "threat to world peace," requiring a strong U.S. military.⁸ The Heritage Foundation would also have the United States greatly increase its preparedness for involvement in low-intensity conflicts around the world — in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.⁹ Some officials in the Pentagon seem to be thinking in similar terms, and are therefore planning future strategy based on meeting "regional contingencies."¹⁰ And columnist Ben Wattenberg wants the United States to continue to build weapons simply to remain "Number One."¹¹

Moreover, the United States continues to provide money to virtually every Third World country through a variety of national and international bodies. The United Nations is one of these bodies, and the administration — believing that the Persian Gulf crisis has rejuvenated the United Nations — is pressing Congress to make up past arrearages that accumulated as a result of congressional resentment over the way the United Nations was taking advantage of America's status as the body's largest funder.

Ronald Reagan, despite his conservative reputation, repeatedly pushed through funding increases for multilateral development institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Development Association, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. President Bush has agreed to a 50 percent hike in the International Monetary Fund's resources, as well as the creation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Although the United States is the single largest contributor to the latter institution, it is run by a French president and — against the wishes of Washington — refuses to refrain from subsidizing government ventures in Eastern Europe. And Washington, despite supposed budget stringency, will spend \$15

³ *The Washington Times*, November 20, 1990.

⁴ Ted Galen Carpenter, "We Are Not the World's Social Worker," *The Orange County Register*, October 7, 1990.

⁵ Bruce Fein, "Fiddling While Liberia Burns," *The Washington Times*, October 23, 1990.

⁶ William Pascoe, "In Ethiopia, Mengistu's Final Solution," The Heritage Foundation, Executive Memorandum No. 200, May 12, 1988.

⁷ John Copper, "Scholar: ROC Must Stay Alert," *Free China Journal*, October 15, 1990.

⁸ Edwin Feulner, "The Post-Cold War World Remains a Dangerous Place," *The Orange County Register*, September 7, 1990.

⁹ David Silverstein, "Preparing America to Win Low-Intensity Conflicts," The Heritage Foundation, Background No. 786, August 31, 1990.

¹⁰ *The Washington Post*, May 19, 1991.

¹¹ Ben Wattenberg, "Can the United States Remain No. 1 and Is It Worth It?" *The Orange County Register*, February 7, 1990.

billion annually on foreign aid in coming years. This money goes to leftist dictators, socialist planners, and a host of nonpartisan, garden variety thugs, all in the name of advancing America's interests.

Obviously, some advocates of military intervention oppose much of the current foreign aid program, just as some supporters of foreign aid oppose military intervention. But most believers in an expansive American presence abroad — including the president, secretary of state, and leading legislators, analysts, and columnists — are equally avid supporters of both forms of intervention. Indeed, while military involvement has the most dramatic impact, financial assistance is the most pervasive form of Washington's foreign activity.

Given the expansiveness of the U.S. role abroad, it is time to ask: Is there anything for which the American people are not forced to pay? Is there anything for which young Americans are not asked to die?

Justification of Foreign Policy

To answer these questions, one must first decide on the purpose of the national government. What are the primary duties of the U.S. government? The first is to safeguard the country's security, in order to protect citizens' lives and property. (The U.S. government also has some obligation to attempt to protect American citizens traveling abroad, but ultimately those who do business outside the United States must voluntarily incur the risks of doing so. Thus, the formal justification for the United States's entry into World War I — to preserve the right of Americans to travel on armed belligerent merchant vessels carrying munitions through declared submarine zones — was frankly absurd.) The second primary duty of the government is to preserve the constitutional system and liberties that make America a great country and one worth living in. Every foreign policy action should be consistent with these two functions, and there are no higher goals for the president, legislators, and other officials.

This is not, of course, to say that there are no other important ideals in life. For instance, the Apostle John wrote in his first epistle that "This is how we know what love is: Jesus Christ laid down his life for us. And we ought to lay down our lives for our brothers."¹² But moral duties that apply to individuals are very different from the obligations and authority of the civil institutions that govern all. The Apostle John did not suggest that we should force our neighbors — indeed, our entire country — to lay down their lives.

Many people no longer see any moral dimension to taxing and drafting others to implement the government's policies. Joshua Muravchik of the American Enterprise Institute, for instance, sees no problem in promoting "common purposes" so long as such actions "don't involve curtailing the rights of our own citizens, but involve only taxing them."¹³ Yet both taxation and conscription, the policy used for years to man Washington's extensive overseas

¹² 1 John 3:16.

¹³ Joshua Muravchik, "In From the Cold War," *Reason*, March 1991, p. 25.

commitments, certainly “involve curtailing the rights of our own citizens.” An activist foreign and military policy should therefore require a justification that is important enough to warrant circumscribing people’s freedom.

A Foreign Policy of Higher Principles?

Advocates of an interventionist foreign policy have, of course, advanced many lofty justifications for their policy: To promote democracy. To ensure stability. To protect human rights. To stop aggression. To enforce international law and order. To create a new world order. And on and on. Such appeals to higher principles and values are very seductive. Suggesting that foreign policy should be based on the promotion of the national interest sounds decidedly cold and selfish in comparison.

The moral goals articulated by many interventionists are important, but we should have no illusions about the ability of the U.S. government to promote, let alone impose, them. Furthermore, recourse to such principles is often simply a rationalization for pursuing strategic or political ends. A cursory survey of activist foreign policy decisions ostensibly taken in the name of higher moral principles reveals ample evidence of both naïvete and sophistry.

For instance, policy makers in Washington regularly proclaim their love of democracy and the free market, but as of this writing, there is little sign of reform in Kuwait City; American troops have fought to make the Middle East safe for a monarchy that has so far sought to evade its promises of greater domestic freedom. Going further back in history, Washington created the Export-Import Bank in 1934 to underwrite private exports to the USSR, then ruled by the bloodiest dictator to arise in history. More recently, this institution funded Nicolae Ceaușescu of Romania, and continues to subsidize virtually every authoritarian regime to come along. The United Nations Development Program has undertaken projects in North Korea; the World Bank is again lending to China. Mengistu’s murderous Ethiopia was a client of the IMF as well as the Bank. The list goes on and on.

Despite its professed ideals, the United States has used its troops to prop up authoritarian regimes in Korea and Vietnam. In two world wars, it cultivated grand alliances with, respectively, an authoritarian Russia (although admittedly, by the time the United States declared war, the tsar had been overthrown) and a totalitarian USSR. It has viewed its bases in and defense treaty with the Philippines as equally important during the presidencies of Marcos and Aquino.

Not only has America’s intervention often been motivated by factors other than disinterested selflessness, but Washington has equally often bungled the job. Financial assistance to a host of Third World autocracies has strengthened the enemies of freedom and democracy. Aid and support tied the United States to failing dictatorships in Iran and Nicaragua; their falls resulted in neither democracy nor allies. America’s entry into World War I to promote a utopian world order had perhaps the most disastrous consequences of any international

meddling by any state ever; by allowing the allies to dictate an unequal and unstable peace, it sowed the seeds of this planet's worst conflagration, which bloomed just two decades later.¹⁴

Even more important than the question of Washington's sincerity and realism in promoting higher principles in its foreign policy is the question of cost. How much money — and how many lives — are we prepared to sacrifice to bring American principles to other countries? The price of restoring Kuwait's sovereignty proved surprisingly cheap, but nothing guaranteed the paucity of U.S. and allied casualties. Although they refused to discuss specific casualty estimates in advance, U.S. commanders engaged in hostilities fully expecting a casualty figure many times greater. How many American lives did policy makers think Kuwait's liberation would have been worth? Five thousand lives? Fifty thousand lives? And, even if Iraq was the aggressor, the deaths of tens or even hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, many of them either civilians or military conscripts, must also be recognized as a very real cost of U.S. intervention.

How many body bags per foreign life saved would make intervention elsewhere worthwhile? Why did Iraq's earlier brutal assaults on its Kurdish minority not warrant war? How about Syria's depredations in Lebanon? China's swallowing of Tibet? The war between India and Pakistan? Or Pol Pot's mass murder in Cambodia?

If young American males — and now females — are born to give their lives overseas to forestall aggression, protect human rights, and uphold a new world order, should not the United States have gone to war to unseat the two dictators who (unlike Saddam Husayn) truly were the moral equivalent of Hitler — Stalin and Mao? Why was protecting human rights in these instances not worth war? If the answer is that the cost would have been too great, then those who attempt to make moral distinctions between sacrificing 58,000 Americans for Vietnam but refusing to offer up some unspecified larger number to free more than one billion Chinese need to explain their methodology — unless, of course, they believe that the United States really should have ignited World War III in the name of a new world order.

In fact, the United States did not intervene to liberate the two largest communist states because doing so was not perceived to be in America's interest, owing to the catastrophic costs that such actions surely would have entailed. For all the idealism embodied in the moral explanations for U.S. behavior, American intervention is usually animated by a general sense of realpolitik.

In the case of the Gulf war, humanitarian concerns may have eventually come to dominate President Bush's thinking. But had the initial fighting been between, say, Ethiopia and Somalia, the United States is unlikely to have intervened, just as Washington did not act when those two countries fought more

¹⁴ For a discussion of the key role that the United States's entry into World War I played in creating the conditions that led to World War II, see William Henry Chamberlin, *America's Second Crusade* (Chicago, Ill.: Henry Regnery & Co., 1950), pp. 13-39.

than a decade ago. Concerns about the regional balance of power and Iraq's growing arsenal of weapons of mass destruction were also real, but secondary; after all, the United States was prepared to leave Saddam's military strength intact had he chosen to withdraw from Kuwait by January 15. Despite President Bush's rhetoric, Washington's real vital interest in the Gulf was to ensure allied access to oil. Likewise, past aid to President Mobutu of Zaire can be explained only as an attempt to buy influence with a dictator who controls important natural resources. The presence of troops in South Korea is often justified by U.S. officials as giving America an advanced outpost to be used against the Soviets in the event of war.

As unsatisfactory as an emphasis on America's national interests may be to some, it is the only proper basis for U.S. policy.

As unsatisfactory as an emphasis on America's national interests may be to some, it is the only proper basis for U.S. policy. Such an approach reflects the purpose of the United States government — to protect the security, liberty, and property of the American people — in a sense that the international pursuit of utopian ideals does not. Reasons of national interest and security are the only legitimate justification for U.S. intervention abroad.

Weighing Costs

However, it is not enough to decide that the United States has one or more interests at stake in some foreign matter, because interests are not of unlimited value. The benefits of such objectives have to be balanced against the costs of intervention.

Perhaps the most obvious expense is financial. NATO accounts for roughly half of the entire military budget; the defense of the Pacific runs to about \$40 billion. Operation Desert Shield cost \$60 billion or more (although that bill was largely covered by allied states). Foreign aid adds another \$15 billion annually to the deficit. All told, roughly 70 percent of America's military outlays goes to prepare for conventional wars abroad. Observes General Wallace Nutting, former commander-in-chief of the U.S. Readiness Command, "We today do not have a single soldier, airman, or sailor solely dedicated to the security mission within the United States."¹⁵

Our domestic freedoms also suffer as a result. World Wars I and II resulted in massive assaults on civil liberties, including the suppression of dissent and free speech, and culminated in the incarceration of more than 100,000

¹⁵ Quoted in "The U.S. as the World's Policeman? Ten Reasons to Find a Different Role," Center for Defense Information, *The Defense Monitor*, vol XX, no. 1, 1991, p. 2.

Japanese-Americans. Much more modest, but still unsettling, was the anti-Arab sentiment unleashed during the short war against Iraq.¹⁶ Moreover, a panoply of security restrictions that grew out of the cold war continues to limit our freedom.¹⁷

Both wars also vastly expanded the government's economic powers. Federal spending in 1916 was just \$713 million; it shot to \$18.5 billion in 1919, eventually settling back to the \$3 billion level throughout the 1920s, more than quadruple its prewar level. Similarly, federal outlays in 1940 were \$9.5 billion. Spending increased nearly tenfold, to \$92.7 billion, fell to \$29.8 billion in 1948, triple prewar levels, and then began its inexorable growth upward.¹⁸ Observes Heritage Foundation vice president Burton Yale Pines, "today's mammoth federal government is the product not so much of the New Deal but of the massive power assembled in Washington to wage World War II and the Cold War."¹⁹ Some of the government's new regulations were never reversed: New York City, for instance, still suffers from the destructive effects of rent control, a supposedly temporary wartime measure. All told, writes Robert Higgs of Lafayette College, after World War II:

A host of legacies remained: all the government-financed plants and equipment and the military-industrial complex to continue operating them; important postwar legislation inspired by wartime practices, including the Employment Act, the Taft-Hartley Act, and the Selective Service Act of 1948; the GI Bill and the new middle class it fostered; a voracious and effective federal income-tax system; a massive foreign aid program. More importantly the war left the constitutional structure of the country deeply altered in the direction of judicial abdication and excessive autonomy; the nation no longer possessed a "peacetime Constitution" to which it could return. Most significantly the war moved the prevailing ideology markedly toward acceptance of an enlarged governmental presence in the economy. At last even the majority of businessmen had come to accept, and often to demand, Big Government."²⁰

Similarly, America's interventionist foreign policy has malformed the domestic constitutional system. We have seen both a centralization of power in the federal government and the aggrandizement of the presidency. How far we have come is reflected by the fact that serious thinkers who purport to believe in jurisprudential interpretation based on the original intent of the framers argued that the president had the unilateral authority to move more than 500,000 men and women far from home and launch a war against another sovereign state without congressional approval. While reasonable people may disagree

¹⁶ See, for example, *The Washington Times*, February 19, 1991; *The Orange County Register*, January 14, 1991; Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, "Arab Americans: Suspects Without Probable Cause," *The Washington Post*, January 27, 1991.

¹⁷ See, for example, Morton H. Halperin and Jeanne M. Woods, "Ending the Cold War at Home," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1990-91, pp. 128-43.

¹⁸ *Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 1992* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. VII-13.

¹⁹ Burton Yale Pines, "Ten Principles of a Conservative Foreign Policy," Heritage Talking Points, 1991, p. 3.

²⁰ Robert Higgs, *Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 235-36.

over the exact demarcation line between presidential and congressional war-making powers, the Constitution means nothing if it does not require congressional action in this instance. And, although U.S. participation in formal United Nations forces is rather limited, it represents an even greater abrogation of Congressional authority, since the U.N. Act dispenses with the need for a declaration of war when such troops are involved.

Further, intervention has a great human cost. Woodrow Wilson's fantasies of a new world order led him to enter the mindless European slugfest called World War I,²¹ which left 116,000 young Americans dead and did nothing to prevent the outbreak within one generation of an even worse war, which killed another 407,000 Americans. Since the end of the Second World War, more than 112,000 young Americans have died in undeclared conflicts. It is one thing to ask young Americans to die for the U.S. Republic. It is quite another to expect them to sacrifice their lives in the interest of power-projection politics more characteristic of an empire.

With the growing ability of even small political movements and countries to kill U.S. citizens and to threaten mass destruction, the risks of foreign entanglements increase.

Finally, intervention could one day threaten the very national survival even of the United States. We live in a world where biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons are spreading, along with the availability of ballistic missiles. Terrorism has become a fixture of international life. With the growing ability of even small political movements and countries to kill U.S. citizens and to threaten mass destruction, the risks of foreign entanglements increase. No longer are the high costs limited to soldiers in the field. In coming years, the United States could conceivably lose one or more large cities to demented or irrational retaliation for American intervention. A modest SDI program would reduce these risks, but it would never be able to provide full protection.

Considering Alternatives

How, then, should we formulate a foreign policy? Every action taken abroad should reflect the purpose for creating the U.S. government; namely, to serve the interests of U.S. society and the people who live there. The role of the U.S. state is not to conduct glorious utopian crusades around the globe. It is not to provide a pot of cash for the secretary of state to pass out to friendly regimes to increase U.S. influence abroad. It is not to sacrifice the lives of young

²¹ Historians continue to argue about the proportion of blame deserved by the respective parties in that war. One illuminating account is Walter Millis, *Road to War: America 1914-1917* (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 1935).

Americans to minimize other peoples' sufferings. In short, the money and lives of the American people do not belong to policy makers, even the president, to expend for purposes other than defending the American community.

Of course, some analysts argue that promoting moral values, particularly democracy and human rights, advances American national interests by making conflict — or, at least, war — less likely. The link is tenuous, however. Indeed, in the Middle East, North Africa, and some other states, true democracy is likely to unleash destabilizing forces, particularly Islamic fundamentalism. The end of the totalitarian rule that kept simmering ethnic tensions in Eastern Europe under control has already resulted in violent conflict in the Balkans. The best we can say is that democracies generally do not attack their neighbors.

Further, America's ability to advance democratic values is inconsistent at best. There is little that the United States can do to make Serbia a free country, for example. And Washington's policies often throw the United States's commitment to democracy into question. Foreign aid, in particular, has more often assisted authoritarian rulers than liberal forces throughout the Third World. In the absence of any direct link between important U.S. objectives and the imperative to advance democracy in a particular country, Americans' resources should not be used in this way. This would in no way preclude private groups from undertaking such efforts, just as many conservative and libertarian organizations are now active in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, to decide that a specific intervention is consistent with the purpose of the U.S. government is not enough to justify it. We also need to assess whether there are alternative means of achieving the goal. A free Europe is certainly important to the United States, but the maintenance of 195,000 soldiers there is not necessary. The Soviet threat has waned, while Europe's ability to defend itself has grown. A sharply reduced Soviet threat may remain in coming years as the USSR struggles with daunting economic, ethnic, and political problems, but we are far more likely to see a Soviet civil war than aggression against the West. Even General John Galvin, the supreme allied commander in Europe, says that he does not believe the Soviets are planning an offensive any longer, and that once they withdraw from Eastern Europe, it would take them six weeks to mobilize.²² Thus, there is no reason why the Europeans, with thrice the economic strength of a decaying Soviet Union and a new buffer in the former Warsaw Pact states, cannot create their own security system that would deter any potential threat.

Similarly, South Korea is vastly stronger than North Korea in every way except current military strength.²³ Seoul's growing edge has become increasingly obvious as South Korea has stripped away the North's allies, particularly the Soviet Union and the East European states. The South is fully capable of eliminating the military imbalance in the peninsula. South Korean officials do

²² *The Wall Street Journal*, May 13, 1991.

²³ For a more detailed analysis, see Doug Bandow, "Leaving Korea," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1989-90, pp. 77-93.

not deny their country's ability to sharply increase its defense efforts; instead, they tend to complain about having to bear the added expense.²⁴ This is hardly a justification for an American presence. Seoul could gradually increase its military spending — which could be unnecessary if the North enters into meaningful arms control negotiations — as U.S. forces were phased out.

There were even alternatives in the Persian Gulf. One justification for American intervention was to help restore a regional balance of power. Concern over maintaining a post-war balance of power was at least one factor in the administration's decision to end the war when it did, and allied forces commander General Norman Schwarzkopf warned in the fall of 1990 about the threat to the "long-term balance of power in this region" posed by attempting to "drive on to Baghdad and literally dig out the entire Baathist regime and destroy them."²⁵ (Of course, such a balance would be of considerably less concern to the United States if an aggressive Iraq were not believed to threaten vital U.S. economic and strategic interests in the region; few Americans would advocate the use of military force to maintain a balance of power in, say, central Africa.) However, such a balance could well have been achieved without 500,000 American troops. Iraq was surrounded by enemies and could have been constrained by a combination of Iran, Syria, Turkey, and perhaps Egypt. Although these states were unlikely to initiate war to liberate Kuwait, the status of which is essentially irrelevant to anyone's security, they had a real interest in deterring an Iraqi assault on Saudi Arabia. And they were fully capable of doing so, despite the popular build-up given Saddam Husayn's forces. (In retrospect, Iraq's capabilities appear to have been greatly overestimated, at least in part as a matter of Pentagon policy.)²⁶

It might be difficult to fashion alternative solutions that do not involve direct U.S. intervention, and Washington might not always be fully satisfied with the outcome. But it is unrealistic to expect the United States to assume the responsibility for maintaining global order. Instead, Washington should seek to promote cost-effective policies that yield results most consistent with the U.S. government's duty to protect Americans' security and constitutional freedoms.

Indeed, even if there appear to be no alternatives to a U.S. commitment, the United States must weigh benefits against costs before it intervenes, and avoid or extricate itself from tragic but ultimately irrelevant conflicts.

For example, what if U.S. policy makers concluded that South Korea would not defend itself if Washington pulled out its troops?²⁷ In fact, Seoul would probably be the last American ally to give up, but what if it decided to do so? A Northern takeover of the South would be a tragedy for the latter, but it would have little impact on the United States, whose security would remain

²⁴ Private interviews with the author. See Doug Bandow, "Seoul Long," *The American Spectator*, November 1990, pp. 35-36.

²⁵ *The New York Times*, November 2, 1990.

²⁶ See, for example, *The Washington Times*, March 5, 1991.

²⁷ Such an argument has been made by William Taylor and Michael Mazarr of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Letter to the Editor, *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1990, p. 188.

largely unchanged and whose economy would suffer only marginally from the loss of a mid-sized trading partner. Obviously, other deleterious effects are also possible; it has been argued that China, for instance, might be more likely to invade Taiwan absent an American defense guarantee for Seoul. However, like politics, aggression is primarily local, and there are many good reasons for Beijing to exercise restraint irrespective of the likelihood of an American military response. The threat to go to war should be reserved for cases involving vital American interests. Korea is a peripheral, rather than a vital, interest of the United States, and does not warrant spending billions of dollars and risking tens of thousands of lives every year.

A similar analysis could have been performed on the Gulf. Even if the other regional powers had not taken steps to contain Iraq, the likelihood of Saddam Husayn striking Saudi Arabia was overplayed, since it would have left him dangerously overstretched. Similarly, the consequences even of a highly unlikely conquest of the entire Gulf were overstated. Iraq and Kuwait together accounted for about 7.3 percent of international oil production before the embargo; control of Saudi Arabia would have given Saddam 15.6 percent, and if the other small sheikdoms were also included, the total would have increased to 21.5 percent. Thus, in the fantastic worst-case scenario, Saddam would have controlled about one-fifth of international production; enough to nudge prices up, to be sure, but not enough to control prices or wreck the international economy.²⁸ If proponents of Operation Desert Storm believed that energy prices and the consequent repercussions on the international economy warranted war, they should have been more forthcoming about how many body bags per unit increase in oil prices they believed to be acceptable. Nor did Saddam's invasion of Kuwait threaten America's ally Israel. To the contrary, Iraq only attacked Israel in a desperate attempt to split the coalition; absent the U.S. presence, Baghdad would surely not have attacked Israel, because that country was fully capable and willing to retaliate.

Conclusion

The United States enjoys many advantages that provide it with the luxury of remaining aloof from geopolitical conflicts that engulf other countries. The United States benefits from relative geographic isolation, for example. (This does not insulate it from nuclear attack, of course, which is why sufficient resources should be allocated to develop some form of missile defense.) The United States also has the world's largest single economic market, which reduces the impact of the loss of one or more trading partners. (Germany and Japan, for example, would suffer far more if the U.S. market was denied to them.) Moreover, America has a constitutional system and political philosophy

²⁸ A more detailed analysis of the energy issue is provided by David Henderson, "Do We Need to Go To War for Oil?" The Cato Institute, Foreign Policy Briefing No. 4, October 24, 1990. See also *The San Francisco Chronicle*, October 29, 1990.

that have endured for more than two hundred years and have proven to be popular around the world.

This unique status allows the United States to balance the costs and benefits of intervention differently from most other states. Alliances make a lot more sense among European states threatened by the Soviet Union, for instance, or between Saudi Arabia and its neighbors when they are threatened by Iraq. Observes Patrick Buchanan, "Blessed by Providence with pacific neighbors, north and south, and vast oceans, east and west, to protect us, why seek permanent entanglements in other people's quarrels?"²⁹

The United States enjoys many advantages that provide it with the luxury of remaining aloof from geopolitical conflicts that engulf other countries.

For this reason, the United States is rarely open to charges of appeasement, such as are sometimes rightly leveled at other countries, for its vital interests are rarely threatened directly. For example, had France and Britain accurately perceived the potential threat posed by Nazi Germany, they should have blocked the remilitarization of the Rhineland, and they certainly should not have helped dismember Czechoslovakia (through active intervention, it should be noted). Washington's failure to raise a new expeditionary force in 1933, however, did not constitute appeasement. (In fact, there is nothing wrong in principle with appeasement, if that means only diplomatic accommodation among great powers. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia all resolved potentially violent conflicts without war by making concessions to one another that could be called "appeasement." The case of Nazi Germany was different because Hitler wanted far more than could be given to him, and because the allies materially weakened themselves — for example, by eviscerating Czechoslovakia — in attempting to satisfy him.) For a more recent example, it would not be appeasement for the United States to decline to defend a populous and prosperous South Korea; for Seoul to choose not to augment its forces once U.S. troops were gone, however, would be.

The end of the cold war has resulted in a new world order, whether or not the United States defines or polices it. The Soviet military remains a potent force, of course, but Moscow's will to use it in an aggressive fashion appears to have dissipated. And the ability of our allies — a Japan that is the second-ranking economic power in the world, a reunited Germany that dominates Europe, and so on — to contain the Soviet Union has grown. These two changes alone give the United States an opportunity to refashion its foreign

²⁹ Patrick Buchanan, "America First — and Second, and Third," *The National Interest*, Spring 1990, p. 80.

policy. What should a new, noninterventionist policy look like? It should rest on the following bedrock principles:

- The security of the United States and its constitutional system should remain the U.S. government's highest goal. Individuals may decide to selflessly risk their lives to help others abroad. Policy makers, however, have no authority to risk their citizens' lives, freedom, and wealth in similar pursuits.
- Foreign intervention is usually expensive and risky, and often counterproductive. Many smaller nations may still need to forge preemptive alliances to respond to potentially aggressive regional powers. Because of America's relative geographic isolation and other advantages, however, intervention is rarely necessary to protect its security and free institutions. This is especially true today, with the disappearance of a threatening hegemonic power.
- America's most powerful assets for influencing the rest of the world are its philosophy and free institutions, the ideas of limited government and free enterprise that are now sweeping the globe, and its economic prowess. These factors ensure the United States's influence irrespective of the size of its military and where that military is stationed. The United States can best affect others through private means — commerce, culture, literature, travel, and the like.
- The world will continue to suffer from injustice, terror, murder, and aggression. But it is simply not America's role to try to right every wrong — a hopeless task in any event. The American people are entitled to enjoy their freedom and prosperity, rather than having their future held hostage to unpredictable events abroad, however laudable the goals of intervention seem to be. Their lives and treasure should not be sacrificed in quixotic crusades unrelated to their basic interests.

The world is changing faster today than it has at any time since the end of World War II. As a result, the United States has no choice but to refashion its foreign policy. While Washington should remain engaged throughout the world culturally, economically, and politically, it should bring its military home and curtail expensive foreign aid programs. After bearing the primary burden of fighting the cold war, the American people deserve to enjoy the benefits of peace through a policy of benign detachment.

Brassey's and the International Institute for Strategic Studies present...

STRATEGIC SURVEY 1990-1991

Strategic Survey provides the Institute's annual analytical review and assessment of security-related events around the world. The significant events of the year are examined in their political contexts and the trends for international security identified.

"... authoritative a tradition of outspokenness and willingness to challenge conventional thinking ..."

The Guardian

NOW AVAILABLE IN HARD AND FLEXICOVERS

Published in May 1991
276pp ISSN 0459-7230

THE MILITARY BALANCE 1991-1992

This annual survey of military forces around the world is the most respected and comprehensive handbook of its kind. *The Military Balance* presents the type, number and deployment of the armed forces of every country in the world, together with information about each one's population, GNP and defence expenditure.

"The general comments on the super-powers, the Alliances and regions of the world are as perceptive, balanced and illuminating as ever." British Army Review

NOW AVAILABLE IN HARD AND FLEXICOVERS

Published in October 1991
approx. 245pp ISSN 0459-7222

SURVIVAL

The Institute's journal. *Survival* contains original articles, documentation and book reviews, thus providing a forum for both policy debate and academic discussion.

Recent issues include articles on the following:

Post-war Gulf security, Shahram Chubin. Pre-war Gulf diplomacy, John K. Cooley. The remaking of Eastern Europe's security, Curt Gasteyger. The Gulf war and the new world order, Lawrence Freedman. The air war in the Gulf, R.A. Mason. The ground war in the Gulf, William J. Taylor, Jr and James Blackwell.

FREE SAMPLE COPY
AVAILABLE ON REQUEST

Published bimonthly
96pp ISSN 0039-6338

ADELPHI PAPERS

In-depth analysis of current and future problems of international security concern covering a wide geographical range and subject spread.

Recent titles include the following:

British Strategic Priorities in the 1990s, Philip A.G. Sabin. Soviet Attitudes towards Ballistic Missile Defence and the ABM Treaty, Jeanette Voas. Gorbachev and the Future of the Soviet Military Institution, Harry Gelman.

Approximately 12 papers published per year
ISSN 0567-932X

**SINGLE COPIES OF ALL JOURNALS,
PAPERS etc. CAN BE PURCHASED...***

SUBSCRIPTION PACKAGES 1991

Combined: 1 × *Military Balance*, 1 × *Strategic Survey*, 12 × *Adelphi Papers* (approx.),
6 × issues of *Survival*

1 year Flexicover
£140.00 / US\$210.00

2 year Flexicover
£266.00 / US\$399.00

**... OR SAVE UP TO £81 WITH A COMBINED SUBSCRIPTION
TO ALL 4 PUBLICATIONS!**

* Further Information

Prices of single copies of IISS publications, further subscription details and ordering information can be obtained from Caroline Bolton, Brassey's (UK), 50 Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1AA. Tel: 071-377 4881.

Why Third World Space Systems Matter

by Thomas G. Mahnken

The war in the Persian Gulf illustrated vividly the impact of the developing world's acquisition of advanced military technology. Saddam Husayn's ballistic missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and erst-while nuclear program are a microcosm of the problem. However, the growth of Third World military capabilities is not limited to weapons of mass destruction. Another area that will play an increasingly important role in Third World military development is the use of space for military purposes.

Military space systems played a prominent part in the U.S. victory over Iraq, as they have in previous operations. Now such capabilities are spreading to a significant number of states in the developing world, which see high-technology weapons as necessary instruments of national policy. Currently, only seven states — the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, Japan, India, and Israel — possess an indigenous space-launch capability, but a number of others have had satellites launched by states with such a capability.

The use of space by a widening circle of states has a number of implications for U.S. national security policy. Firstly, the development of Third World missile and space programs is forging a new set of geopolitical relationships over which the United States has little influence. Secondly, the spread of this technology is already eroding the political leverage possessed by the original space powers, a leverage based on their ability to control the flow of satellite information and space technology to client states. Thirdly, the spread of this technology is likely to be uneven and could lead to regional instabilities, especially if a state were to perceive and attempt to exploit a transitory military advantage in its space capabilities. Lastly, the acquisition of missile and space capabilities by rising regional powers will significantly alter the circumstances U.S. forces face when operating abroad. Collectively, these trends suggest Washington must begin formulating policies and acquiring capabilities that will allow it to retain its influence in a rapidly changing strategic environment.

States possessing advanced military capabilities can be divided into a hierarchy of three tiers. The top tier is occupied by the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which possess large arsenals of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), cutting-edge civilian and military space programs, and, in the case of the Soviet Union, deployed antisatellite (ASAT) weapons.

Thomas G. Mahnken is an analyst with SRS Technologies, where he works on national security and long-range planning issues. The views expressed here are those of the author alone.

The second tier is occupied by states such as China, Brazil, France, Great Britain, India, Israel, and Japan. These states are motivated to acquire advanced military systems by a combination of regional security and global commercial interests, and have substantial programs for the use of space with both direct and indirect military implications. (In fact, the distinction between civilian and military uses of space is fuzzy; while no regional power has yet deployed dedicated military space assets, a number of their current or planned civilian space platforms could be used for military purposes. Further, technology developed for civilian systems can easily be applied to the creation of dedicated military assets.) Second-tier states also have advanced ballistic missile programs with a significant indigenous element. In the future, such states could capitalize upon their ballistic missile and space infrastructures to develop and deploy ASAT weapons.

In the third tier are states such as Iran, Pakistan, and Libya, which have limited indigenous capabilities, but are able to purchase ballistic missiles from supplier states. These countries are also able to gain access to satellite data through the purchase of imagery from commercial earth-observation satellites or the lease of channels on communication satellites.

Ballistic Missiles

The experience of the Gulf war has made Americans aware of ballistic missile proliferation. During the forty-one days of Operation Desert Storm, Iraq launched eighty-one modified Scud missiles against the U.S.-led coalition and Israel: thirty-nine against Israel and forty-two against Saudi Arabia. While most were ineffective, a single strike on a U.S. barracks near Dhahran killed twenty-eight U.S. soldiers and wounded ninety-eight. While chemical warheads were not employed, the spectre of their use was a constant source of unease. Earlier, Iraq had used its ballistic missiles to much more devastating effect against Iran in the "War of the Cities." From February to April 1988, some 190 Al-Husayn (modified Scud) missiles were fired at Iranian cities, resulting in approximately two thousand Iranian casualties, evacuation of half the population of Tehran, and a severe disruption in the Iranian war economy.¹

The then-director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Webster, has testified that by the end of the decade, fifteen states in the developing world will possess ballistic missiles, and six of them will have intermediate range ballistic missiles.² While the missiles employed by Iraq were highly inaccurate and carried relatively small high-explosive warheads, it is likely that Third World states will employ more sophisticated systems in future conflicts: missiles with greater range, higher accuracy, and more destructive warheads. According to

¹ Prepared testimony of W. Seth Carus in *Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Third World, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology of the Senate Armed Services Committee*, May 2, 1989, p. 44.

² *Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, January 23, 1990, p. 15.

Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, ten of the states developing a ballistic missile capability possess or are developing chemical weapons,³ and Webster has testified that by the end of the decade, eight of the countries seeking ballistic missiles may have nuclear weapons.⁴

As indigenous ballistic missile technology advances in the Third World, the ability of the United States and other advanced industrialized countries to control proliferation diminishes. Furthermore, civilian space programs may conceal ballistic missile programs; any satellite launch vehicle (SLV) can be used as a surface-to-surface missile with the addition of a guidance and control package.

By the end of the decade, fifteen states in the developing world will have ballistic missiles, and six of them will have intermediate range ballistic missiles.

Ballistic missiles might allow regional powers to alter the scope, and potentially the intensity, of a local conflict in ways unfavorable to the United States. On a tactical level, ballistic missiles allow states to strike distant targets quickly, with little warning, and with a high probability of penetration. On an operational level, the possession of ballistic missiles by hostile powers threatens to constrain U.S. influence within a theater, and may jeopardize the ability of the United States to carry out operations in aid of allies. On a strategic level, the possession of such systems by regional powers — in combination with their growing economic, military, and political influence — provides grounds for challenging the leadership of the United States on regional issues.

Space Assets

While a great deal of attention has been given to the spread of ballistic missiles in the Third World, another equally far-reaching phenomenon has been less noticed: the sale of space technology to the developing world. Like ballistic missiles, space technology is spreading through several channels, including the purchase of space systems and data from the industrialized world and the development of systems using foreign technology and expertise.

Space assets, such as reconnaissance and meteorology satellites, allow states operating them to possess more accurate information about their surroundings. While a number of states in the Third World have intelligence-sharing agreements with the established space powers, such understandings

³ *Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues*, February 22, 1989, pp. 38-39.

⁴ *Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence*, p. 15.

put client states at the mercy of their suppliers. An indigenous space reconnaissance ability gives a state an independent, day-to-day observation capability that may be of tactical importance. Also, regional powers could benefit from the dual-purpose (military/civilian) use of communication and navigation satellites, for it would allow those powers to use their military forces more effectively and thereby exercise greater control over a conflict. The Gulf war demonstrated the utility of navigation satellites in locating, positioning, and maneuvering U.S. and allied forces; and terminals permitting the use of navigation satellite data are available worldwide. Currently, fourteen states operate their own communications satellites (Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Soviet Union, and the United States); five more plan to do so (Iran, Israel, Italy, Spain, and Turkey).⁵

The capability to use communications satellites for military purposes would be all the more significant for large states with poor communications infrastructures, such as China, India, and Brazil. One Brazilian military analyst has proposed using satellites to coordinate a network of reconnaissance and surveillance platforms covering the South Atlantic.⁶ The possession of a dedicated military communications satellite — or simply the use of channels on a civilian system for military purposes — would also provide a regional power with a secure communications network that would be difficult for an opponent to monitor. According to Henry Sokolski, deputy for nonproliferation policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense:

The spread of relatively secure communications systems and rudimentary surveillance satellite capabilities could make it much easier for regional powers to target our forces or those of our friends and make it more difficult for us to know what these regional powers are doing. . . . [These] systems could be used by regional powers to cripple critical peacekeeping operations, such as those that we carried out with our allies in the Persian Gulf, and do so in a manner that would be most difficult to counter.⁷

Commercial Access


Virtually any state in the developing world can gain access to satellite data with military applications, because satellite imagery and communications channels are commercially available. Thus, even states that lack the technology to build, or the funds to purchase, their own satellites have access to satellite data. The American Landsat 4 and 5 offer customers monochromatic imagery with a resolution of 30 meters, while that of the French-operated SPOT (*satellite*

⁵ "Comsats," *Space Technology International* 1990, pp. 158-64.

⁶ Orlando Bonturi, *Brazil and the Vital South Atlantic* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), pp. 78-79.

⁷ "Proliferation and Arms Control," *Statement of Henry D. Sokolski before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, July 11, 1990, pp. 3-4.

MAP 1
SPOT AND LANDSAT GROUND STATIONS



pour l'observation de la terre) is 10 meters. Imagery is available directly from EOSAT, the operator of Landsat, and SPOT Image, the operator of SPOT. The Soviet Union also supplies 5 meter resolution imagery through the Soyuzkarta agency. In addition, states such as Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia operate ground stations to receive SPOT and Landsat data on their territory (map 1). While imagery is supposed to be available on a non-discriminatory basis, states that operate ground stations have an advantage in receiving timely images, owing to their ability to process data locally.⁸

New sources of satellite imagery will emerge over the next twenty years. The European Space Agency's earth resources satellites will be able to produce high-resolution imagery, and will be able to image at night and through cloud cover, a capability not possessed by most current satellites. France is also developing a radar-equipped imaging satellite, with resolution varying from 2 to 50 meters.⁹ Japan may likewise enter the commercial market: in 1992 it expects to launch an earth sensing satellite with a resolution of 18 meters, and night/all-weather imaging capability. In addition, France, Italy, and Spain plan to launch a joint military reconnaissance satellite, Helios, the data from which might in the future be made available to other states.¹⁰

While the resolutions of current commercial observation satellites do not provide imagery that is accurate enough to identify small ground units or individual aircraft, they can detect a number of militarily relevant objects

⁸ Leonard S. Spector, "Keep the Skies Open," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 1989, pp. 15-20.

⁹ *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, October 23, 1989.

¹⁰ *Military Space*, November 21, 1988.

TABLE 1 REQUIRED GROUND RESOLUTIONS FROM COMMERCIAL OBSERVATION SATELLITES (in meters)					
Target	Detection	General ID	Precise ID	Description	Technical Analysis
Bridges	6	4.5	1.5	1	0.3
Radar	3	1	0.3	0.15	0.015
Supply Dumps	1.5-3	0.6	0.3	0.03	0.03
Troop Units	6	2	1.2	0.3	0.15
Airfield Facilities	6	4.5	3	0.3	0.15
Rockets/Artillery	1	0.6	0.15	0.05	0.045
Aircraft	4.5	1.5	1	0.15	0.045
SSM/SAM Sites	3	1.5	0.6	0.3	0.045
Surface Ships	7.5-15	4.5	0.6	0.3	0.045
Vehicles	1.5	0.6	0.3	0.06	0.045
Minefields	3-9	6	1	0.03	0.09
Ports and Harbors	30	15	6	3	0.3
Railroad Yards	15-30	15	6	1.5	0.15
Roads	6-9	6	1.8	0.6	0.4
Urban Areas	60	30	3	3	0.75
Terrain	—	90	4.5	1.5	0.75
Detection: Location of a class of units, object, or activity of interest General Identification: Determination of general target type Precise Identification: Discrimination within target type of known types Description: Size/dimension, configuration/layout, components construction, equipment count, etc. Technical analysis: Detailed analysis of specific equipment					
Source: Ann M. Florini, "The Opening Skies: Third-Party Imaging Satellites and U.S. Security," <i>International Security</i> , Fall 1988.					

(table 1); most reconnaissance and surveillance missions of interest to states in the developing world — such as locating troop concentrations and the construction of new military facilities — could be accomplished using imagery from commercial satellites. SPOT imagery has been used to monitor such militarily significant sites as the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona; the Golan Heights; the Mitla Pass in the Sinai; the Fao Peninsula, Basra, and the Shatt al-Arab in the Persian Gulf; and Mirpur and Muzaffarabad on Pakistan's borders.¹¹

Iraq relied extensively upon satellite imagery during its war with Iran, and, soon after the invasion of Kuwait, representatives of the Iraqi government tried to purchase current imagery of the Middle East from EOSAT. While their requests were denied, as the sale would have violated the U.N. embargo on trade with Iraq, the episode shows the perceived utility of such data. Similarly, SPOT Image ceased transmission of imagery of the Persian Gulf area almost immediately after the invasion of Kuwait. Service has since been restored.

¹¹ Peter D. Zimmerman, "From the SPOT Files: Evidence of Spying," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 1989, p. 25.

The value of commercial-quality imagery can be improved by electronic enhancement and the use of trained imagery interpreters. While processing times currently make reliance on satellite imagery impractical for tactical intelligence purposes, it could be quite valuable for strategic purposes, such as monitoring enemy troop concentrations, and planning air and land attack corridors. In addition, it is reasonable to expect that the resolution of commercially available imagery will improve and that processing times will decrease, allowing those states that rely on this source access to more timely intelligence data. Thus, it has been estimated that imagery with a resolution of one meter will be the commercial standard by the end of the century.¹² With near-real-time access to such high-resolution data, satellite data could be used not only to locate targets, but also to provide targeting data to strike forces, and to evaluate strikes and plan follow-on attacks. In particular, such data could be used to support ballistic or cruise missile attacks or conventional force operations.

While Western commercial suppliers of satellite imagery showed admirable restraint in refusing to supply data to Saddam Husayn, such restraint may not prevail in future contingencies, particularly if the threat is less apparent and the response less unanimous. In general, as such capabilities spread, commercial pressures will grow — and with them, the temptation to supply data in an effort to undercut competitors.

In addition, the commercial availability of data from the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) and Soviet Glonass navigation satellite networks will have important military implications, owing to the value of such data for aircraft and missile guidance and for command and control purposes. Access to commercial GPS data will allow users to determine locations to within 10 meters. Such a capability will allow the precise guidance of unmanned air vehicles, potentially transforming them into accurate cruise missiles.

Indigenous Space Assets

In addition to the current commercial availability of space data, a significant number of states will acquire in the next twenty years indigenous capabilities to use space to support and enhance their military operations.

Iraq. Before its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was on its way to establishing the infrastructure for a space program with military implications. On December 5, 1989, in a move that surprised many observers, Iraq tested the three-stage Al-'Abid space launch vehicle from the Al-Anbar Space Research Base west of Baghdad. Hussein Kamil, minister of industry and military industrialization, announced that the rocket would be used to place satellites in orbit.¹³ Iraq also reportedly signed a contract with the Brazilian National Institute for Space Re-

¹² Jeffrey Richelson, "Military Intelligence — SPOT is Not Enough," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 1989, pp. 26-27.

¹³ *The Washington Post*, December 9, 1989.

search (INPE) and the Brazilian aeronautics manufacturer EMBRAER for construction of a military reconnaissance satellite with a 20-meter resolution, with equipment supplied by China and France. According to press reports, the deal was cancelled by the Brazilian foreign ministry in April 1989 because Brasilia, under pressure for its international arms sales, was sensitive to the satellite's military value.¹⁴ Given the demise of the Brazilian satellite deal, the continuing status of Iraq as an international pariah, and the devastation of Iraq's domestic infrastructure during Operation Desert Storm, the future of the Iraqi space program is at best uncertain.

Brazil. Brazil has also launched an ambitious space program with both military and civilian components. Brazil's armed forces already use a satellite communication system — the logical choice, given the country's size and poor communication links. Brazil also operates the BRAZILSAT series of telecommunications satellites, built by the Canadian aerospace firm Spar. In 1977, the Brazilian government inaugurated the All-Brazilian Space Program, an effort to launch an indigenous satellite with a Brazilian booster.¹⁵ The Brazilian SLV will be capable of placing 200 kilograms into a 700 kilometer circular equatorial orbit.¹⁶ Further, Brazil has the advantage of possessing two near-equatorial launch sites, at Alcantara and Natal, that will allow it to conduct low-power launches into geosynchronous orbits.¹⁷

Despite ambitious goals, the Brazilian space program has experienced a number of setbacks, owing to the cost of the program, the difficulty of acquiring certain components from the West because of government restrictions on the export of missile technology, and problems with the domestic development of certain key technologies. As a result, Brazil has signed space cooperation agreements with both the USSR and China, giving it access to advanced space technology to augment its indigenous program. Brazil and China have also established International Satellite Communications, a joint venture between Brazil's Avibras and the China's Great Wall Industry Corporation to market space services, including launch vehicles, launch facilities and services, satellites, and earth stations and antennas.¹⁸ In addition, Brazil and China plan a series of joint satellite launches involving the development of four China-Brazil earth resources satellites, the first of which is to be launched in 1992 from the Chinese launch site at Shanxi aboard a Long March booster. These satellites will be capable of producing images in both the visible and infrared bands with a resolution of 19 meters, and will revisit a given site every twelve days. China

¹⁴ *Fôlha de São Paulo*, April 7, 1989; *Fôlha de São Paulo*, February 6, 1991.


¹⁵ "Brazil Aims for Self-Sufficiency in Space," *Interavia*, January 1986, p. 90.

¹⁶ *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, August 24, 1987.

¹⁷ A geosynchronous satellite orbits the earth once every twenty-four hours at high altitude, thus remaining above the same point on the earth's surface. Low earth orbits are those with a distance of between 150 and 1500 kilometers from the surface of the earth. Sun-synchronous orbits are low earth orbits that allow satellites to view the entire surface of the earth every day, and to be over a desired point on the earth at approximately the same time each day.

¹⁸ *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, May 29, 1989.

MAP 2
THIRD WORLD SPACE LAUNCH SITES



and Brazil also plan to sell imaging services and to export earth stations and image analysis systems to other states.¹⁹ Such a network would represent yet another source of commercially available military intelligence to compete with such traditional suppliers as Landsat and SPOT.

India. India is another state that has developed a substantial infrastructure for the exploitation of space, with both civilian and military applications. India has three launch sites: Sriharikota (Shar), Trivandrum (Thumba), and Balasore, as well as a substantial space-tracking network. India is developing an ambitious series of four space launch vehicles to support its satellite program. The workhorse of the Indian space program is the SLV-3, which launched India's first satellite in 1980.²⁰ India also tested its Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) in 1987 and 1988, although neither test was a complete success. The ASLV is capable of delivering a payload of 150 kilograms to a 400 to 500 kilometer low earth orbit. The next step will be the four-stage Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle, designed to place the 1,000 kilogram Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite into a 900 kilometer sun-synchronous orbit. In the 1990s, New Delhi expects to test its Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle, which will place the 1900 kilogram Indian national satellite II (INSAT II) in a geosynchronous orbit.²¹ Thus, by the end of the century, India hopes to possess a capability that currently only the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and the European Space Agency have.

The Indian satellite program has potential military applications for reconnaissance and surveillance. An Indian analyst noted the military value of satellite imagery:

¹⁹ *O Estado de São Paulo*, July 6, 1988; *Fôlha de São Paulo*, July 6, 1988.

²⁰ *The Washington Post*, July 18, 1980.

²¹ *Flight International*, January 11, 1986.

With satellite imagery technologies improving towards finer resolutions and even becoming commercially available, very few of our military secrets are safe. In the future it will be difficult to enter into meaningful force reduction agreements with China or Pakistan unless India is able to match the missile capabilities of China as well as the information acquisition capabilities of both China and Pakistan through satellites and intelligence sharing.²²

A number of Indian satellites could be of use for earth observation. The IRS series has a variety of remote sensing cameras for observing India's natural resources. IRS-1A has two sets of imaging sensors, one with a spatial resolution of 72.5 meters, and one with a spatial resolution of 36.25 meters. The second generation of satellites will incorporate improved sensors with a multispectral resolution of 20 meters and a monochromatic resolution of 10 meters, in line with that currently offered by SPOT.²³

In addition, Indian communications satellites could be used to improve the command and control of dispersed forces, including naval groups. The INSAT series of satellites, for instance, are combined platforms for meteorological observation and direct satellite television transmission. The first generation was built by Ford Aerospace for the Indian Space Research Organization; INSAT II is being produced indigenously.²⁴

Israel. Israel has launched two indigenous satellites, Ofek 1 and 2, from Palmahim on the Mediterranean coast, using Shavit space launch vehicles. While neither satellite carried an operational payload, there is speculation that Israel plans in the future to loft surveillance satellites. As one Israeli reporter put it:

The need to know more about what is happening beyond the neighboring Arab confrontation states has been proven in the last few years. . . . It is not a question of attaining general knowledge about the military buildup of an Arab country 800 km away from Israel but, first and foremost, the need for real-time knowledge of details such as the movement of Iraqi troops toward Israel, or the firing of surface-to-surface missiles.²⁵

A source on the Israeli General Staff has been quoted as saying that Israel wants to develop an independent intelligence-gathering capability so that Israeli officials would not have to rely on Washington for information; Ofek 1 and 2 may be initial steps towards building that capability.²⁶ Israel also plans to build two Amos communication satellites, the first of which is to be launched in 1993 by Arianespace.²⁷

Other states. A tier of smaller, though technologically advanced, powers may also have the capability to build or purchase satellites for communications or reconnaissance tasks. For example:

²² *The Times of India*, January 31, 1989.

²³ Government of India, Department of Space, *Annual Report 1988-1989*, pp. 13-16, 21.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-9.

²⁵ *Ha'aretz*, June 27, 1990.

²⁶ *The Washington Times*, September 20, 1988.

²⁷ *Interavia Space Directory*, p. 462.

- Pakistan launched its first experimental satellite, Badr-1, from Xichang in southwest China in July 1990 aboard a Chinese Long March 2E rocket.²⁸
- Indonesia has reportedly discussed space cooperation with China, involving the construction of a launch site in Indonesia and joint satellite launches.²⁹ In addition, Indonesia operates the Palapa series of geosynchronous communications satellites.
- Taiwan has authorized a program to build and launch a scientific satellite into low-earth orbit by 1995.
- South Korea plans to loft its first experimental satellite, Korsat, by early 1993. Seoul also plans to launch a domestic telecommunications satellite in 1995.³⁰
- South Africa has tested a booster rocket, believed to be a modified Israeli Jericho II IRBM, from its test range at Overberg to the Prince Edward Islands.³¹

Beyond the rise of indigenous space capabilities, cooperation among developing states is likely to increase as more countries seek access to space launch capabilities for scientific, commercial, and military purposes. For instance, it is likely that states within a region will pool resources to operate space assets, sharing both costs and benefits of such expensive projects as communication, earth resource, and meteorology satellites. Multilateral satellite arrangements may mirror regional military-political agreements. In this respect, the Arabian regional communications satellite (ARABSAT), purchased and operated by a consortium of twenty-two Middle East states, may prove to be a model for future multinational operations of space assets. Similarly, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela have pooled resources to operate the "Simon Bolivar" satellite, a joint communications satellite to be launched in 1994 to serve Central and South America. These are indicative of the growth of regional arrangements on space matters outside the context of the superpower rivalry.

Antisatellite Weapons

As satellites become more important to regional powers as a means of supporting and enhancing military operations, such states may feel compelled to develop means to neutralize the capabilities of their adversaries. Because

²⁸ *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, July 23, 1990.

²⁹ *Flight International*, March 8, 1986; *Flight International*, February 1, 1986.

³⁰ *Space News*, September 24-30, 1990.

³¹ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, July 15, 1989.

they are deployed in low-earth orbit, earth observation/reconnaissance satellites are vulnerable to ground-based ASAT weapons,³² unlike communications satellites, which are in a 22,300-mile-high geosynchronous orbit. While ASATs require some highly sophisticated technology, the deployment of a rudimentary ASAT by a state such as China, Israel, or India within the next twenty years is not out of the realm of possibility: the United States developed an ASAT system using 1950s-vintage technology, a level of sophistication not beyond the reach of a number of Third World powers in coming years.³³ These states not only enjoy advanced domestic technological capabilities, but they have access to sophisticated computer and tracking technology from the United States and Europe as well.

The simplest form of ASAT would involve the use of a direct-ascent booster to scatter debris in the path of a target satellite. The ability to scatter small objects, such as nails or ball bearings, in front of a target satellite might give a regional power a covert kill capability. The Brazilian SLV, any of the Indian space launch vehicles, the Israeli Jericho II or Shavit, the Iraqi Al-'Abid, and even the Saudi DF-3 have the thrust necessary to reach low-earth orbit if employed in a direct-ascent mode. Such an approach would still require accurate computation of the target satellite's orbit to plot an interception, but not the sophisticated tracking and homing technology required for the ASAT itself to hit its target satellite.

The most effective form of ASAT would involve the use of a booster with a nuclear warhead to disable enemy satellites. Since space is a vacuum, satellites would be affected by the radiation resulting from the explosion rather than by the blast itself; nuclear effects could disable satellites to a distance of over 1,000 kilometers, beyond even direct line of sight of an explosion.³⁴ The Soviet Union is believed to be capable of using its Galosh antiballistic missile in such a mode. In addition to a booster, such a system would, of course, require the possession of a nuclear device. While a nuclear detonation in space in the context of a crisis or regional conflict would no doubt be seen as escalatory, it might nonetheless be viewed as an effective means of degrading enemy space capabilities, especially to a state with limited space assets of its own. In addition, a nuclear ASAT attack would be a way to demonstrate visibly one's nuclear capability while minimizing collateral casualties.

Regional powers could also equip their ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles with a conventional warhead and use them as kinetic-kill direct-ascent ASATs. Such a system would, however, require the development of some sophisticated technologies: a powerful space launch vehicle or ballistic missile to boost the ASAT, sophisticated ground tracking and support facilities

³² See Ashton B. Carter, "Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible," *International Security*, Spring 1986, pp. 46-98.

³³ See Bhupendra Jasani, ed., *Space Weapons — The Arms Control Dilemma* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1984), pp. 11-13.

³⁴ John M. Collins, *Military Space Forces: The Next Fifty Years*, Congressional Research Service, report 89-578 RO (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 12, 1989), pp. 26-29.

to locate the target satellite, advanced computational capabilities to plot the ASAT's path, and some sort of terminal guidance and maneuvering system to allow the ASAT to intercept its target. A conventional ASAT would also require sensors (such as active or passive radar; or optical; or infrared sensors) to guide the missile to the target. Such sensors, however, could be adapted from other types of precision-guided munitions, such as antitank or surface-to-air missiles, already widely available throughout the developing world.³⁵

The deployment of a rudimentary ASAT by a state such as China, Israel, or India within the next twenty years is not out of the realm of possibility.

Similarly, a number of states could create a co-orbital ASAT — which maneuvers until it is close to its target and then explodes — using experience gained in handling satellites. A co-orbital system would be a less timely method of destroying a satellite, as it has to match orbits with the target. It would also require complex technologies that might not be as readily available as those for a direct-ascent system. For instance, a co-orbital system would require a much more extensive ground tracking capability than a direct-ascent ASAT, owing to the need to monitor the target and the ASAT throughout their orbits. A co-orbital ASAT, on the other hand unlike a direct-ascent system, could be able to reach satellites in higher orbits, such as communications and early warning satellites.

Both the USSR and China have pursued co-orbital ASAT programs. The Soviet Union is known to possess an operational co-orbital ASAT. The system, launched by the SL-11 SLV, maneuvers itself into an orbit intersecting that of the target satellite, then explodes. According to the Department of Defense, the Soviets have carried a number of tests of the system in space.³⁶ Further, it has recently been disclosed that China conducted a co-orbital ASAT program until the early 1980s. The program, begun under Mao Zedong, would have used the booster from the DF-5 ICBM to launch the kill vehicle into orbit. The program was apparently stopped, however, because the PRC had yet to build the requisite ground tracking network.³⁷

Communications satellites, deployed in geosynchronous orbit and thus out of range of most direct-ascent ASAT systems, are vulnerable to jamming from the ground. In fact, there is already evidence that states in the developing

³⁵ Eric H. Arnett, "Antisatellite Weapons," *Issue Paper*, American Association for the Advancement of Science Program on Science, Arms Control, and National Security, January 1990, p. 6.

³⁶ Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1989: Prospects for Change* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 55.

³⁷ Remarks by Chinese physicist, Academy of Science member, and former PLA colonel, at workshop on "Future International Space Policy," sponsored by Los Alamos National Laboratory and University of California, San Diego, Calif., January 9-11, 1991.

world have interfered with U.S. space assets in this way. For instance, U.S. communications satellites have been subject to radio interference from ground stations operating on the same frequency. According to one report of a recent case, the interference, generated by a hostile state in the Middle East lasted for weeks (the identity of the state has not been publicly released). When the U.S. satellite changed to a different channel, the interference also changed channels, suggesting that the jamming was deliberate.³⁸

Implications for U.S. Policy

Military-political. The creation of multiple sources of satellite information will ensure that rising regional powers will have alternative sources of supply open to them at market prices. In the past, traditional space powers, such as the United States, the Soviet Union, and France, were able to exercise a degree of control over other states through their monopoly on the ability to build and launch satellites. This leverage is being eroded as new suppliers of space services and militarily relevant space technology enter the market. It may soon be impossible to deny space data, or even access to space, to a developing state. Easy access to satellite imagery could also reduce U.S. influence and flexibility in a crisis. For example, with other parties able to observe U.S. military capabilities and posture, it would become more difficult for American leaders to bluff an adversary.

The acquisition of space capabilities is likely to be uneven, and thus potentially destabilizing. States with relatively sophisticated domestic science, technology, and national space programs will be at an advantage vis-à-vis neighbors that lack the technology or resources to develop indigenous assets. For instance, it is likely that India will possess more timely and accurate space intelligence — and more capable missile forces — than its neighbor and adversary, Pakistan. Similarly, Israel will likely be at an advantage relative to its Arab neighbors. These asymmetries could lead to regional instability. For example, a state might believe that a transitory advantage in space assets or ballistic missiles should be exploited for military gain. On the other hand, a disadvantaged state could feel compelled to take preemptive action when a neighbor was about to gain such an advantage.

Operational. The acquisition of ballistic missiles, space assets, and possibly antisatellite weapons by regional powers means that they are acquiring a military capability that will allow them to exert more control over future conflicts, for example, by altering the geographic scope of a conflict through ballistic missile strikes against targets in or beyond the theater, and by deploying forces in response to accurate and timely satellite intelligence.

The acquisition of military space capabilities by regional powers could provide a local power with a critical advantage over U.S. or allied military forces

³⁸ James T. Hackett and Robin Ranger, "Proliferating Satellites Drive U.S. ASAT Need," *Signal*, May 1990, p. 156.

in a future regional conflict. While regional powers — owing to their limited objectives — will always be able to concentrate forces in the theater of operations, the United States may not be able to achieve such a concentration, owing to its global commitments. Regional powers will also be able to reduce the United States's ability to achieve tactical — or, for that matter, strategic — surprise, owing to their ability to conduct reconnaissance from air and space. For example, the grand deception carried out by coalition forces in the recent Persian Gulf war — when 150,000 U.S., British, and French troops were moved one hundred miles through the desert to outflank Iraqi defensive positions — would have been greatly complicated, if not made impossible, had Iraq possessed timely data from observation satellites.

The grand deception carried out by coalition forces in the recent Persian Gulf war would have been greatly complicated, if not made impossible, had Iraq possessed timely data from observation satellites.

Further, the availability of multiple sources of high-quality commercial observation data holds out the possibility that a regional power would be able to monitor not only activities in the region, but U.S. military staging areas in the United States and abroad. Third World powers may also acquire the ability to interrupt the flow of satellite data to the United States through ASAT attacks or jamming. While such capabilities are likely to be rudimentary, the U.S. satellite capability in distant theaters is also likely to be limited, and it might be difficult for the United States to deploy new satellites over the theater in a timely manner.

The possession of increased strategic reach by regional powers will also allow them to attack U.S. forces at a greater distance. As the Persian Gulf war showed, ballistic missiles may be targeted at U.S. or allied support bases in the theater, although their use against naval forces would be difficult without near-real-time targeting support. The possession of accurate satellite navigation and command-and-control assets, in combination with airborne early warning and maritime search forces, would also simplify the task of directing air and sea forces to meet U.S. forces.

Regional powers may also be able to obtain satellite information from commercial suppliers of data, blurring the distinction between belligerent and neutral states. Belligerents in regional conflicts have traditionally received important intelligence information from the major powers. Speculating on what will happen once other states such as China, Brazil, India, and Japan begin to supply such data to states that might become belligerents is worthwhile. Would China supply Islamabad with satellite information to counterbalance New Delhi's indigenous capability? Would Brazil supply one of its largest arms cus-

tomers, Libya, with satellite data in the event of a conflict with the United States?

Force posture. If the United States hopes to retain military flexibility as space capabilities spread throughout the developing world, it must acquire forces that allow it to counter attacks on its space systems. At the same time, it must have the capacity to limit an opponent's flexibility and freedom of action.

Firstly, the United States will need the ability to monitor activities both on the earth and in space. Traditionally, the U.S. sensor network has been oriented toward gathering information on the activities of Soviet conventional, nuclear, and space forces. The acquisition of ballistic missile and space capabilities by others has produced a growing need to monitor activities by these states. U.S. space assets have proved invaluable in recent operations ranging from naval deployments in the Persian Gulf and the liberation of Panama to operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. To quote Lieutenant General Thomas Moorman, commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command:

In a multipolar world, a world of diverse threats, our demands for global information will be much more intense. The forces we deploy will require the traditional kinds of support. . . . We'll have fewer places overseas from which to collect that kind of information. But space systems will be on the scene, already there, everywhere, to provide it.³⁹

For instance, U.S. satellites reportedly provided decision makers in Washington with important information in the days leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, monitoring Iraqi air-defense radars and tracking the build-up and movement of Iraqi ground forces. The U.S. was reportedly able to use a wide variety of communications and reconnaissance/surveillance satellites in the region at the time of the invasion.⁴⁰

Secondly, the United States will need the ability to defend both U.S. forces abroad and allies from ballistic missiles. The Patriot antitactical ballistic missile was an invaluable asset in the war with Iraq, intercepting the vast majority of Iraqi missiles within its range. However, the war has also shown the limitations of Patriot. A point-defense system, it is unable to protect wide areas of territory. Hence several Scuds escaped interception, one landing on an apartment building in Tel Aviv. What will be needed is a system to provide Global Protection Against Limited Strikes: a layered ground- and space-based system that offers multiple opportunities to engage incoming missiles, reducing chances of failure. Key to such a system will be ground-based theater missile defenses such as the Patriot, the U.S.-Israeli Arrow interceptor, or the U.S. Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system. Space-based sensors being developed as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative will be crucial to early warning of missile attacks, detecting launches, and assessing attacks. Further, as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait attests, future crises may develop literally overnight. Space-based interceptors such as Brilliant Pebbles, constantly in orbit, are able to pro-

³⁹ James W. Canan, "Space Gets Down to Earth," *Air Force Magazine*, August 1990, p. 32.

⁴⁰ *The Washington Post*, August 10, 1990; *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, August 13, 1990.


vide global presence and round-the-clock ability to intercept long-range ballistic missiles. Such space-based weapons will become increasingly important as Third World states acquire missiles of greater range.

In addition, as regional powers acquire the ability to use space assets to support their military operations and threaten U.S. and allied reconnaissance satellites, the United States will require the means to prevent hostile states from controlling space, or key locations in space. The U.S. Army has formulated plans to deploy a ground-based ASAT on U.S. territory. Nonetheless, in the current strict budget climate, the system faces a precarious future. If the United States fails to deploy an antisatellite system, it may be forced to attack satellite ground links to deny an opponent access to space data. Such an operation will become all the more difficult as portable ground stations spread in developing states. Another option involves increasing the capability of U.S. satellites to defend themselves against enemy ASATs through maneuvering, protection of key components, and redundancy of vital functions.

Conclusion

The Persian Gulf war is a harbinger of the complexities the United States will face as it heads towards the twenty-first century. The ability of developing states to construct and maintain ballistic missiles, space assets, and ASAT weapons will give such states increased control over their regional environment. Conversely, it will reduce U.S. leverage over regional affairs. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, a number of states will likely possess a multidimensional military aerospace capability, which until now has been the sole province of a handful of developed states.

Thus, U.S. and allied forces deployed abroad will face a more difficult and complex operational environment than during the past four decades. The full realization of this situation is some years off, but a number of policy and acquisition decisions need to be made soon. If the United States hopes to retain its ability to support allies globally and enforce international stability as it has throughout the postwar era, it must obtain the capabilities that will allow it to maintain its advantages.



The Democratic Revolution...

...has just begun

We live in an age of democratic revolution. Communism is in retreat. All over the world, people are demanding human rights and free elections. Yet repressive governments remain, and the world's newest democracies face awesome challenges.

Democracy is now the central issue in international affairs. And there is only one publication exclusively devoted to monitoring freedom's progress throughout the globe—the *Journal of Democracy*.

The *Journal of Democracy* gives you a thorough understanding of this new era in global politics. Each quarter we present you with authoritative analyses of democratic developments in key countries—from the Soviet Union to South Africa, from Chile to China, from Nigeria to Nicaragua.

Our contributors are the political and intellectual leaders of the democratic revolution—men and women on the front lines of the struggle to achieve or consolidate democracy in their own countries—as well as renowned scholars and political analysts.

The world's leading democratic thinkers and activists read the *Journal of Democracy*. Shouldn't you?

JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY

Yes! Start my subscription for one year (4 issues) for the special price of only \$19.95, a 33% discount off the newsstand price

Name _____ ☐ Payment enclosed ☐ Bill me Charge my: ☐ Visa ☐ MasterCard
Address _____ Credit card No. _____ Exp. date _____
City _____ State _____ Zip _____ Signature _____

All subscriptions must be paid in US dollars. Canada and Mexico subscribers add \$6 for additional postage.
Overseas subscribers add ☐ \$8 for surface mail postage, or ☐ \$24 for airmail.
Send this order to *Journal of Democracy*, P.O. Box 3000, Dept JD, Denville, New Jersey (USA) 07834

20R91

Documentation

Could the Prague Spring Have Been Saved?

A substantial re-evaluation of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia is now possible, owing to a new openness on the part of senior participants in the event, and greater access to formerly closed Czechoslovak archives. Taken together, these new sources suggest that fiercer resistance by the people and leaders of Czechoslovakia, if combined with stronger remonstrances from Westerners and other outsiders, might have averted the invasion, and might even have sparked the collapse of Moscow's East European empire twenty years earlier. Given the recent events and ongoing tensions in the Baltics, this point is also of more than historical interest.

The Search for a Political Solution

by Jiří Valenta

Soviet decision making during the early part of the Czechoslovak crisis was shaped by bureaucratic pulling and hauling among the central decision makers. As the specific interests of these bureaucracies came into conflict, a lengthy debate ensued as well as a polarization of forces among those favoring intervention, those questioning it, and those who were undecided.

The Major Players

Although the Soviet archives pertaining to the invasion of Czechoslovakia remain closed, many Soviet officials are now willing to discuss the subject. What their accounts suggest is that the debate over the Czechoslovak situation tended to be much more polarized at lower levels than at higher levels, and earlier in the crisis rather than later. The final decisions tended to be consensus decisions.

Jiří Valenta is the director of the Institute for Soviet and East European Studies at the Graduate School of International Studies, the University of Miami. A revised version of his book, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision*, is forthcoming from Johns Hopkins University Press in Baltimore and Progress Publishers in Moscow. **Jan Moravec**, a member of Czechoslovakia's government committee for analyzing the years 1967-1970, is the author of *The Seventh Day Was Not Sunday*, 1990.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most crucial factor for Soviet minister of foreign affairs Andrey Gromyko was that “counterrevolution was raising its head” in Czechoslovakia.¹ But Alexey N. Kosygin (head of the Council of Ministers and thus nominal head of the Soviet government), as well as certain Soviet leaders responsible for foreign affairs in 1968 — especially the ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin — questioned early on the wisdom of an invasion because of the consequences for foreign policy vis-à-vis the Western countries.

In truth, the Soviets had little to fear as far as American diplomacy was concerned. American policy makers were guided by memories of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, when they had encouraged exaggerated expectations among the Hungarians, and they did not want to be blamed for doing the same among the Czechoslovaks. Thus, U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson entirely ignored the developments in Prague, while senior figures in the State Department referred to them only infrequently and cautiously, and only during the early stages of the reforms. On the contrary, U.S. acquiescence to continuing Soviet domination in Eastern Europe was conveyed unambiguously through public pronouncements in which American leaders expressed a strong interest in beginning the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the USSR, in spite of the ongoing Soviet pressure on Czechoslovakia.

This hand washing attitude was also demonstrated by Henry Kissinger at a Prague meeting in the summer of 1968 with the new Czechoslovak foreign minister Jiří Hájek. According to Hájek, Kissinger (then serving as a consultant to the Johnson administration on the negotiations with Vietnam) asked the Czechoslovaks “not to repeat Imre Nagy’s mistakes” — presumably referring to the Hungarian prime minister’s decision to sever Hungary’s ties with the Warsaw Pact during the 1956 Hungarian revolution. “This would plunge Europe into unrest,” Kissinger reportedly warned.² Much later, when Kissinger met with Dubček in Prague in 1990, he continued to insist that nonresistance had been the right choice in 1968.

As it turned out, of course, America’s hands-off policy failed to achieve the desired result, and even backfired. The invasion occurred anyway, although admittedly one cannot be sure that a different U.S. policy would have prevented it. As for Washington’s fear of upsetting the SALT negotiations, the invasion caused them to be postponed.

However, Washington’s reticence did invalidate the chief argument of those in the Politburo who questioned an invasion on the grounds that it would have serious international repercussions. In mid-July, Kosygin had accepted the suggestion of János Kádár, Hungary’s leader, that bilateral negotiations be held between the Soviet Politburo and the Czechoslovak Presidium, a last attempt to find a nonviolent solution to the crisis. In the latter part of the crisis,

¹ Interview with former foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, Jiří Hajek, *Mladá fronta*, December 2, 1989, p. 28; and the author’s conversations with Hájek, July 1990.

² Interview with Jiří Hájek, *Der Standard*, August 23, 1989, p. 3.

however, Kosygin and most other wavering Politburo members came to share the mindset that favored a military intervention.

The International Department. Quite a number of opponents of a military solution could be found in the International Department and the organs associated with it, especially the influential board of the Prague-based journal *Problemy mira i sotsializma* (published in English as *World Marxist Review*). Vladimir Lukin, who worked for the journal in 1968 (and is now chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Russian parliament), was openly opposed to invasion at the time. He and others, who questioned the invasion openly or secretly, were concerned about the deleterious effects it would have on Soviet-Czechoslovak relations and on the organizational task of their journal. Lukin was arrested by Soviet troops during the invasion and shipped back to Moscow, where he managed to survive the Brezhnev years at the Institute of the United States and Canada under Georgiy Arbatov.

American policy makers had encouraged exaggerated expectations among the Hungarians in 1956, and they did not want to be blamed for doing the same among the Czechoslovaks.

Ideological watchdogs. The ideological watchdogs of the USSR were primarily concerned with the effects of the Czech reforms on Soviet domestic politics. Admiration for the Prague Spring became widespread in Soviet dissident circles during 1968 and was the influence under which the dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov wrote his influential manifesto, *Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom*.³ Such contagion naturally frightened the key Central Committee chiefs of the departments charged with ideological affairs. This was especially true of Sergey Trapeznikov, head of the Soviet Central Committee Department of Science and Education. He was one of the most influential of Brezhnev's advisors in the late 1960s, and his negative influence, in both domestic and foreign policy, was felt in Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia.

The KGB. On the whole, the KGB detachments in Prague and elsewhere in Eastern Europe were furnishing the Soviet Politburo with biased and distorted information regarding Czechoslovakia. They construed Alexander Dubček, the new first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist party (*Komunistická Strana Československa* — CPCz), and his fellow reformers as potential agents of the “imperialist” powers, and as a minority who relied mainly on the support of radical pressure groups rather than on the workers. On the other hand, the antireformers — who in the latter stages of the crisis

³ Andrei Sakharov, *Memoirs* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990).

were to become Moscow's quislings — were portrayed not as a small rival group fearing loss of power, but as representatives of a widespread coalition of "healthy party cadres."⁴

To back up its assessment of a counterrevolution in the making, the KGB also fabricated evidence. According to KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky, thirty or so KGB agents posed as Western tourists in order to plant caches of arms on the German border and to put up inflammatory posters about an anticommunist coup. A few senior officials in the First Chief Directorate (responsible for foreign intelligence gathering) in Prague had serious reservations about fabricating evidence against Dubček, according to Gordievsky. But others actively organized and carried out these schemes.⁵

Dissent within the KGB, such as it was, came mainly from officials attached to the First Directorate in the United States, and particularly from General Oleg Kalugin, head of counterintelligence at the Soviet embassy in Washington in 1968. Kalugin claims that the information he dispatched from Washington was based on absolutely reliable documents, and disproved the involvement of the CIA or any other Western agency in the Prague Spring. In fact, Kalugin says, he reported that Washington was surprised by the Prague Spring. The KGB leadership in Moscow, however, leaned more toward information supplied by the departments dealing with the USSR and Eastern Europe, which depicted a counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia. As a result, information to the contrary may never have gotten beyond KGB chief Yury Andropov. Kalugin was told upon his return to Moscow, "Your papers were destroyed, we cannot show such things to our [Politburo] leadership."⁶

The Soviet military. Following the KGB, the Soviet military was the most vocal advocate of a military intervention in Czechoslovakia. It appears that the Soviet generals responsible for the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the Soviet Ground Forces in particular, put the political leadership under pressure to use force. These generals were principally concerned not with the domestic political situation in Czechoslovakia, but with strategic and logistical considerations and with their ability to pursue unhampered their organizational interests in the Warsaw Pact countries.

The Warsaw Pact. Pro-invasion pressure and biased information from the East European communist party leaders were among the most significant influences on the Soviet decision-making process in 1968. Walter Ulbricht and Wladyslaw Gomulka, the leaders of East Germany and Poland, respectively, began pushing for tough policies as early as March 1968 — that is, at the time key changes were being made in the leadership of the Czechoslovak party and state. As Kiril T. Mazurov (a Politburo member and first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers) was to say years later regarding the invasion:

⁴ Jiří Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 104-8.

⁵ Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), pp. 483-86.

⁶ Author's interview with Kalugin, July 1990.

The main roles were played by Gomulka and Ulbricht. They were constantly phoning, suggesting solutions, and insisted on [the] toughest steps . . . and on soldiers entering Czechoslovakia.⁷

At the behest of Gomulka and Ulbricht, a conference of East European party leaders was set for March 23, in Dresden. There Ulbricht expostulated that: “[p]resident of the Czechoslovak National Assembly Josef] Smrkovský is organizing a counterrevolution and you do not see it.”⁸ Gomulka and Ulbricht were soon joined in their fevered alarm by Todor Zhivkov, the Bulgarian leader. But a contrasting view was held by the Hungarian leader, János Kádár. According to new evidence from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, Kádár was disturbed by the developments in Prague, but was reluctant to endorse an interventionist solution until the Soviets opted for it in mid-August.

To back up its assessment of a counterrevolution in the making, the KGB also fabricated evidence.

The Ulbricht-Gomulka faction’s disagreement with Kádár was manifested at another summit of Warsaw Pact leaders in Moscow in early May. Here, the decision was taken to support the “healthy forces” in Czechoslovakia by conducting joint military maneuvers on Czechoslovak territory. Ulbricht played an important role in forging a policy of support for the nascent antireformist coalition of Drahomír Kolder and Vasil Bilak in the Czechoslovak leadership, and he maintained that if this group failed to achieve majority support, the Warsaw Pact should come forward with a “joint political declaration” in support of them, presumably backed up by some form of military force if necessary.⁹ Although Kádár agreed with the policy of pressuring Prague through military maneuvers, he continued to harbor reservations about the hardliners’ stance. Gomulka disagreed “with comrade Kádár that a counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia does not exist,” and saw a “certain danger” in Kádár’s view.¹⁰

Despite Kádár’s growing concern that Dubček could become another Imre Nagy, the relatively moderate Hungarian line continued through a third summit conference in July 1968 in Warsaw. Although the Hungarian leaders, in an effort to prepare for all contingencies, gave their assent to new Warsaw Pact pressures on Czechoslovakia,¹¹ Kádár decided to meet with Dubček before the

⁷ Interview with Kiril T. Mazurov, *Izvestiya*, August 20, 1989; and interview with Mazurov, September 4, 1989, reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: The Soviet Union* (hereafter, FBIS, *Sov*), September 7, 1989, from Budapest Television.

⁸ *Záznam z porady šesti bratrských stran v Drážďanech (23. 3. 1968), vypracovaný V. Bílákem* (hereafter, *Záznam z porady*), Czechoslovak Communist party’s (CPCz) Archives, Fund 01, vol. AJ 131, pp. 15–16.

⁹ *Zapis vystoupení na setkání prvních tajemníků ÚV, KS, BLR, MLR, NDR, PLR, a SSSR v Moskvě*, 8 května 1968, 13.00–20.00. Archives of Czechoslovakia’s government committee for analyzing the years 1967–1970 (hereafter AK), Z/P 2. Czech translation in *Lidové noviny*, February 22, 1991, p. 6.

¹⁰ *Lidové*, pp. 6, 9.

¹¹ *Zapis ze zasedání ústředního výboru Maďarské socialistické dělnické strany dne 7. srpna 1968*, pp. 10 and 15, AK, Z/M 17.

conference to search for a diplomatic solution. This unilateral move led the other Warsaw Pact leaders to ostracize the Hungarian delegation. According to Kádár, the differences on Czechoslovakia persisted at the Warsaw meeting, and although “the ranks of the advocates of a military interference expanded,”¹² the decision to invade was not taken at the time.

The Kremlin View

The bulk of the information available to the Politburo pointed in two directions. On the one hand, Washington appeared to have no interest in wooing Prague away from the Soviet orbit. Still, the leaders of the East European countries — particularly Poland and East Germany — did not believe that Washington could be indifferent, and repeatedly reminded the Soviet leaders of this. Among the Soviets themselves, the KGB, the military, and Moscow’s ideological watchdogs also reacted negatively to events in Czechoslovakia, while most of those concerned with foreign policy worried primarily about the political costs of an invasion.

However, there were no real “hawks” or “doves” in the top Soviet leadership of 1968. The newly available evidence confirms what had earlier seemed apparent: the differences among the Politburo members were overwhelmingly tactical. All wished to ensure the survival of the ruling Czechoslovak Communist party because it was willing to subordinate Czechoslovakia’s interests to those of Moscow. But scarcely any of them wanted to invade Czechoslovakia. The question was whether the Soviets could have it both ways.

Certainly they were anxious to try. As a precaution, the Soviet General Staff began considering and debating the use of force in Czechoslovakia as early as February 1968. In May, the Soviet leadership decided to unsheath the saber of invasion, while stopping short of wielding it. This was achieved by conducting massive Warsaw Pact military exercises in and around Czechoslovakia.

This move accomplished several things. Firstly, it served as a form of psychological pressure and a warning to the reformists to keep events more tightly in hand. Secondly, it demonstrated Moscow’s readiness to strike if the Politburo decided that the Prague Spring was a threat to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, the military exercises provided a cover for invasion preparations — hiding them like a car in a traffic jam — without alerting the leaders in Prague (and indeed the world) that an invasion was in the making. Such surprise was essential to keeping the costs of an invasion bearable. As a final bonus, the deceptive maneuvers allowed the Kremlin to back down if it chose, with no one the wiser.

With time and room for maneuvering, the decision-making process of the Soviet Politburo became one of consensus building, with Secretary-General

¹² Statement of János Kádár, *Magyarország*, no. 28, 1989, p. 5.

Brezhnev playing the leading role. By nature, however, Brezhnev was not a strong consensus builder, tending rather to let the forces impinging upon him culminate in some final position. In the early 1960s, Nikita Khrushchev recalled that Brezhnev had been nicknamed “the ballerina,” because anyone who wanted to could “turn him around.”¹³

Gradually, the forces impinging upon Brezhnev convinced him that he could not tolerate the “loss” of Czechoslovakia. With time, it also became clear that he could no longer tolerate Prague’s degree of ideological deviation. Accordingly, a consensus position began forming around the ritualistic concepts of opposing Western imperialism and defending, by military force if necessary, the Leninist regimes in East-Central Europe.

Čierna nad Tisou

But could Prague be compelled to curb itself, or would armed force be required? Regarding this question, an important juncture was reached during a meeting between the Presidium of the CPCz and the Soviet Politburo, held at Čierna nad Tisou (Čierna n.T.) on July 29 through August 1, 1968. The meeting had been proposed on July 14-15 by János Kádár, who was still reluctant to endorse a military intervention, even though he was disturbed by the developments in Prague.

When they arrived at Čierna, Brezhnev and a majority of the Politburo were still undecided about what course to pursue, and they wanted to avoid an invasion. As Czechoslovak documents show, the Soviets understood Čierna as giving the Prague leadership a last chance to prove that it could and would deliver on the conditions set by Moscow. At the same time, however, the Soviet leaders were looking ahead to a possible invasion, calculating the strength and probing the minds of their opposition, and sizing up the quislings that they could count on in case of an invasion.

From their observations at the Čierna meeting, the Soviet leadership came to the conclusion that the reformers of the CPCz Presidium — Alexander Dubcek, Josef Smrkovský, Oldřich Černík (the Czechoslovak premier), František Kriegel, and Bohumil Šimon — would be in the minority during future meetings of the Czechoslovak Presidium. This calculation was a key factor in the Soviet decision to invade three weeks later.

The Ultimatum of Čierna nad Tisou

by Jan Moravec

On July 29, 1968, the members of the Czechoslovak Presidium and the Soviet Politburo met in Čierna n.T., on the borders of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Soviet Union, in an attempt to avert the military invasion of Czechoslovakia

¹³ Sergei Krushchev, *Khrushchev on Khrushchev: An Insider Account of the Man and His Era* by His Son, Sergei Krushchev (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown, 1990), pp. 32-33, 67.

by Soviet forces. Until this year, no firm evidence concerning the import of those discussions was available. The reason was that on the last day of the meeting, August 1, the “Kremlin men” forced the Czechoslovak members and their advisors to seal the stenographic records and all of their personal notes from the meeting. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, this testimony (comprising about two thousand pages) disappeared into the safes of the CPCz’s pro-Soviet first secretary, Gustav Husak.

Following the December 1989 revolution in Czechoslovakia, however, this material became available. What it shows is that the Soviets were still of two minds. On the one hand, explicitly, they were offering the Czechoslovaks a last chance to do Moscow’s bidding: rule society by control rather than consent, and demonstrate a willingness to subordinate Czechoslovak interests to Soviet interests. This ultimatum was issued in the form of a debate over the nature of socialism and over Prague’s fealty to Moscow.

At the same time, some Soviet leaders implicitly were offering military assistance to the Czechoslovak representatives who opposed radical reform. Specifically, they were probing for support by asking who among the Czechoslovaks was “progressive” (reform-minded) and who was “conservative” (understood to mean pro-Soviet). At the same time, they were hampering the ability of the Prague reformers to rally national and international support for their cause by insisting on silence concerning the content of the meeting at Čierna.

Control versus Consent

The introductory speeches at Čierna clearly demonstrated that the two sides had quite different ideas about socialism and about the situation in Czechoslovakia. Soviet Politburo members insisted that socialism in Czechoslovakia had to be maintained by force. The more reformist of the Czechoslovak participants wished precisely to end that sort of socialism in their country.

Thus, according to the Soviet model, a main characteristic of socialism was the leading role of a Communist party, purportedly representing the dictatorship of the proletariat. At Čierna, therefore, Soviet participants read excerpts from articles in the Czechoslovak press, and excerpts from radio and television broadcasts, criticizing the past and present activities of the CPCz, the Czechoslovak government, and the Stalinist model of government in general. For Brezhnev and his associates, the existence of such dissent demonstrated that the situation in Czechoslovakia was counterrevolutionary. (Pages 5, 28, 32)¹⁴

They further documented the incipient counterrevolution by mentioning the birth of four noncommunist political parties; the attempt to restore the Social Democratic party; the establishment of the K 231 (Club of Unjustly Perse-

¹⁴ All page number references refer to the record of the Čierna n.T. meeting, *Záznam jednání předsednictva ÚVKŠČ a ÚVKSSS v Čierna n.T., 29. 7-1.8. 1968* (hereafter *Záznam*), CPCz Archives, Fund 07/15, vol. AJ 274.

cuted People), KAN (Club of Engaged Non-Party Members), the Society of Foreign Army Fighters, and other organizations outside CPCz control.

Brezhnev concluded: "We want to say that according to our assessment, antisocialist organizations — which have quite large memberships, are supported from abroad, and ever more openly make their claims to power — have been formed in Czechoslovakia. Political opposition, which is to carry out the restoration of the capitalist system in Czechoslovakia, has virtually come into existence." (Page 25)

Brezhnev and other Politburo members scorned the evidence of popular support for the CPCz: public opinion polls, large rallies, and supportive petitions. "I know how such evidence is obtained," said Brezhnev cynically. (Page 57)

In addition, Brezhnev alleged that anticommunists were plotting violence: "Today the counterrevolution seeks to gain power peacefully, without an armed conflict. But it also reckons with other possibilities. The fact that secret weapons have been found is generally known." (Page 27)

In fact, several submachine guns and revolvers had been found in the Sokolov district near the West German border. Conceivably, the weapons were placed there by people opposed to the communist leadership. As noted earlier, they may well have been placed there by the KGB, perhaps in cooperation with other Warsaw Pact intelligence services. But it hardly matters; rebels armed with submachine guns would have had no chance against the huge hardware of the Czechoslovak army, which included several thousand tanks. Thus, Brezhnev's arguments were disingenuous at best.

Brezhnev stated that "... The present Czechoslovak counterrevolution has chosen new, subtler tactics, essentially aimed at being able to fight for its antipopular goals under the cloak of a certain 'new model of democratic socialism.'" (Page 32)

On the Czechoslovak side, Dubček, Černík, Smrkovský, and Josef Špaček (a member of the CPCz Presidium) conceded at Čierna that freedom of the press had been misused and that some new organizations were not socialist. But they denied there was any danger of counterrevolution, so long as one did not equate socialism with dictatorship. Said Dubček, "The main contradiction between the letter of the five [Warsaw Pact] parties and the stand of the CPCz is thus in their different understanding of party tactics. The Warsaw letter, ... as well as the letter from the CPSU, lead to a return to the administrative methods of power." (Page 39)

Černík pointed out that earlier fears about the reformers being ousted, if they did not resort to dictatorship, had proven groundless: "Excuse me, but I have to recall one thing: in Dresden [on March 23] we were told that we would be swept away within a matter of days. We had to listen to such words as that we were mere figureheads and no one in Czechoslovakia was taking us seriously. ... " (Page 57)

Černík continued, "This party leadership has unprecedented support," and he reassured the Soviet Politburo by stating that "we will use all means to defend our revolutionary achievements if necessary. . . ." (Page 57)

Alexey Kosygin, then Soviet prime minister, responded sarcastically: "I would like to return to our talks when I spent seven days in Czechoslovakia [in the second half of May]. Also, then, when we said that it was high time for you to take control of the press, radio, and television, comrades Dubcek, Smrkovsky, and Císař also said at that time, give us a month and you will not believe your eyes about our press. . . . The very opposite happened." (Page 75)

These few quotes show that the highest representatives of the CPCz and the CPSU did not reach agreement on the basic issue — the possibility of democratic socialism. Clearly the reformist members of the CPCz leadership failed to persuade the CPSU Politburo that their humane form of socialism was compatible with Marxism-Leninism. Mikhail Suslov, the CPSU's chief ideologist, expressed the Soviet viewpoint by condemning the speech that Čestmír Císař, an academician and the CPCz secretary, had delivered on the 150th birthday anniversary of Karl Marx:

In this address he obscured the most important questions about the socio-economic foundations of socialism. The most important things were not there, that Marxism is the revolutionary teaching of the working class. . . . In the spirit of true social democrats comrade Císař was silent about the class essence of Marxism-Leninism. Císař openly attacked Leninism, Leninism as the Marxism of the present epoch. . . . Císař considers it a duty and an important question to seek new variants of Marxism. (Pages 103-4)

Internationalism versus Patriotism

Just as Moscow could not tolerate a Communist party that relied on consent, neither could it tolerate a Communist party that put its country's interests ahead of the USSR's. The Soviet empire was not a commonwealth, and to consider it as such would endanger both Soviet power and the power of its many allies around the world. For the Communist leaders of the Warsaw Pact, therefore, the Czechoslovak experiment posed a danger as much through revived nationalism in Eastern Europe as through revived democracy.

Černík tried to assure the Soviets that the Czechoslovak revolution was not intended for export: "In its search for new forms of socialism, new forms of the administration and management of society, Czechoslovakia relies on the general principle of Marxism-Leninism and proceeds from its own historical experience." (Page 50)

Dubček spoke even more emphatically:

We do not think that we are creating a universal model or example for other communist parties with our policy. . . . The principle of socialist ownership of the means of production by society, the leading role of the Communist party and the Marxist concept of the construction of socialism, as well as our adherence to the socialist camp and the international communist movement remain the basis of our policy and we are resolved to defend them. (Page 46)

Ironically, up to 1968, the Czechoslovaks had been the most faithful of the Soviet Union's allies. This was primarily because the CPCz's leaders had managed to ward off the deployment of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory. For example, in February 1948, CPCz leaders had prevented the stationing of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory, even though Stalin had wanted to place troops there. The CPCz succeeded in persuading Stalin that it deserved his confidence and a special status.¹⁵ In the twenty years after, Moscow had contemplated stationing troops in Czechoslovakia many times but never followed through.

All of that changed in 1968. In his address at the very start of the Čierna meeting, Dubček rejected the idea of interference in the affairs of Czechoslovakia:

We cannot agree that parties which have normal relations between one another meet to assess the situation in one party against its will and without having a clear notion of the real state of affairs. . . . Calling such conferences is not in harmony with the norms of relations between fraternal parties. . . . How can it be accepted that one party is being told how to solve its internal problems? Is it possible to avoid interpreting such a course in any other way than as a violation of the principles accepted in mutual relations between the communist parties, as an attempt to influence the development in this country while disregarding the head of the present party and state leadership? . . . Because the questions of independence and sovereignty are highly sensitive for our nations which have had their own independence for relatively a short time and fought hard for it in history. (Page 34)

The differences between the Soviet and Czechoslovak understanding of the proper relations between their parties and states became even more apparent when the discussion turned to the Warsaw Pact exercises going on in Czechoslovakia. Dubček expressed disquiet not with the exercises themselves, but with the repeated postponement of the date for the withdrawal of the Pact forces:

Today, one month after the exercises have ended, allied troops still remain . . . on our territory. This would be unimportant at a normal time but it arouses conjectures and speculations which are hard to dissipate in a situation made dramatic by the letter of five parties. . . . A day or two, a week and a fortnight passed, and various questions were asked again and again . . . there were questions which I too could not answer because neither the prime minister nor the president of the republic nor the first secretary of the party could explain these questions. (Page 36)

Dubček's interpellation was joined by Černík: "I, comrade Brezhnev, wrote a letter to comrade Ivan Yakubovski [commander of the Warsaw Pact forces] because I had repeatedly phoned him and could not reach him, had left him a message to phone but no one has called. Therefore, I wrote asking for the answer about the withdrawal so that I could inform at least the government and the CPCz Presidium." (Pages 57-58)

¹⁵ Record of Czechoslovak leader Klement Gottwald's discussions with Stalin in the Crimea, September 1948, CPCz archives, Fund K. Gottwald.

Kosygin's reaction was abrupt, almost hysterical:

Discussions begin . . . where the borders are. Is there a difference between our and your borders at all? I think, comrade Dubček and comrade Černík, you cannot give any other answer than that we have just one border in the West and it is also our border. It is the border of the Second World War and we will never retreat from it . . . and when it is our common border how can there be any questions when the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Treaty armies orders troops to stay one or two weeks longer. Who can prevent them? (Page 83)

An unknown Czechoslovak advisor, recording Kosygin's speech, made a note beside it, in letters over an inch tall: "SWINE."

Kosygin continued: "You don't know how to tell the people why two regiments have stayed on? Tell them that it is your and our affair." (Page 84)

The climax of Kosygin's address came when he conjured up imaginary concentrations of huge NATO forces massing on the borders of Czechoslovakia and stated that, under these circumstances: "The Czechoslovak people would certainly welcome our Bulgarian and Polish armed forces in Czechoslovakia." (Page 84) This was virtually a challenge to the Czechoslovak Presidium, or at least its conservative members, to ask for the entry of military forces from the Warsaw Pact states, but the offer of military assistance to Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact forces was unanimously refused at a special evening session of the CPCz Presidium.

Quislings and Patriots

The Soviets at Čierna were laying down various ultimatums for the Czechoslovak Presidium, and they were also thinking of what would happen if their demands were not met and they were to choose to invade. For this reason, as the documents from Čierna show, the Soviets had begun to scout out potential loyalists and hardliners.

At Čierna, Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Suslov, among others, strongly attacked Dubček, Černík, Císař, and Ota Šik (the deputy premier of Czechoslovakia). Several Soviet leaders asked: Who is progressive and who is conservative in the CPCz Presidium? Kosygin probed, "Is Šik a left-winger? We can prove with much evidence that he is a man of the right. When we look at his political bases, they are actually an attempt to introduce the capitalist mode of production in Czechoslovakia." (Page 31)

And again, "Comrade Dubček, you said that there were right-wing forces and that you really had to fight against right-wing forces. We are friends, so let's talk openly. We want to know who they are. If you are fighting them, you know who you are fighting, but we haven't heard even once who of you in the CPCz leadership represents the right-wing forces so that we could help you fight them. We would like to hear who they are." (Page 65)

On the first day, no one from the Czechoslovak delegation answered such allegations and questions. On the second, however, after the speeches of the more conservative Presidium members — Drahomír Kolder, Vasil Bilak,

Oldřich Švestka, František Barbírek, Jan Piller, and Jozef Lenárt — the Soviets could draw their own conclusions as to who was who. The six just mentioned more or less agreed with the Soviet analysis of the situation; their main conclusion was to take control, especially of the media.

Yet the Soviet leader Nikolai V. Podgorny continued to press the Czechoslovak delegation further: “Some newspapers have been allowed already now to recommend who from the CC Presidium should be elected and who should not. And who is now progressive and who is conservative.” (Page 65)

Still, nobody answered. Eventually, another conservative Presidium member, Emil Rigo, answered: “As far as I know, comrades Kriegel, Císař, and Šimon are progressive; comrade Černík has joined them and it appears that comrade Dubček is also progressive. I say this because this is how a question was asked and it has not been answered yet.” (Page 154)

Thus, the records from Čierna indicate that six members of the CPCz Presidium (out of eleven — Jozef Lenárt was a nonvoting member) more or less supported the Soviet Politburo. But it was a matter of degree. None of the CPCz completely supported the CPSU leadership at Čierna, nor did they ask, at least openly, for Soviet, Bulgarian, and Polish troops to be sent to Czechoslovakia. For example, both Bilak and Kolder strongly criticized the conditions in the CPCz Presidium. But Bilak actually supported Dubček, Černík, and Smrkovský in the final part of his speech. (Page 120) And Kolder, who had been chairman of the commission that submitted the draft of the Prague Spring’s Action Program defended “his child.” (Page 120)

Thus, even the addresses of their most faithful followers, Bilak and Kolder, did not satisfy the Moscow bosses, and this may be the reason why the Ukrainian ruler Piotr Shelest, the last to speak, was provocatively sharp. He condemned the CPCz leadership and the whole party: “You, comrade Dubček, told us that there was nothing horrible in your country. It is above all horrible that you can depart from the Marxist-Leninist positions and your party and republic can go over to the bourgeoisie. . . .” (Page 158) Shelest specifically accused the Czechoslovak leadership of doing nothing against a wave of chauvinism and nationalism, and then outrageously raised the nonissue of “Transcarpathian Russia” — a Western part of the Ukraine that in the pre-World War II period belonged to Czechoslovakia:

“Some official . . . calls are even made for a revision of borders. I have with me a Czechoslovak document which has been sent to us and that says: ‘E.g. Transcarpathian Russia, it is part of our country which never belonged to Russia. . . . In 1945, the starved Transcarpathian nation was deceived and betrayed.’ Comrades, what question is this. They started to exert illegitimate pressure on people for the Transcarpathian Ukraine to be joined by any means and force to Czechoslovakia.” (Page 159)

Shelest then turned on Kriegel and said (confusedly): “When comrade Kissinger visited you, he came and had talks with some comrades, and he said in those talks that they were satisfied with the situation in Czechoslovakia

These are imperialistic pronouncements and we must not permit this and comrade Kriegel must realize it.” (Page 161)

Kriegel objected: “Why are you reproaching exactly me?” and received a terse answer: “Simply because we do. . . .” (The transcript of the proceedings appears to be incomplete at this point in the Kriegel-Shelest exchange. It would appear either that the note taker did not record this exchange fully, or that a page is missing from the transcript; if the latter, one must wonder whether it was removed intentionally.)

Dubček protested resolutely against Shelest’s antagonistic pronouncements: “. . . I would primarily like to express regret at the tone used on some questions of content mentioned by comrade Shelest. He aimed his remarks at the communist party and its leadership. He said that we were abandoning Marxism-Leninism. Then comrade Shelest said that we wanted to drive a wedge between the CPSU and other communist parties. I want to categorically reject this. . . .” (Pages 168-69)

The Snare of Secrecy

After dark, on the day of the preceding exchange, representatives of the Soviet Politburo — Kosygin, Suslov, Podgorny, even Shelest — came to the railroad coaches of the Czechoslovak delegation (all the participants were living out of railroad coaches) and apologized to Dubček. Shelest even gave him a “Khrushchev hug” — with kisses. Tête-à-tête meetings were held after this reconciliation between Dubček and Brezhnev, and between groups of four — Dubček, Černík, Smrkovský, and Svoboda on one side, and Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and Suslov on the other. But, again, no records of these meetings exist in the archives of the CPCz. At these meetings, Suslov was said to display a moderate approach toward the Czechoslovak problem, but this is not formally documented in the archives.

Nevertheless, the purpose of such reconciliation can be obtained from Brezhnev’s final address:

Now above all about this meeting at Cierna n.T., we think that after its conclusion neither of the sides should come out with any speeches or information that would unilaterally interpret the content and importance of the meeting. No insinuation may appear about questions connected with the meeting from either side. Nothing should be published about this issue besides an official communique.

Secondly, we agreed during our preliminary discussions that none of the comrades who participated in our meetings may be reproached for the nature of their speeches. . . After the meeting no one may dare voice criticism concerning the content of the speeches and the less so permit comrades to be given labels. This is a prerequisite for the strengthening of our unity and friendship. Violation of the agreement on this issue would do general and basic harm to our relations. We have been told that the Czechoslovak side accepts this agreement. Am I right?

Voices from the Czechoslovak side: Yes. (Page 334)

The agreement to keep secret the controversy between the CPSU and the CPCz was the chief mistake of the reformist forces in the CPCz leadership because it kept them from rallying Czechoslovak and world opinion in defense of Czechoslovak independence.

At the end of the meeting, Brezhnev stressed the condition again: “. . . so that not a single one of the participants in the meeting be castigated for his statements during the confidential talks, but that he must not be touched even with a finger. If this is violated, then the whole spirit of our agreement will be violated.” (Page 338) Kosygin added: “Then everything will get out, there will be no agreement. . . .” (Page 338)

The Ultimatum

After the Czechoslovak delegation agreed to keep the conference secret, Brezhnev summarized the actions that Moscow would be looking for in the days ahead. Above all, the CPCz would have to take control of the mass media and prohibit the activities of the newly created noncommunist organizations. Said Brezhnev:

We cannot discipline the media of mass propaganda in Czechoslovakia. This is what the Czechoslovak comrades themselves must do, and primarily the CPCz CC Presidium, the government, and other bodies that you have for it. You have the bodies for it and this mechanism as a whole must really be set in motion to solve this question. . . . We reached preliminary agreement on this at the conference attended on behalf of the CPCz CC by comrades Dubček, Svoboda, Černík and Smrkovský. . . . (Page 335)

Podgorny added: “Besides the media of mass propaganda there is also the question of various clubs and other reactionary organizations, the question of their activity. This is also a basic question.” (Page 335)

If these actions were not taken, Brezhnev made clear, the alternative would be invasion. “You gave us a promise and we believe that you will fight. On our part, however, we want to state that we are ready to give you unlimited assistance in this fight. We are already fully prepared to provide this aid. If our plan fails, it will be difficult to call a new conference. I say this responsibly. We will come to your help. Thank you, comrades . . . for our joint work.” (Page 349)

The Last Chance

by Jiří Valenta

After Čierna, the drama of Czechoslovakia became much simplified. On one side was a relatively small faction of Czechoslovak Communist party conservatives, but backed by Moscow and its East European communist sympathizers. On the other side was the reformist government of Czechoslovakia, which could count overwhelmingly on the sympathy of the masses of Czechoslovak

people and of free people around the world — though not on the aid of their governments.

The Opponents of Reform

The latest evidence strongly supports the conclusion that biased information and the subtle pressures exerted by the Czechoslovak antireformist leaders — who turned quislings after the Čierna n.T. meeting — were a key consideration in the decision to invade. The antireformists were helped by the fact that their information coincided with the assessments of the Soviet KGB in Czechoslovakia and the team composed of the Soviet ambassador to Prague, Stepan Chervonenko and Counsellor Ivan Udaltsov.

In accordance with the agreement made at Čierna, a one-day meeting of the leaders of all the Warsaw Pact countries was held at Bratislava on August 3. At this meeting, we now know, Bilak hand-delivered to Brezhnev a letter that had been signed by eighteen of the antireformist Czechoslovak leaders. This letter depicted the situation in Czechoslovakia as grave and almost surely leading to an anticommunist coup; because of this, according to Kádár's memoirs, Bilak and his supporters asked for Soviet military assistance in staging a counter-coup.¹⁶

On August 13, Brezhnev called Dubček at the request of the antireformers, who were dissatisfied with Dubček's implementation of the Čierna n.T. agreements. In a long conversation with Dubček, Brezhnev reproved him for failing to honor the agreement reached at Čierna n.T. Then, in a personal letter dated August 16 (released in Russian only in 1990), Brezhnev insisted that Dubček fulfill the promises that Brezhnev believed had been made at Čierna. "On cadre issues," Brezhnev wrote, "at Čierna n.T. you said firmly that you would relieve comrades Kriegl, Císař, and Jiří Pelikán [the head of Czechoslovak television] of their functions."¹⁷ He also insisted that the Ministry of the Interior be divided, thus weakening the reformist minister Josef Pavel.

In fact, Dubček had promised nothing concerning cadre issues at Čierna n.T. — he had only been silent or evasive concerning Brezhnev's demands. But while Dubček intended for his evasiveness and silence to mean that he took no position on the demands about cadres, Brezhnev assumed that they implied consent.

The Prague conspirators — by now more than a dozen — sent Brezhnev an urgent follow-up letter, dated August 17, asking for an answer to their August 3 letter by August 19. Their plan was to create a division at the August 20 meeting of the CPCz Presidium, then put together a majority that would call for Warsaw Pact intervention.

The conspirators' reason for picking the August 19 date was that the Czechoslovak Presidium would be meeting on August 20 for the last time be-

¹⁶ János Kádár, *Magyarország*, no. 28, 1989.

¹⁷ The original text of this letter was reported in *Rudé Právo*, May 14, 1990, pp. 1-2.

fore the Slovak Party Congress of August 23, which they saw as the first step toward a “counterrevolutionary coup.” They were also looking ahead to the full Party Congress to be held on September 9, believing that “a right-wing Congress would have meant a great threat.”¹⁸

The Prague Reformers

Most of the reformist members of the Czechoslovak delegation regarded the Čierna meeting favorably. This is somewhat strange, given Brezhnev’s forceful ultimatum at the meeting’s conclusion, but they nevertheless seemed to think that a rift had been averted by compromise: both sides were to forget Warsaw, and mutual recriminations were to stop in the press. No agreement had been made, written or oral, on “military assistance,” and the Soviet forces in fact left Czechoslovakia on August 3, immediately following the conference.

In Dubček’s view, Brezhnev was apparently still vacillating at Čierna, perhaps fearing the high cost of invasion. When he saw that Dubček was supported by a substantial number of reformers, and when the West European Communist parties began expressing alarm over the possibility of an invasion, Brezhnev pleaded illness and withdrew from the conference. In private talks with Dubček, Brezhnev even tried to elicit sympathy for his diplomatic illness. Brezhnev may well have been as nervous and vacillating as Dubček portrays him. Despite his aggressive rhetoric in speeches prepared in advance and aimed not only at the Czech leaders but also if necessary at a high-level Soviet audience, Brezhnev and the majority of the Soviet Politburo had still not made up their minds about an invasion. We will not know the full extent of their tactical differences until Soviet archives are opened.

The Soviet leaders, nonetheless, understood Čierna as an ultimatum that had been set forth by the Soviets and accepted by the Czechoslovaks. Today, Dubček argues that this self-serving interpretation arose from the commander-like habits of the Leninist political culture, where “it was said” automatically means “it was agreed and accepted.”¹⁹

Perhaps it would be closest to the truth to say that the Čierna meeting did end with an ultimatum — but that the ultimatum had not been accepted. The reformers had no intention of undoing their work on Brezhnev’s orders. Rather, duplicating his tactics vis á vis the Czechoslovak conservatives, Dubček hoped to outwit the CPSU leadership by surviving until the 14th CPCz Congress on September 9, where conservative leaders were expected to be defeated and Dubček hoped to unite the leadership behind the reformist platform.

¹⁸ *Zápis ze společného uzavřeného zasedání ústředního výboru a rady ministrů konané 23. srpna 1968*, AK, 2/M 19.

¹⁹ “Alexander Dubček Remembers,” *Občanský deník*, August 3 and 10, 1990; author’s interview with Dubček, August 15, 1990.

Deterrence and Strategic Surprise

By mid-August, it was clear to Brezhnev that the Prague Spring was not going to be reversed by the CPCz's leaders. Meanwhile, former hold-outs in the Politburo, such as Kosygin, had switched to a pro-invasion stance.

Moscow continued to compare the costs of invasion with those of other political alternatives. The Politburo was worried, for example, about the extent to which the military would be able after the invasion to manage the political aspects of its intervention, prevent civil war, and find an eventual successor to Dubček.

Under the circumstances, what might Prague have done to increase the costs of invasion? Could a credible demonstration of Czechoslovakia's will to resist, coming at this late date, have raised the price of invasion so high as to deter it until September 9, when at least the political forces in Czechoslovakia were expected to shift in Dubček's favor?

From a purely military viewpoint, the defense of Czechoslovakia was feasible. Former Soviet general and dissident Petro G. Grigorenko, who knew well both Soviet doctrine and the Czechoslovak terrain and military, wrote to Dubček at the time, analyzing the situation in this way:

It should be fairly easy to defend Czechoslovakia. . . . The Austrian border is safe, as is the Hungarian border. The Hungarians are so weak that they can be easily frightened off. Only the borders with the USSR, Poland, and East Germany are left, and less than a dozen roads would have to be blocked [enroute] to halt the tank armadas. And if they were to add to that the defense of a small number of airports, there could be no surprise invasion. And without surprise the entire invasion would fail. It might even end with a total collapse of the invaders.²⁰

Of course, the whole point in raising the costs of an invasion was to avoid or at least postpone it, and Grigorenko believed that his plan would do that as well:

The Czechoslovak army is the most capable in Eastern Europe, and the people are unanimous in support of their government. A military gamble in conditions like that [laid out by Grigorenko] could kill Brezhnev and his government. Czechoslovak resistance could set in motion destructive anti-imperialist forces in East Germany, Poland, and yes, for that matter in the Soviet Union itself.²¹

General Grigorenko tried to convey his analysis to Prague in a July 1968 letter through the Czechoslovak embassy in Moscow. For three reasons, however, Dubček rejected the urging of a few in the Czechoslovak military, who suggested preparing a military defense of the country. Firstly, he believed — and continues to believe — that military resistance would have turned into a “senseless bloodbath.” He and his advisors (including Oldřich Jaroš, Vera

²⁰ Petro G. Grigorenko, *Memoirs* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), p. 338.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 388.

Jarosova, Jan Moravec, and Václav Kural) apparently accepted the principle that passive resistance is morally superior to self-defense.²²

Secondly, and more decisively, Dubček argues that his leadership was still forming at the time of the invasion and could not have organized the kind of military resistance that the Yugoslav leader, Josip Broz Tito, had mounted in 1948–49. In Yugoslavia, Tito firmly controlled the army and security forces, and enjoyed a high level of authority as well as popular recognition as the leader of his country's wartime resistance. Playing from these strengths, he was able to purge the pro-Moscow fifth column in his government.

In Dubček's mind, his own authority and control over the armed forces and security forces in Czechoslovakia were so much less certain that he dared not purge his pro-Soviet fifth column. As a result, Dubček committed his worst mistake: he left the armed forces under the control of antireformist figures. Worst of all, Dubček's minister of defense, General Martin Dzur, was an ally of the Czechoslovak antireformist faction led by Presidium member Vasil Bilak, first secretary of the Slovak Communist party. Dzur actively collaborated with the Soviet generals before and during the course of the invasion.²³

Another important blunder, in the opposite direction, was the dismissal of Czechoslovak general Václav Prchlík, who was critical of Warsaw Pact pressure on Czechoslovakia. Although Prchlík never got as far as developing concrete defenses against an invasion, his dismissal, which Dubček presented to the Soviet leaders at Čierna as a kind of concession, must have been an important signal that strengthened the interventionists' case in Moscow.²⁴

Thirdly, and most critically, the reformers failed to rally a defense of Czechoslovakia — and an international outcry — partly because they had agreed to silence at Čierna, evidently overrating the degree to which unmobilized world opinion would deter Moscow. In particular, several of Dubček's advisors (Kriegel, Smrkovský, and Hájek) were aware that the World Communist Conference scheduled for November 1968 was very important to some Soviet leaders (particularly Suslov and Boris Ponomarev, the latter a member of the USSR's Secretariat in charge of the International Department of the Central Committee), and these advisors convinced Dubček that the invasion would not materialize because it would jeopardize that conference. At Čierna, Czechoslovak documents show, Dubček had referred to the World Communist Conference three times in the most positive terms.²⁵ World communist opinion did matter to the Soviets, but the Czechoslovaks should have sought to mobilize it, rather than simply counting passively on it.

As for the West, Ryszard Kuklinski, a member of the Polish military at the time of the invasion, was to recall years later:

²² Interviews with author, 1990–91.

²³ *Zpravodai*, no. 5, 1990, p. 32.

²⁴ *Záznam*, p. 39.

²⁵ *Záznam*, pp. 35, 37.

I began to listen to Western newscasts in order to confirm my a priori assumption that the world knew of the coming invasion, that the world was resolutely opposed to it and protesting it, and that lastly perhaps we could succeed in avoiding the worst. . . . I felt deeply disenchanted and helpless. That world on which I had counted so much was preoccupied with the war in Vietnam and with the mass protests against it that were then surging across the entire Europe as well as the United States. . . . No one was protesting against the potential invasion of Czechoslovakia. On this subject both the Eastern and Western mass media preserved total silence.²⁶

In fact, Western intelligence services and observers did not see what seemed so obvious to Kuklinski. Like Dubček, they believed the Soviets would not invade because of the high international costs, and this in turn reinforced Prague's misreading of Soviet intentions.²⁷ A Hungarian leak about the impending invasion may have reached Dubček on or around August 20, but if it did, it was evidently disbelieved.

Interestingly, some of these misperceptions were shared by the antireformist group. Bilak has admitted in his unpublished memoirs that — just as the Prague reformers believed world opinion would block an outright invasion — he too feared until the very day of the invasion that the Soviets would not intervene for “international reasons.”²⁸

On August 16-17, however, the fateful Soviet decision was made, and on the night of August 20-21, Warsaw Pact forces crossed the border into Czechoslovakia.

Lessons for U.S. Policy

The extraordinary U.S. caution of 1968 was counterproductive. As mentioned earlier, the Johnson administration made the shortsighted decision not to warn the USSR about the consequences of an invasion for fear of harming the upcoming Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. In fact, the Soviet invasion forced postponement of the SALT talks. While it is doubtful that anything the United States could have done would by itself have deterred the Soviet leadership from sending forces into Czechoslovakia, the combination of a strong U.S. stand and indications from the Czechoslovak leadership that they would resist Soviet force might have deterred the invasion. The Soviets acted in part because they knew they could achieve strategic surprise. Their confidence was further bolstered by the hands-off policy of the United States and Czechoslovakia's preference for nonresistance. It is no secret among the Soviet officials that the formula for the invasion of Czechoslovakia proved so effective that it served as the model for Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. There, too, the initial price to be paid seemed low because of ambiguous U.S. signals and Moscow's misreading of the strength of the Afghan resistance.²⁹ In

²⁶ Ryszard Kuklinski, “The Crushing of Solidarity,” *Orbis*, Winter 1988, p. 10.

²⁷ For a further discussion, see Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia*.

²⁸ Unpublished memoirs of Vasil Bilak, *Milníky mého života*, pp. 53, 61, 63.

²⁹ *Izvestiya*, October 14, 1990.

sharp contrast, the U.S. preemptive diplomacy in Poland in 1980-81 contributed to Soviet uncertainty in that situation and may have helped to avert an invasion.³⁰

Soviet behavior in most of Eastern Europe after the 1989 revolutions reversed the image of a national security strategy based on the Leninist "old thinking." However, Moscow's stance toward its own republics, particularly the Baltic republics (whose incorporation into the Soviet Union was never accepted by the Baltic people or the U.S. government), has not changed greatly since the time of Stalin. This was demonstrated by the Soviet security forces' use of violence in Lithuania and Latvia in January 1991. Indeed, these interventions resembled the use of force in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan in that the decision to use force followed requests for "fraternal assistance" from pro-Moscow forces within these countries. In 1991, for example, the so-called National Salvation Committee of Lithuania, a counterpart of Czechoslovakia's antireformist faction of 1968, were seeking Moscow's assistance to seize power by force. At the time of this writing, further escalation of the Soviet military intervention in Lithuania has been averted primarily because of the perceived costs to a Soviet government that has begun to recognize the importance of cultivating the favor of the West to help it deal with its own staggering domestic problems. These costs have been impressed upon Moscow by veiled warnings from Washington and Western Europe that arms control negotiations and economic assistance to the USSR could be endangered by further violence in the Baltics. Potential costs were also heightened by Soviet awareness of the possibility of formidable Baltic resistance should the confrontation escalate.

While the outcome of the ongoing process of democratization in Russia and in the non-Russian republics will not be decided in Washington, the lessons of the 1968 invasion suggest that U.S. policies aimed at preventing conservative interventionism can make a difference in the battle for democratization in the Soviet Union.

³⁰ See Jiří Valenta, "The Explosive Soviet Periphery," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1983, pp. 84-101; and Jiří Valenta, "Perspectives on Soviet Intervention: Soviet Use of Surprise and Deception," *Survival*, March/April 1982, pp. 50-60.



Foreign Policy Research Institute

Recent FPRI Books

The Devil and Uncle Sam: A User's Guide to the Friendly Tyrants Dilemma, Edited by Adam Garfinkle et al. (Transaction Publishers, forthcoming).

Mobutu or Chaos?: The United States and Zaire, 1960-1990, by Michael G. Schatzberg (University Press of America, 1991).

Perestroika at the Crossroads, edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Alfred J. Rieber (M.E. Sharpe, 1991)

The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah, and the West, by Daniel Pipes (Birch Lane Press, 1990)

In Search of Civil Society: Independent Peace Groups in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, by Vladimir Tismaneanu (Routledge, 1990)

The New Insurgencies: Anticommunist Guerrillas in the Third World, by Michael Radu (Transaction Books, 1990)

Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition, by Daniel Pipes (Oxford University Press, 1990)

Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods, by Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu (Pergamon-Brassey's, 1990)

The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power, by Rensselaer Lee, III (Transaction Books, 1989)

The Long Shadow: Culture and Politics in the Middle East, by Daniel Pipes (Transaction Books, 1989; paper 1990)

The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan, by Muriel Atkin (University Press of America, 1989)

Information about FPRI books is available from Thelma Prosser, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3615 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

Correspondence

The Approaching Sack of Hong Kong

To the Editor:

Bretigne Shaffer's article, "Beijing, the West, and the Approaching Sack of Hong Kong" (Summer 1991), is an excellent analysis of where the problems lie as Great Britain and Communist China prepare for the 1997 retrocession of Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland. The crux of the matter is that the Hong Kong people lack faith in both the Communist leadership and the Communist system.

Though this lack of trust has long existed, it has been reinforced in recent years as Chinese Communist authorities have taken the steps Ms. Shaffer describes to insure that democracy never takes root and flourishes in Hong Kong. For example, the Basic Law, which is intended to serve as the foundation for Hong Kong's future political system and bill of rights for the Hong Kong people, will be subject to interpretation and amendment by Chinese Communist authorities as they see fit. Chinese Communist leaders will enjoy ultimate power over Hong Kong affairs, including Hong Kong's administration, legislative process, and judiciary. They will be authorized to apply mainland China's laws to Hong Kong in a state of emergency and to enact laws prohibiting subversion. Thus, it is clear that Hong Kong's Basic Law will be subordinate to Peking's law and that it will provide no guarantee of the political freedom and basic rights of the Hong Kong people.

Since Hong Kong is one of the world's last holdovers from the era of Western colonialism, its retrocession to the motherland should be cause for joyous celebration by Chinese everywhere. Yet most Chinese view the takeover as unfortunate. Few believe the Communist policy of "one state, two systems" will guarantee the continued prosperity, autonomy, and basic rights of the Hong Kong people. This doubt arises from the contradiction inherent in the policy: If a market-oriented economic system is best for Hong Kong over the next half century, why replace it with an inferior system at the end of fifty years? If a market-oriented system brings prosperity to Hong Kong, why deny the rest of mainland China the same opportunity? In short, why allow two systems to coexist, if one is clearly superior to the other?

History has shown repeatedly that an economy driven by market forces is the better system. Recently, we have seen this idea find acceptance in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and many other places. It is also becoming increas-

ingly clear that a market-oriented economy not only encourages but requires a more democratic political system. There is now no question that free enterprise and democracy are best for mainland China; the problem is that the Communist leadership has not recognized, or is not willing to accept, this fact. Unless they go beyond the superficial adjustments exemplified in the “one state, two systems” policy and commit themselves to fundamental reform of the mainland’s political, economic, and social systems, Communist authorities will never gain the trust of the Hong Kong people.

Why allow two systems to coexist, if one is clearly superior to the other?

Unfortunately, this outcome does not appear likely at present. It is obvious that the prospect of democracy terrifies Chinese Communist leaders, as evidenced by the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. This fear also underlies their objection to seats for Hong Kong-elected representatives on Hong Kong’s Legislative Council.

In her article, Ms. Shaffer addresses the question of which policies Western countries should pursue regarding the retrocession of Hong Kong. In turn, I would like to outline the policy of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan toward Hong Kong. First and foremost, the ROC hopes to see the continuation of the Hong Kong people’s freedom and prosperity under a market-based economic system. Free enterprise is deeply rooted in Hong Kong and, if allowed to continue, can serve as a model for the rest of mainland China. It can also give rise to democracy, which is the only means of guaranteeing the basic rights of the Hong Kong people. For our part, we will not withdraw from Hong Kong. The ROC will keep channels of contact and communication wide open, in order to encourage the development of a free economy and a democratic political system, not only for Hong Kong but for all of mainland China. This policy, we believe, will best serve the interests of our Chinese compatriots in the fateful years ahead.

Mou-shih Ding
Representative

Coordination Council for North American Affairs¹
Washington, D.C.

¹ The Coordination Council for North American Affairs was established in 1979 after the United States ended formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. The CCNAA handles trade, cultural, and consular matters previously administered by the ROC’s embassy.

Brief Reviews

WORLD POLITICS

Common Ground on Terrorism. John Marks and Igor Beliaev, eds.

In the Camera's Eye: News Coverage of Terrorist Events. Yonah Alexander and Robert Picard, eds.

Issawi's Laws of Social Motion. Charles Issawi.

Origins of Terrorism. Walter Reich, ed.

Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for Government, Journalists, and the Public. Yonah Alexander and Richard Latter, eds.

Terrorist: The Inside Story of the Highest-Ranking Iraqi Terrorist Ever to Defect to the West. Steven Emerson and Cristina del Sesto.

Toward a Canada-Quebec Union. Philip Resnick.

WAR STUDIES

Communication Satellites: Their Development and Impact. Heather E. Hudson.

On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter. Andrew W. Marshall, J.J. Martin, and Henry S. Rowen, eds.

Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts "Long Telegrams" of 1946. Kenneth M. Jensen, ed.

Planning in Wartime: Aircraft Production in Britain, Germany, and the USA. Alec Cairncross.

Shooting Blanks: War Making That Doesn't Work. James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi.

Strategic Intelligence for American National Security. Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman.

To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775-1991. Stephen Howarth.

The Transformation of War. Martin Van Creveld.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

Breaking New Ground in U.S. Trade Policy. Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development.

The Challenge of Free Trade. Alan Oxley.

Corruption, Development, and Underdevelopment. Robin Theobald.

Economic Policy Coordination: Requiem or Prologue? Wendy Dobson.

Foreign Economic Liberalization: Transformations in Socialist and Market Economies. András Köves and Paul Marer, eds.

Trade Reform: Lessons from Eight Coun-

Brief Reviews

tries. Geoffrey Shepherd and Carlos Geraldo Langoni, eds.

World Tax Reform: Case Studies of Developed and Developing Countries. Michael Boskin and Charles McLure, Jr., ed.

THE UNITED STATES

American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1991. John E. Rielly, ed.

Best Editorial Cartoons of the Year: 1991 Edition. Charles Brooks, ed.

Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1989. Frank J. Smist, Jr.

Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny. Joshua Muravchik.

The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council. Christopher C. Shoemaker.

Why Americans Hate Politics: The Death of the Democratic Process. E.J. Dionne, Jr.

EUROPE

The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953. Aleksa Djilas.

From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe. Gale Stokes, ed.

A Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution. Andrei Codrescu.

Kiss the Hand You Cannot Bite: The Rise and Fall of the Ceausescu. Edward Behr.

The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy. Misha Glenny.

The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986-1989: A Turning Point in East-West Relations. Stefan Lehne.

THE SOVIET UNION

Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder since 1917. R.J. Rummel.

Living Off the West — Gorbachev's Secret Agenda and Why It Will Fail. Sol Sanders.

The Long Pretense: Soviet Diplomacy from Lenin to Gorbachev. Arnold Beichman.

Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. Walter Laqueur.

Stalin's War against the Jews: The Doctors' Plot and the Soviet Solution. Louis Rapoport.

Steeltown, U.S.S.R.: Soviet Society in the Gorbachev Era. Stephen Kotkin.

The Twilight Struggle: The Soviet Union vs. the United States Today. Constantine C. Menges.

THE MIDDLE EAST

America Entangled: The Persian Gulf Crisis and Its Consequences. Ted Galen Carpenter, ed.

Facing a Cruel Mirror: Israel's Moment of Truth. Michael Bar-Zohar.

Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime. Middle East Watch.

Living Together Separately: Arabs and Jews in Contemporary Jerusalem. Michael Romann and Alex Weingrod.

Political Dictionary of the Arab World. Yaacov Shimoni.

Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography. Ephraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi.

EAST ASIA

China and the Crisis of Marxism-Leninism. Jürgen Domes et al.

China Review. Hsin-chi Kuan and Maurice Brosseau, eds.

The Coming War with Japan. George Friedman and Meredith LeBard.

Hong Kong! Hong Kong! Dick Wilson.

Hong Kong 1991. Hong Kong Government Information Services.

The Other Hong Kong Report: 1991. Richard Y.C. Wong and Joseph Y.S. Cheng, eds.

WORLD POLITICS

By Patrick Clawson

Common Ground on Terrorism. Edited by John Marks and Igor Beliaev. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1991. 183 pp. \$2.50 (paper).

The U.S.-Soviet Task Force to Prevent Terrorism was formed in 1988 with the help of prestigious U.S. foundations and individuals, including former deputy secretary of state John Whitehead, the Rockefeller Family Associates, and the Carnegie Corporation. Soviet participants included retired KGB generals, the Soviet Peace Committee, and *Literaturnaya Gazeta* magazine. Their 1989 meetings produced this collection of eight essays on topics such as the Middle East, religious extremism, narco-terrorism, techno-terrorism, U.S.-Soviet cooperation, and legal issues.

The essays shy away from the history of Soviet support for terrorist groups — now richly documented with archival material from Eastern Europe. For instance, the essay on terrorism in the Middle East (by Geoffrey Kemp, Augustus Richard Norton, and Andrey Shoumikhin) portrays the Soviet Union first and foremost as a victim of terrorism in that region. Only one meek sentence hints at the Soviet role in training the hijackers and bomb throwers: “there were instances when the Soviet Union was accused of allegedly supporting and thus being involved, if only indirectly, in activities of terrorist groups in the region.”

The editors report that the Americans set the agenda at the meetings, and the Soviets mainly listened. They attribute this to the greater attention devoted by the United States to terrorism. At least as plausible is that the Soviets saw an opportunity to learn what the Americans knew without divulging their own storehouse of information on terrorist groups. This volume is a throwback

to the naïve days of 1970s détente: too polite to mention the sordid history of Soviet misdeeds, it consistently interprets Soviet actions in the most benign light.

Issawi's Laws of Social Motion. By Charles Issawi. Illustrated by David Pascal. Enlarged edition. Princeton, N.J.: Darwin, 1991. 256 pp. \$16.95.

Issawi is both a distinguished professor emeritus of economic history and a wit; and he combines the two sides of his character in this collection (smartly illustrated by Pascal) of aphorisms about politics, economics, and society. Only a few are actual laws: "The more oil you take out of the ground, the more you find in it." The great majority are insightful observations: "Other states are like children who have grown up in a large family," he notes; "the U.S. is like an only child." "Western civilization works — in Japan." "The only thing academics do promptly is read their own proofs."

Although only a small number of laws deal with the Middle East, Issawi's own area of specialty, these include some of the most pithy and original of the collection. Perhaps his best known law concerns the distribution of petroleum reserves: "Where there are Muslims, there is oil; the converse is not true." Then there is the challenge of those who would fix the Middle East: "God sent Moses, and he couldn't fix it; he sent Jesus, and he couldn't fix it; he sent Muhammad, and he couldn't fix it. Do you think you can fix it?" He has little time for quantitative types: "Whatever model you plug the Middle East into, a camel comes out." D.P.

Origins of Terrorism. Edited by Walter Reich. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990. 289 pp. \$44.50 (\$13.95, paper).

What makes particular individuals prone to respond to radical ideologies and difficult political situations by joining terrorist groups? In what will doubtless long remain the standard book on the psychological dimensions of terrorism, Reich and his contributors examine this question. An unusual joint venture by the Woodrow Wilson Center and the National Institute of Mental Health, the collection comprises fourteen essays on five topics: terrorist behavior as strategy or psychology; ideological and religious motivations for terrorism; psychological mechanisms that allow terrorists to do what they do; pressures on leaders responding to terrorism; and what is known or could be learned about the psychology of terrorism. Geographically, most attention is paid to the Middle East and the West.

Reich's concluding essay on "the rewards of terrorist life" is especially stimulating. It may be useful, he argues, to think of terrorism as a career choice rather than a psychological pathology. Once launched on a terrorist path, a young man acquires a lifestyle he could not otherwise maintain. In a sense, then, the "origins of terrorism" are less important than the question of why people remain terrorists. Research on ways to break the powerful psychological hold of terrorist groups on their members may be the key to weakening these groups.

Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for Government, Journalists, and the Public. Edited by Yonah Alexander and Richard Latter. McLean, Va.: Brassey's (U.S.), 1990. 147 pp. \$29.95 (paper). **In the Camera's Eye: News Coverage of Terrorist Events.** Edited by Yonah Alexander and Robert Picard. McLean, Va.: Brassey's (U.S.), 1991. 155 pp. \$29.95 (paper).

Editors and publisher alike should be embarrassed about offering the products of two conferences held only three months apart in these slim volumes. What could have been one important book on terrorism and the media is instead two undistinguished collections. Further, the 1990 collection is heavily European in focus, while the 1991 collection is solely about the United States (except for Thomas Cooper's essay comparing U.S. and Soviet coverage). They even share faults: neither volume, for example, troubles to make the elementary but vital distinction between the electronic and print media.

The main focus of the 1990 collection, and an important theme of the 1991 volume, is reconciling the citizen's right to know with public order. Much is made of voluntary press guidelines in both volumes, but to say the discussion is thin would be charitable. The reader learns nothing of efforts to implement uniform voluntary press guidelines in the United States (and their failure — largely owing to the opposition of *The New York Times*) nor of the problems with U.K. press guidelines.

Each collection also has its particular weaknesses. The 1990 conference produced too few essays to meet even Brassey's lax notion of a book, so the volume is padded with thirty-four pages of documents. The 1991 volume has some terrible papers. Robert Terrell and Kristina Ross offer up leftist nonsense that equates terrorism with war — or rather, with wars of which the authors disapprove, like the one in Vietnam. Jack Lule contributes to the reputation of communication studies, of which he is a professor, as an insubstantial discipline in an essay about the shooting of Robert Stethem during the 1986 hijacking of TWA 847 to Beirut. It is hard to take seriously Lule's thesis that "through its stories on Robert Dean Stethem, *The New York Times* offered readers a mythic drama of love and hate."

Terrorist: The Inside Story of the Highest-Ranking Iraqi Terrorist Ever to Defect to the West. By Steven Emerson and Cristina del Sesto. New York: Villard Books, 1991. 235 pp. \$5.95 (paper).

Adnan Awad, a Palestinian Arab from near Haifa, is the "highest-ranking Iraqi terrorist" of the title. Born in 1942, he lived in several Arab countries and engaged in a range of dubious enterprises before moving to Iraq in the late 1970s, where he prospered in the construction business. Befriended by Mohammed Rashid (currently in jail in Greece, awaiting trial for blowing up a Pan Am jetliner on its way to Hawaii in August 1982), he fell into the clutches of Abu Ibrahim, the head of the 15 May Organization and one of Iraq's leading agents of terror. In August 1982, Awad set off for Geneva to blow up the Noga Hilton hotel. On reaching Switzerland, however, he turned himself over to the

American embassy. Today, Awad moves from one American city to another under the auspices of the federal Witness Protection Program.

Emerson is a leading investigative journalist dealing with intelligence matters; here, as in *The Fall of Pan Am 103*, he is at his best, piecing together a complex and elusive story. Awad's sensational tale exposes much about Middle East terrorism. It also offers an exciting and original glimpse into a subterranean world, both in the Middle East and in the United States. D.P.

Toward a Canada-Quebec Union. By Philip Resnick. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991. 119 pp. \$29.95 (\$14.95, paper).

In 1987, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and the premiers of Canada's ten provinces signed the Meech Lake accords, a series of amendments to the constitutional reforms of 1982. The accords aimed (successfully) to persuade Quebec to accept the new constitutional arrangement, in part by recognizing Quebec as a "distinct society." But the Meech Lake accord fell apart in 1990 when some of the other provinces withheld their consent. This failure, Resnick holds, results ultimately from the existence of two peoples — francophone Quebecers (who associate culturally and historically with their province) and English Canadians (who associate with federal institutions, such as the Ottawa government and the Mounties, and with federal history, such as the westward expansion and the experience of the world wars).

Given this intractable split, what constitutional arrangement ought Canadians pursue? A loose confederation is unfeasible, Resnick argues, because English Canada has little interest in sharing its resources with an otherwise independent Quebec. Yet complete independence for Quebec would further increase the impact of the United States on English Canada, a result unwelcome by nationalist/protectionist elements of the population. Therefore, Resnick suggests, the future lies in a Canada-Quebec Union in which the two partners would enjoy virtual domestic autonomy and leave such common concerns as foreign policy, defense, currency, and the environment to a federal government. Whatever the political likelihood of this plan, its bilateral approach breaks up the tired dilemma of a unitary state versus a multi-provincial confederation.

Adam Taxin

WAR STUDIES

By Bruce Berkowitz

Communication Satellites: Their Development and Impact. By Heather E. Hudson. New York: Free Press, 1990. 338 pp. \$24.95.

Don't let the title frighten you off; this is not a manual for technical experts. Rather, it is a useful guide to the political-economic side of a multi-billion dollar international industry that has received too little systematic study.

Hudson, a scholar at the University of San Francisco, explores the development of the communications satellite concept (which originated almost fifteen years before it was technologically feasible) and the establishment of Intelsat, the international consortium based in Washington that operates most communications satellites. According to her, Intelsat itself is somewhat like AT&T prior to the break-up. Created in the mid-1960s, when Big Government often thought Big Industry would be the most effective provider of utilities, Intelsat was granted a virtual monopoly.

Like other regulated monopolies, Intelsat provides reliable service, but it also limits entrepreneurship, stalls the use of innovative technologies, and makes many wait for service until the consortium is able to provide it. By discussing the competitors who are chipping away at Intelstat's monopoly, Hudson provides a useful program for identifying the players in a game that is about to change greatly.

On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter. Edited by Andrew W. Marshall, J.J. Martin, and Henry S. Rowen. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. 330 pp. \$49.95.

Albert Wohlstetter made three landmark contributions to strategic thinking in the postwar era. He brought to attention the importance of survivability to nuclear deterrence in the 1950s; the underestimates of Soviet forces by U.S. intelligence during the 1960s; and the growing importance of regional and unconventional conflict in the 1980s. During the same period, Roberta Wohlstetter wrote the single most important postmortem of an intelligence failure, showing how warning signals prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor got lost amid the "noise" of routine information.

This *Festschrift* explains these contributions and their impact on policy. Although the essays do not provide dramatic new thinking, they do expand, reflect on, or draw upon concepts explored by the Wohlstetters, for example, the development of U.S. nuclear strategy, the role of the Third World in U.S. security policy, and the problem of proliferation.

Most interesting, however, are the volume's personal touches, particularly the vignettes of each author's experience with Albert or Roberta Wohlstetter. The selection of editors is itself telling in this regard: Marshall and Rowen are forty-year associates of the Wohlstetters; Martin has known them for "only" twenty-five years.

Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts "Long Telegrams" of 1946. Edited by Kenneth M. Jensen. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. 70 pp. \$9.95 (paper).

Collected here for side-by-side comparison are three foreign ministry cables, all written in 1946 and all providing an assessment of the emerging cold war. The documents include: George Kennan's seminal and familiar "Long

Telegram” from the U.S. embassy in Moscow, possibly the earliest rationale for the Western policy of containment; three similar messages to London from Frank Roberts, the British chargé d'affaires in Moscow; and a cable to Moscow by Nikolai Novikov, the Soviet ambassador to Washington.

The newly released Novikov cable is the reason for publishing this collection. The Soviet Foreign Ministry maintains that it was “in a way parallel to Kennan’s famous cable.” Novikov describes U.S. and British motives at that time as a policy of “encirclement,” designed to strangle and pressure the Soviet regime into submission. Unlike Kennan and Roberts, though, Novikov offered no recommendations.

All three of the formerly classified cables track closely their governments’ overt policies. The real question lies elsewhere: we know the influence of the U.S. and British missives; did Novikov’s cable influence Soviet policies? If so, how?

Planning in Wartime: Aircraft Production in Britain, Germany, and the USA. By Alec Cairncross. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991. 197 pp. \$65.00.

During World War II, the British Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) faced the challenge of building forces to fight a prolonged war at a moment when scores of aircraft were being lost each month. Cairncross was an official in MAP, and his memoir, *Planning in Wartime*, describes the organization, administration, and bureaucratic politics of meeting this challenge. He also offers brief comparisons with the German and American experiences.

Many of the specific problems Cairncross describes are quaintly irrelevant to modern war production. Air forces no longer deploy vast numbers of aircraft; modern aircraft are too expensive, take too long to build, and each is far more capable (for example, three modern fighter-bombers carry the same bomb load as a squadron of B-17s). Still, the study remains valuable. The features of defense organizations that we take for granted today, such as statistical monitoring and long-range planning, were pioneered in World War II. Indeed, in many respects, Cairncross’s efforts were the predecessor of Alain Enthoven’s McNamara-era Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. Combine this with a war-time environment and tremendous technological progress (in 1939 the British flew fabric-covered biplanes; by 1945, they had built jet fighters and were beginning to explore ballistic missile defense) and one has the makings of a thoroughly dry but interesting memoir.

Shooting Blanks: War Making That Doesn’t Work. By James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi. New York: Morrow, 1991. 513 pp. \$25.00.

We know that weapons and military organizations often fail, and obviously it would be advantageous to know why. Dunnigan and Nofi offer five reasons: intelligence fiascoes, inexperience, unqualified media creating misunderstandings of military matters among the public, inefficiency in planning and procuring weapons, and a failure to gear military planning to the most

likely threat. The authors draw these conclusions from virtually all wars and war-planning efforts since Napoleonic times, but they draw on their database mainly in the form of anecdotes.

Worse, Dunnigan tends to write the same book over and over. His studies were interesting enough at first, but, like Gregorian chants, they now sound all alike. *Shooting Blanks* draws heavily on his earlier *How to Make War* (1982) and *A Quick and Dirty Guide to War* (1985). Like those books, too, this one provides the reader with facts at fire-hose rate, when sips might serve better. Dunnigan and Nofi do have some commonsense recommendations (for example, don't automatically retire officers who fail to earn promotion; they have experience that is costly to replace). But most of these recommendations were made by the military reform movement of the 1970s and early 1980s, and many have been adopted.

Strategic Intelligence for American National Security. By Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991. 244 pp. \$12.95 (paper).

Berkowitz and Goodman describe in this comprehensive, step-by-step review how the intelligence process works: the collection of raw data from sources (agents in the field, radio and electronic signals, reconnaissance imagery); the analysis and evaluation of data; and the making of informed predictions about the future shape of international conflicts.

Essential to the process, the authors point out, are the quality of employees and their ability to provide useful guidance to national policy makers; the intelligence community's organizational structure; and above all, the dissemination of intelligence findings on a systematic and timely basis. Pooling their experience as intelligence analysis officers, Berkowitz and Goodman present a concise and competent account of what both students and teachers need to know about this arcane field and its complexities. Ray S. Cline

To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775-1991. By Stephen Howarth. New York: Random House, 1991. 620 pp. \$25.00.

Pity the historian whose book runs to the present. No sooner has he finished than his claim to completeness starts to erode, sometimes dramatically. So it is with Howarth, a British naval historian. After diligently covering the U.S. Navy's two hundred-plus years of history, his work concludes just prior to the service's most remarkable performance since World War II, when its cruise missiles and carrier-based aircraft played key roles in the air assault against Iraq.

No matter. Howarth provides a straightforward history of the U.S. Navy, from its origins in the Revolutionary War to the service's current attempts to define its role in the post-cold war world. By his own admission, much of the narrative is familiar to military scholars and professionals. The book's main contribution lies in providing within a single volume the history of U.S. naval power, including such key events as the introduction of steam power, the impact of arms control, and racial integration.

Howarth's reliance on a remarkable volume of original-source material from the National Archives, rather than on the many published histories of the Navy, is another merit. Finally, because Howarth does not try to impose an overall theme on U.S. naval policy (a failing of K.J. Hagan's *The People's Navy*, 1991), he provides both a useful reference for the specialist and a primer for the uninitiated.

The Transformation of War. By Martin Van Creveld. New York: Free Press, 1991. 254 pp. \$22.95.

What impels an author to take a few interesting observations and hype them as grandiose discoveries? *The Transformation of War* is not a bad book, but its blurb promises "the most radical interpretation of armed conflict since Clausewitz," prompting the reviewer to set his standards accordingly.

Van Creveld argues that modern war requires large conventional forces and, since only major industrialized states can muster such forces, war has been "rational" in the sense of being an extension of national policy (hence the reference to Clausewitz). Nowadays, Van Creveld argues, a new model of war has emerged, consisting of civil strife (Lebanon, Yugoslavia), guerrilla warfare (Angola, Afghanistan), and terrorism (Libya). Such wars are messier, because the distinction between civilian and combatant is blurred, and the parties who would might negotiate a settlement are hard to identify and may lack control over their followers.

Alas, there are three flies in Van Creveld's soup. Firstly, the trends he identifies are not as recent as he suggests. Guerrilla warfare goes back at least as far as the Boer War of 1899-1902. Secondly, others have already pointed out these trends: the President's Commission on Integrated Strategy, for one. Thirdly, these new forms of war may not replace old-fashioned warfare, but simply add to it. At any rate, every time someone predicts "The End of War as We Know It," someone else (such as Saddam Husayn) seems to come along to prove him wrong.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

By Patrick Clawson

Breaking New Ground in U.S. Trade Policy. By the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. 139 pp. \$28.50 (paper).

A subgroup of the Committee for Economic Development, which is made up of top officials from America's leading corporations, got together to prepare this study of major policy issues.

Of the three issues treated here, the most attention is given to unfair trade practices. Recommendations are made for ways to improve the U.S. re-

sponse to export subsidies, domestic subsidies, restrictions on access to domestic markets, and infringement of intellectual property rights (that is, violations of patents, copyrights, and trademarks). Interestingly, the proposal on dumping recognizes the merits of the European and Japanese complaint that Washington determines the existence of dumping by a method that produces too high a reference price.

The second issue is whether global or bilateral trade reform is superior. Here the study is too pessimistic about the prospects for a free trade agreement with Mexico, and largely ignores the enthusiasm for such agreements sweeping Latin America. But it makes an excellent case against bilateral trade agreements with East Asian states, whose trading patterns are too diffuse to make such agreements practical. The third issue is the link between trade and investment; the report makes the sensible argument that so long as the United States runs a foreign trade deficit, the best way to finance it is through foreign investment, because the alternative is loans (which can be withdrawn in a crisis and require fixed interest payments).

The Challenge of Free Trade. By Alan Oxley. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. 254 pp. \$35.00.

As Australia's representative to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oxley was an important figure in the GATT negotiations. His account resembles the organization itself: badly organized and wrong on key points, yet dealing with a vital issue, and probably dealing with it better than anyone else. *The Challenge of Free Trade* is not a bad primer, and that is a high compliment for a book on such a complex issue. (But why does the chapter on "What is GATT?" come in the middle of the book?)

Oxley is particularly good at capturing the messy character of GATT's current Uruguay Round of talks, a five-year-long set of negotiations seeking a trade liberalization agreement. He captures the flavor of the negotiating sessions, and outlines in a readable — almost interesting — manner the long list of issues under dispute. He also provides an excellent list of the high costs of the various trade barriers.

On the other hand, Oxley is flat wrong on one of the most vital issues, namely, the concept of dumping. Article 6 of the GATT agreement defines dumping as one of two phenomena: selling abroad at a lower price than at home (the definition Oxley cites and the one preferred by those accused of dumping) or selling at a price below cost (the definition preferred by those charging dumping). It is disturbing that someone so involved in the negotiations does not appreciate the difference, since this ambiguity in the GATT agreement has fueled rancorous disagreements between those accused of dumping and their accusers.

Corruption, Development, and Underdevelopment. By Robin Theobald. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990. 191 pp. \$15.95 (paper).

Theobald minimizes the responsibility of Third World elites for the massive, institutionalized corruption in their countries by implying that corruption is a global problem, even if somewhat greater in the Third World. When he finally turns to corruption in developing nations, we learn that the problem results from “the strong presence of international capital,” which distorts these economies “according to the dictates and needs of the industrial heartland” of Europe and America. His analysis entirely misses the connection between corruption and autocracy.

Despite his debilitating biases, reality finally drives Theobald to endorse the free market as a solution to the Third World’s terrible problems with corruption. Reluctantly, he suggests that limiting the economic role of the state may be needed; indeed, “it may be that privatization offers the only viable prospect of curtailing corruption in the third world.” Has the day come when even critics of the capitalist international economic order must concede that the Third World has no alternative to free markets and privatization? Only this explains the puzzling contrast between Theobald’s analyses and his conclusions.

Economic Policy Coordination: Requiem or Prologue? By Wendy Dobson. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1991. 162 pp. \$11.95.

Is the world economy divided into mark, dollar, and yen blocs? Almost inadvertently, Dobson seems to have demonstrated that this is the case. Her analysis of monetary coordination among Europe, the United States, and Japan ignores differences among the European states. She can do this because of the increasingly tight linkage to German monetary policy on the part of all the West European states — Britain being the last holdout in the EC — and, as of early 1991, on the part of all the Nordic states.

Dobson’s volume covers two subjects: the history of coordination among the Group of Seven (Japan, Canada, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany); and the evolution of economic variables since enhanced coordination began in 1985. She offers criteria by which coordination efforts can be judged: informality and frankness, a clearly defined mandate, strong leadership and clear lines of accountability, an agreed-upon analytical framework and policy guidelines, and adequate technical support. She also proposes specific measures to improve the coordination process: involving central bankers more, ending the separation between meetings on exchange rates and meetings on macroeconomic policy, creating an institutional memory, reducing the number of states and individuals involved, and aligning the mandates of deputies to do actual coordinating.

Published by the United States’s premier think-tank on international economics, Dobson’s book is well-organized, full of information, and offers important, practical policy proposals. In short, it is definitive.

Foreign Economic Liberalization: Transformations in Socialist and Market Economies. Edited by András Köves and Paul Marer. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. 289 pp. \$42.50 (\$17.95, paper).

These twenty-two papers come from a conference held in Budapest in November 1989. Half are about Eastern Europe, including six about Hungary, while the other half are either about other ex-poor states (Mexico, Israel, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan) or about international experience in general. Neng Liang, Joseph Battat, and Marer make a fascinating argument for dividing countries' approaches toward trade not along inward-outward lines but between the "protected export promotion" of the successful newly industrialized lands (combining pro-export and anti-import policies) and "de facto import promotion" of many Third World countries (which subsidize consumers by making imports cheap, while ignoring exporters).

The articles offer dramatically different forms of advice. Kamilla Lanyi documents the regulations that strangle Hungary's foreign trade, with the implication that only radical reform can eliminate the bureaucratic obstructionism that subverts openings. Representative of the opposite tendency is Bela Kadar, who became Hungary's Minister of Economic Relations soon after writing his contribution. He argues against pursuing economic policies, however rational, that may ignite violence. Implicit in this and similar theses is that preservation of the privileges created by the old system of subsidies and regulations is a better way to preserve social peace than would be a reform that leads to rapid growth — a proposition this reviewer finds doubtful.

Trade Reform: Lessons from Eight Countries. Edited by Geoffrey Shepherd and Carlos Geraldo Langoni. San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1991. 136 pp. \$12.95 (paper).

From 1984 to 1988, the World Bank undertook a study of thirty-seven cases of trade liberalization, attempting to ascertain whether liberalization makes it harder for a country to service its debt — including its debt to the World Bank. The cases examined took place sufficiently long ago to permit a full evaluation of their effects: Greece in 1953 (by Demetris Papageorgiu), Spain after 1959 (Guillermo de la Dehesa), Yugoslavia 1965-1975 (Oli Havrylyshyn), Chile since 1974 (Dominique Hachette), Korea and Singapore in the 1960s and 1970s (Richard Sharpe), and Argentina 1976-1982 (Domingo Cavallo). Seven of the essays in this collection resulted from that study. Five of the seven cases were successful, despite great differences in the economic conditions at the time the reforms began, the speed at which reforms were adapted, the relative weight given to reforming different kinds of restrictions (especially, high tariffs versus administrative barriers), and other economic policies adopted along with trade reform. The exceptions were Argentina and Yugoslavia, in which the reform efforts stalled and were then reversed.

Brazil is the subject of two additional essays (one by Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, one by Donald Coes), both demonstrating that country's depressing lack of commitment, now and in the past, to any sustained trade liberalization.

Michael Michaely's summary essay focuses on the conditions that promote a sustained liberalization effort, as opposed to a one-time burst of activity that is later eroded. He argues that liberalizations are more likely to survive if they begin with strong measures, are launched during a crisis situation, and initially relax bureaucratic restriction rather than just cut tariff rates.

World Tax Reform: Case Studies of Developed and Developing Countries. Edited by Michael Boskin and Charles McLure, Jr. San Francisco, Calif.: International Center for Economic Growth, 1991. 332 pp. \$29.95 (\$14.95, paper).

As a result of the worldwide tax reform movement, a body of data has been acquired on the subject and some principles have begun to emerge. Both are examined here. Seven industrial states (Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Sweden, Great Britain, and the United States) and four developing states (China, Colombia, Indonesia, and Mexico) are covered in the country section. Each sets out the context of the tax system prior to reform and the main issues in the debate over reform. Policy makers should read the essay by Arnold Harberger, which sets out nicely the main issues of concern to fiscal experts and economists who want to make tax codes more growth-promoting. He covers five issues: the desirability of taxing value added rather than sales, the efficiency gains from uniform tariff rates, the inappropriateness of taxing income from corporations (whose owners pay income tax on whatever profits the corporation does not reinvest), the perverse effects of tax breaks for specific industries, and the importance of indexing for inflation in calculating taxes on businesses.

Although *World Tax Reform* is not likely to interest casual readers, it is a useful compendium on the principles that have guided tax reforms in recent years and the resulting experiences. The level of detail is just right for the interested U.S. policy maker, with just enough to give a flavor of the unique characteristics of each country's circumstances and the peculiarities of its tax system. The most striking lesson for Washington is how limited have been its debates about tax reform, tinkering around the edges of a system with some fundamental flaws.

THE UNITED STATES

By Kevin McNamara

American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1991. Edited by John E. Rielly. Chicago, Ill.: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1991. 38 pp. \$7.50.

The concerns of the American people have shifted since 1986 from the Soviet Union and arms control issues to the Middle East and international economic issues. This is the upshot of the fifth survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Concern for Latin America and South Africa also declined, leaving the Middle East as the one region still commanding America's attention. The focus on the Middle East, however, is partly a reflection of the fact that the Council's polls were conducted at the height of the Persian Gulf crisis.

The survey is full of contradictory messages: interest in foreign affairs has never been higher, but concern about foreign policy problems has declined; opinion is generally more critical of Israel, yet there is greater willingness to use U.S. troops to defend this ally. Similarly, many Americans feel the United States ought to play an active role in world affairs, but foreign assistance has become even less popular.

As in past surveys, divisions between public and elite opinion are recorded, and the comparison shows that the public is more isolationist about foreign policy. Average citizens are more skeptical of changes in the Soviet Union and more likely to oppose foreign aid than those in leadership positions; yet they are also less willing to deploy U.S. troops abroad and more protectionist in their economic outlook than elites. This suggests that greater public influence in the foreign policy-making process would lead to a less active U.S. foreign policy.

Best Editorial Cartoons of the Year: 1991 Edition. Edited by Charles Brooks. Gretna, La.: Pelican Publishing Co., 1991. 176 pp. \$10.95.

The 330 cartoons by 150 cartoonists in this collection all date from 1990. They inspire two observations. Firstly, cartoonists seem to share a populist orientation that blurs traditional distinctions between Left and Right. Their main theme, instead, is that the big guy always deserves a mugging. Saddam Husayn is pilloried, but so are the big oil companies for their role in the Gulf crisis; prominent peace activists and fat-cat generals both get their due. Gorbachev is portrayed sympathetically in his confrontations with powerful foes, but ridiculed when seen from the perspective of the less powerful, such as tiny Lithuania or the average Soviet citizen. Castro is uniformly portrayed as a leader whose time is coming to a close, and the Beijing government is universally held in contempt for trampling on the rights of its citizens, as is President Bush's desire not to let the Tiananmen Square massacre rupture relations with the PRC.

Secondly, while cartoons lampooning Nelson Mandela, the Sandinistas, Fidel Castro, and CNN's coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis are hard to find in *The Washington Post* and *Los Angeles Times*, they seem to abound in smaller cities and in the hinterland. The cartoons in this collection represent a full range of opinions, but they suggest that newspapers outside of America's largest cities are less politically correct.

Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1989. By Frank J. Smist, Jr. Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press, 1990. 336 pp. \$49.95.

Seymour Hersh's 1974 exposé of domestic surveillance operations in *The New York Times* prompted Congress to launch unprecedented investigations of U.S. intelligence agencies, and to create permanent oversight committees. Smist focuses on the history of these committees and in so doing reveals an interesting point: greater congressional scrutiny of intelligence is almost always precipitated by executive branch failures that are widely publicized in the news media. This continued to be the case through 1984, Smist notes, as the Senate committee continued to be "stirred to act by stories reported in the press. Indeed, the press helped to frame the very issues the committee considered."

Smist argues that although greater oversight is by no means an unmixed blessing, it presents the White House with some tactical advantages. For example, the members of Congress who are now briefed on intelligence programs must share some responsibility for the success or failure of intelligence operations, and thus have a stake in the health of the agencies. Furthermore, these members discourage less informed colleagues from getting involved, limiting the action to those who theoretically know what they are talking about. Moreover, he reports, "once members came to know what the intelligence agencies really did, they became strong supporters."

The title is a bit misleading; the emphasis is on the period after 1974. Also, the author has an annoying habit of repeating himself, as when he records the exact fate of a Senate resolution three times in the space of a few pages. Overall, however, Smist has produced perhaps the finest documentary record yet of modern congressional oversight of intelligence.

Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny. By Joshua Muravchik. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1991. 258 pp. \$24.00.

Like the policy of containment that once bound liberals and conservatives in a common cause, a foreign policy based on promoting democracy could have enormous bipartisan appeal. It would give Washington the moral high ground while also satisfying the realists' demand that foreign policy serve the national interest (by creating a more peaceful international environment). For Americans who wish to see the United States play an active role in international affairs after the end of the cold war, Muravchik articulates a foreign policy vision motivated by the imperative to spread democracy abroad. In doing so, he provides the kind of foreign policy "vision" pundits say Washington lacks.

Unfortunately, promoting democracy will not soon loom large in U.S. foreign policy. Muravchik cites the prodemocracy initiatives of the National Endowment for Democracy; the State Department's foreign aid and human rights divisions; Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty; the U.S. Information Agency; the CIA; and even the U.S. military, whose occupation of Japan, Germany, and

other countries nurtured democracy. But foreign aid and covert operations — elements common to most of the initiatives cited by Muravchik — are both controversial; and the agencies involved are small, scattered, or unpopular. If the idea of basing foreign policy on the promotion of democracy is to succeed — and it should — it will need institutions organized for that purpose: domestic constituencies, influential lobbies, powerful bureaucracies. The first requirement, however, is a president willing to adopt Muravchik's vision as his own.

The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council. By Christopher C. Shoemaker. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. 152 pp. \$29.95.

Shoemaker offers a lucid argument why national security is, and ought to remain, managed at the White House. Despite the Iran-contra affair, the handiwork of an overly assertive NSC staff member, he argues that the cabinet officials comprising the National Security Council require a strong staff. Primarily, they are needed to integrate the work of the many departments and agencies formulating and executing policy. Indeed, Shoemaker argues that a weakened NSC staff frustrated Oliver North and prompted his unwelcome initiative.

Shoemaker's argument rests on his contention (paraphrasing Clemenceau) that "diplomacy is now too important to be left to the diplomats." The strength of the NSC staff, Shoemaker points out, is "its bureaucratic independence and its presidential perspective." The staff is influential when its leader, the assistant to the president for national security affairs, is strong. This does not necessarily imply an advisor who is a prominent spokesman or a rival of the secretary of state, though it does require that he have the president's ear.

Occasional lapses into governmentese ("PD-2 assigned the primary responsibility for crisis management to the SCC and, therefore, to the APNSA and the NSC staff") mar an otherwise well-written book.

Why Americans Hate Politics: The Death of the Democratic Process. By E.J. Dionne, Jr. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. 430 pp. \$22.95.

Why have voting and participation in the democratic process in the United States gone into apparently inexorable decline in recent years? Dionne blames the quality of political debate for this phenomenon, claiming that politicians frame issues "as a series of false choices" between sixties radicalism and eighties conservatism. Debate is debased, he says, by dragging cultural issues like patriotism, feminism, and racism into politics. Instead of arriving at a consensus, debate is designed to polarize segments of the electorate in such a way as to win elections. This approach enabled Republicans to break up the New Deal coalition and prevail in presidential elections; it also enabled ideologically inclined upper-middle-class voters to prevail within the Democratic party over working-class voters who care more about pocketbook issues. The author maintains there is a "restive majority" of Americans prepared to occupy the pragmatic center in American politics — if they could only find it.

Dionne's analysis is faulty. Political discourse is not the problem; American voters do not boycott elections because the quality of public discussion is insufficiently sophisticated. The most credible analysis is that the American electorate, always described as pragmatic, is increasingly avoiding elections because they simply don't work; that is, they no longer resolve problems or settle disputes. The losers of an election simply pursue their goals through alternate means, such as in the courts, news media, political action committees, and "public interest" organizations. Even after the votes have been counted, decisive action by government is forestalled because warring factions continue their disputes through control of separate branches of government, or recourse to lawsuits. The result is paralysis. This is the thesis of Martin Shefter and Benjamin Ginsburg in their study *Politics By Other Means* (1990). The author briefly mentions this illuminating work; he ought to read it again.

EUROPE

By Vladimir Tismaneanu

The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953. By Aleksa Djilas. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991. 259 pp. \$34.95.

At a moment when Yugoslavia is plagued by a wave of violent ethnic confrontations that threaten to bring about the country's complete disintegration, Djilas's book could not be more timely. The author, a research associate at Harvard's Russian Research Center, knows Yugoslav history thoroughly and has given us an intelligent, scholarly account of Yugoslavism and of Yugoslav unity between 1919 and 1953. Better yet, the account is written with clarity and occasionally with bemused understatement (the introduction includes the observation that "Yugoslavia is a difficult country to understand").

The Contested Country chronicles the origins of Yugoslavism, the role of the Communist International and its emissaries in Yugoslavia, the illusions of socialist internationalism, the dynamics of nationalist movements in Serbia and Croatia, and the attempt by Tito and his followers to overcome ethnic strife in the experiment of a socialist federation of Yugoslavia. Djilas concludes that its utopian underpinnings meant that the communist solution to the national question in Yugoslavia could be only transient and superficial. Old ethnic stereotypes, passions, and animosities continued to smolder under official triumphalism. When communist structures fell apart in the late 1980s, these emotions immediately came back to threaten what had appeared to many, East and West, as a viable federation.

From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe. Edited by Gale Stokes. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 267 pp. \$35.00 (\$12.95, paper).

The list of books recounting East-Central Europe's anticommunist revolutions continues to grow. Stokes, a specialist in Balkan history, has contributed a sampler of primary sources, "to bring together in one convenient place some of the most important and interesting documents that suggest how, over the past forty years, East Europeans have made the journey from Stalinism to a new pluralism." Although the editor contributes a few brief introductory remarks, and condenses some of the entries, he has, for the most part, wisely, allowed the eloquence of his authors — including Milan Kundera, Václav Havel, and Adam Michnik — to stand on its own.

The book chronicles the transformation of the East European states from the imposition of communist totalitarianism to the rise of a new civil society. Its first part focuses on the years immediately after World War II, while the second encompasses the subsequent fifteen-year effort to dismantle Stalinism while maintaining socialism. "Antipolitics and the Retreat to Ethics" then covers the major theme of post-1968 Eastern Europe: "the loss of faith that communism, or even politics as such, could provide solutions to the problems posed by modern life." Part four, "The Return of Politics," presents the onset of pluralism and its dilemmas.

For those unacquainted with the major intellectual concepts of Eastern Europe, *From Stalinism to Pluralism* provides a useful introduction, although it offers the temptation of appearing well-read with small effort.

A Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution.

By Andrei Codrescu. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991. 236 pp. \$21.00.

Codrescu, a professor of English at Louisiana State University and a commentator for National Public Radio, has written an elegant account of his return to Romania following the overthrow of the Ceaușescu. His record of meetings and interviews in Romania are the best part of the book, well worth reading by those who wish to understand recent developments in that country. Of particular significance are Codrescu's accounts of his meetings with some of Romania's foremost literary figures, who have often doubled as democratic opposition, both before and after the fall of Ceaușescu. Particularly memorable is the bleak outlook of literary critic Nicolae Manolescu. Looking back on the overthrow of the Ceaușescu regime, Manolescu comments: "We thought we were in a revolution . . . but we were in fact caught in the crossfire between two Securitate gangs." Codrescu correctly believes that the revolution is not over and democracy-building has yet to begin in earnest.

Codrescu insists that his account is not journalism, leaving this reader puzzled as to what exactly it is. A memoir, a travelogue, a journal? No matter. It is a primary source on today's Romania, available untranslated in the English language.

Kiss the Hand You Cannot Bite: The Rise and Fall of the Ceaușescus. By Edward Behr. New York: Random House, 1991. 293 pp. \$22.50.

How did Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu rise from the lowliest ranks of the Communist party to become the absolute rulers of Romania? Behr, a former Paris bureau chief for *Newsweek*, recounts several theories, but ends up backing the suggestion that Party elders supported Ceaușescu because “they believed they would be able to manipulate him, using him as a convenient figure-head or transitional first secretary.”

Whether Behr is right or not, his account of the Ceaușescus’ rise has the virtue of placing their story in the context of Romania’s twentieth-century history. For instance, he points out that the Romanian Communists, far from opposing the fascist Iron Guard, actually colluded with it. At times, however, Behr relies too heavily on the self-serving statements of former members of the Romanian Communist elite. Information provided by former official hagiographers should not be taken at face value, as Behr tends to do with (for example) data provided by Ion Ardeleanu, the ex-director of the Bucharest Museum of Party History.

The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy. By Misha Glenny. London: Penguin Books, 1990. 245 pp. \$8.95 (paper)

Journalists continue to mine on the 1989 upheavals in Eastern Europe for material. This contribution, by the BBC’s central European correspondent, provides an analysis of the transition to multi-party systems in the Soviet Bloc, Albania, and Yugoslavia.

Though uneven, some of Glenny’s insights are on the mark — such as his observation that “there is no political and social force that can match the power of nationalism in Eastern Europe.” But there are also misses. The chapters on Albania and Yugoslavia are the weakest and (no fault of his) already need updating. Too, Glenny often strays from purely factual identification of the region’s nascent political personalities, showing an unfortunate tendency to mythologize them, both for better and worse. His treatment of post-Ceaușescu political developments in Romania fails to convey how murky the situation there has become.

Despite these flaws, though, *The Rebirth of History* is well worth its modest price, for it offers those unfamiliar with Eastern Europe’s emerging multi-party systems a good introduction to the specific political groups involved.

The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986-1989: A Turning Point in East-West Relations. By Stefan Lehne. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. 300 pp. \$36.00.

The breathtaking pace of change within the Soviet bloc, symbolized by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, has left diplomats searching for a new “European architecture.” Whatever shape it finally takes, the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) seems likely to remain relevant to it and to European international relations generally.

Lehne's timely volume offers a balanced account of the CSCE's workings. He begins with the background meetings that culminated in the Helsinki accords of 1975, and ends with the excruciatingly protracted Vienna meeting of his title. Along the way, the author presents the contrasting views of each bloc on issues of security and human rights, but wisely highlights intra-bloc differences. For example, he shows how Gorbachev's "new thinking" fractured the Warsaw Pact into two groups — one supporting reform (Poland, Hungary) and one adhering to communist orthodoxy (Romania, Czechoslovakia). Lehne similarly discusses the diverging views of Western CSCE members.

In addition to providing a useful summary of CSCE affairs, Lehne argues that the organization has served as an important instrument for facilitating reform in the East, and that the Vienna meeting in particular was a turning point in East-West relations. But this seems backward. Surely it was the fundamental failure of communism that provided the impetus for East bloc reform and the need for reform that then transformed the CSCE into the important instrument it has become.

Janeen Klinger

THE SOVIET UNION

Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder since 1917. By R.J. Rummel. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1990. 268 pp. \$29.95.

Drawing on previous accounts of the Kremlin's mass murders, notably Robert Conquest's *The Great Terror* (1968) and *Harvest of Sorrow* (1986), plus a wealth of more recent sources, Rummel provides a comprehensive account of the Soviet Union's bloody history from Lenin to Gorbachev.

Rummel estimates that, excluding deaths attributable to World War II and the Afghan conflict, the Soviet government between 1917 and 1987 murdered about 62 million people, nearly 55 million of them its own citizens. In contrast, battle deaths in all of this century's wars comes to some 36 million. Other comparisons are no less startling: the number of Jews killed in the Nazi camps during World War II (approximately 4.4 million) is exceeded by the number of people killed in transit to or inside Soviet labor camps during World War II (8.5 million). It is also exceeded by the roughly 6.9 million killed during the thirty-four years of perceived reform following Stalin's death.

Rummel also explains why the Soviet slaughter occurred: "For reasons of ideology, of Marxism. To remove potential, if not actual, opponents; to create a new society, a new Soviet man." In sum, Rummel understands that he is telling the story of communist ideology in practice. Despite his grim subject, he tells that story in readable fashion.

James P. Konzak

Living Off the West — Gorbachev's Secret Agenda and Why It Will Fail. By Sol Sanders. New York: Madison Books, 1990. 249 pp. \$21.95.

Is Western economic assistance essential to the USSR's survival? If so, should the West provide it? Sanders maintains that "The Soviet Union has always been far more dependent on foreign economic support than conventional wisdom has been willing to acknowledge. And, in fact, the Communist experiment which defied natural law has survived only through periodic transfers of resources from the West." While much of his historical evidence for these propositions comes from Antony Sutton (*Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development*, 3 vols., 1968, 1971, 1973) and Werner Keller (*East Minus West Equals Zero: Russia's Debt to the West*, 1961), Sanders skillfully updates these books.

Moreover, he draws appropriate policy conclusions. Soviet dependence, he says, produces two cycles. For the USSR, the cycle comprises economic decline, ideological moderation, Western assistance, and political reaction. The parallel cycle for the West consists of sympathy, self-deception, subsidy, and disillusionment. At the moment, Gorbachev is trying to move from moderation to Western aid. Specifically, he is seeking to use elements of capitalism, together with external assistance, to rebuild Soviet society. The problem is that ultimately Gorbachev must justify his reforms in a socialist context, and for that reason, he must fail.

President Bush and Chancellor Kohl would be well-advised to study this book carefully before the wealth of the Free World is again placed at the disposal of Moscow.

James P. Konzak

The Long Pretense: Soviet Diplomacy from Lenin to Gorbachev. By Arnold Beichman. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1991. 303 pp. \$32.95.

Every U.S.-Soviet treaty seems to be greeted like a new baby in the family, a not-to-be-doubted occasion for joy. In *The Long Pretense*, Beichman (of the Hoover Institution) launches an open assault on this attitude by examining treaty relations between the two countries since the creation of the Soviet state. His persuasive conclusion: "a Marxist-Leninist state cannot become a peace-loving, peace-observing, and treaty-complying member of the international community" unless it first effects fundamental changes in its ideology and reflects those changes in its political institutions. These fundamental changes include dismantling the Soviet machinery of repression, and surrendering control of the political process and economic system. Not only have such changes not yet taken place in the USSR, Western diplomats do not even think of ideological changes as preconditions for negotiating treaties, for they dismiss ideas as a force in Soviet behavior. The result, he says, is an unending cycle of treaties, violations, and more treaties.

Surprisingly, Beichman does not advocate an end to the policy he calls "treatyism." Instead, he pessimistically concludes that "treadmill diplomacy" is inevitable and bows before it. More surprising yet, he seems unsure that treatyism should end, given its political popularity in our representative system. But this confuses what a democracy ought to do in the narrow sense (namely,

express the will of the people) from what it ought to do in a larger sense (further the national interest).

James P. Konzak

Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. By Walter Laqueur. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1990. 382 pp. \$24.95.

Laqueur joins the ongoing Soviet debate over Stalin and Stalinism with his usual passion for cultural and political detail; the resulting study is not to be missed by those interested in the Soviets' soul-searching attempts to master and overcome their Stalinist past. *The Glasnost Revelations* documents the scope and stakes of the current controversies surrounding Stalin's personal role in the making of the Soviet system.

Drawing on the abundant materials that have been published in the USSR, especially since 1987, Laqueur offers incontrovertible evidence that Stalin played a decisive role in staging the Great Terror. Moreover, the heartbreaking revelations he discusses demonstrate the criminal nature of the people who helped the despot implement his most insane designs. Implicitly, he also challenges those Westerners who seek to find in the USSR's economic development a minimal justification (or vindication) for the toll Stalinism imposed on the Soviet people. Indeed, one of Laqueur's best chapters is dedicated to Stalin's "companions-in-arms" — in fact a gang of resentful, vicious minions who slavishly carried out their leader's orders. This Stalinist "elite" appears to have been the equivalent of a bloodthirsty Mafia, similar in several respects to Hitler's henchmen.

V.T.

Stalin's War against the Jews: The Doctors' Plot and the Soviet Solution.

By Louis Rapoport. New York: The Free Press, 1990. 318 pp. \$22.95.

In 1953, nine members of the staff of the Kremlin Hospital — six with Jewish names — were accused of plotting to poison the Soviet leadership. "Yet, this watershed event remains largely unexplored," notes the late *Jerusalem Post* reporter Rapoport, "though many facts about the Stalin Plot are now being revealed for the first time in the era of glasnost."

Rapoport carefully chronicles the story of the alleged plot, and uses it to demonstrate and analyze Stalin's deranged anti-Semitism. Although conceding that delving into a psychoanalysis of an historic figure can be a dubious enterprise, his evidence seems to justify his approach. "Stalin was probably no more anti-Semitic in his early youth than millions of others," writes Rapoport, "But the seeds of all-consuming hatred were there, and they would be nurtured in the coming years." As evidence of Stalin's drive to institutionalize anti-Semitism, Rapoport notes his rivalry with and clinical paranoia of Trotsky, and his pre-World War II anti-Semitic terror. But Stalin knew how to hide his anti-Semitism. Thus, when the doctors' plot was made public, its anti-Semitic origins and planned aftermath of concentration camps went unnoticed outside the Soviet Union: "The Soviet campaign did not seem to perturb some of the most prominent American Jewish leaders."

While the whole truth about the doctors' plot are not known and may never be, *Stalin's War Against the Jews* adds an important, new, and highly readable chapter to the ugly history of Stalinism. V.T.

Steeltown, U.S.S.R.: Soviet Society in the Gorbachev Era. By Stephen Kotkin. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991. 262 pp. \$24.95.

Soviet citizens often feel that they have no significance, and nowhere more so than in the company towns dominated by a single industry. Not only does the industry control access to housing and privileges, but it also often supplants the local organs of government.

Steeltown, U.S.S.R. describes one such company town, Magnitogorsk, a city of about six hundred thousand in the Ural Mountains. Kotkin, a Princeton history professor and the first American to visit Magnitogorsk in forty-five years, used his access to explore the city's social and economic life. His experience leads him to conclude that change in the Soviet Union will be much more difficult than is often presumed in the West. The problem is not just that the people of Magnitogorsk are exploited by central planners, though they are. In addition, they must wait an average of fifteen years for a separate apartment; breathe air containing a level of pollutants thirty-three times higher than that considered dangerous in the United States; and, in the case of men, die on average only three years after going on pension at sixty. Economically, the biggest problem for Magnitogorsk is that central planning creates its own demand by assuring obsolescence. Under conditions of a market economy and international competition, the Magnitogorsk steel works would simply cease to function.

Kotkin's book, based largely on interviews, is too episodic to capture the surrealistic quality of daily Soviet life, but it does portray excellently the consequences of central planning. David Satter

The Twilight Struggle: The Soviet Union vs. the United States Today. By Constantine C. Menges. Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1990. 428 pp. \$21.95.

For a sense of how Soviet policy in the Third World was viewed under William Casey's tenure at the CIA, look no further. During the Reagan administration, Menges served in the CIA as a National Intelligence Officer, then on the National Security Council. In this study, written from a militant anticommunist perspective, Menges describes the origins both of pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist regimes in Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Nicaragua, and of the efforts of anticommunist movements to topple those regimes, with the assistance of the United States and other powers.

For Menges, the enemy is "communism," which he does not sufficiently differentiate from the USSR's military threat. This leads him to exaggerate Soviet accomplishments and to underestimate consistently the effect of local actors on the superpowers' rivalry. For example, it has been factional infighting among the Afghan *mujahidin*, not any inadequacy on the part of Washington, that has

prevented the Afghan resistance from forming a government-in-exile and seeking diplomatic recognition.

Particularly dubious are the book's generalizations in the concluding chapter, "Comparative Analysis and Alternative Futures": that Moscow's aid was a major factor in the success of most national liberation movements after 1961; that economic motives loomed large in Soviet decision making with regard to the cases under review; and that "the Soviet Union has remained steadfast in seeking victories of the pro-Soviet regimes over the resistance movements."

Alvin Z. Rubinstein

THE MIDDLE EAST

By Daniel Pipes

America Entangled: The Persian Gulf Crisis and Its Consequences. Edited by Ted Galen Carpenter. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1991. 117 pp. \$8.95.

Reading the papers from a Cato Institute conference on "America in the Gulf," held on January 8, 1991 (that is, just prior to the beginning of the air war), is not very edifying. The editor lambasts President Bush for "leading a divided nation into war in pursuit of vaguely defined objectives that have little relevance to America's vital interests." William A. Niskanen declares that "a war against Iraq this winter would be the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time. Our government would make a tragic mistake in initiating that war." Richard K. Thomas argues that "there is no purely economic justification for opposing Saddam's takeover even of Saudi Arabia, let alone Kuwait." Gene R. La Rocque, a retired admiral, predicts: "If we attack, the only known result will be the ultimate defeat and possible occupation of Iraq at great cost to the United States." Is it bravery or foolishness that prompts Cato to publish these and like statements after the successful conclusion of Operation Desert Storm?

The libertarian perspective has much to commend it; indeed, the free market approach to economic and political issues offers intellectual excitement for our era that parallels that of socialism a century back. But when it comes to foreign policy, too many libertarians purvey warmed-over leftist broadsides. Why so? Simple. Just as leftists oppose U.S. foreign policy because they oppose what America stands for, libertarians oppose U.S. foreign policy because they oppose Washington and what it stands for. Put differently, they see Washington messing things up with Nazi Germany and Iraq just as it does with New Hampshire and Virginia; and they mistakenly count on free markets to solve noneconomic problems.

Facing a Cruel Mirror: Israel's Moment of Truth. By Michael Bar-Zohar. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1990. 246 pp. \$22.95 (cloth).

No ordinary fellow, Bar-Zohar has fought in each of Israel's wars since 1956; is a ranking Labor party member of Knesset; was advisor to Moshe Dayan; wrote a biography of David Ben-Gurion and an analysis of the Six Day War. He is also the author of spy novels and mysteries and, it is now clear, a perceptive analyst of contemporary Israeli politics.

Facing a Cruel Mirror — a mixture of autobiography, political gossip, polemic, and analysis — visits the 1960s with Ben-Gurion, the 1970s with Moshe Dayan, and the 1980s with Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin. What holds the book together is Bar-Zohar's struggle with the evolution of Israel from a revolutionary, pioneer society to a more normal but (what is most troubling to Bar-Zohar) less heroic one, with only a normal sense of conscience.

For the researcher, Bar-Zohar's narrative offers little that is new, with a few exceptions: Peres abstained from bringing down the National Unity government before the October 1986 rotation due to a belief that Likud infighting would do the job; Peres and King Husayn had nearly achieved an identical agreement a year and a half before the London agreement of April 1987). Its real service is to the non-specialist, for Bar-Zohar analyzes clearly a most labyrinthine political system. A.G.

Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime. By Middle East Watch. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991. 224 pp. \$25.00.

James A. Paul, the writer of *Syria Unmasked*, and Middle East Watch are to be congratulated on a superb piece of research. Unlike the typical human rights inquiry, with its necessary but not terribly informative list of abuses and victims' names, this one paints a picture of the whole system that Syria has put in place. The authors achieved this through a combination of extensive reading and interviewing witnesses. The presentation is restrained; the facts speak movingly for themselves.

Chapters cover such topics as prison conditions and the use of torture; government control of nominally independent associations; the special controls on Kurds, Jews, and Palestinians; and the tight vise on cultural activities. Perhaps the most outstanding chapter, because the most original, is the one that details the no less than fifteen security services, telling who runs them (nearly all 'Alawi) and explaining what each of them specializes in (Lebanon, the protection of government buildings, and so on). The study leaves an overall impression that the regime is more secure than it used to be, and so it is slightly less vicious; but its arbitrary rule has, if anything, increased over the years.

Living Together Separately: Arabs and Jews in Contemporary Jerusalem. By Michael Romann and Alex Weingrod. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991. 258 pp. \$19.95.

Romann and Weingrod, long-time residents of the holy city, argue in this fascinating book that Arab and Jewish identities drive that city's life. The

authors count no less than four lines — language, religion, national affiliation, ethnic-group membership — dividing these two groups. Add to this brew a clash of aspirations, and the result is a “tight, almost impermeable” ethnic boundary. There are Jewish blood banks and Arab ones, Jewish and Arab electricity companies, Arab and Jewish brands of cigarettes, and two kinds of telephone books. The identity of a store is established by its location, the provenance of its goods, the alphabet of its signs, the religion and languages of its proprietor, and its days of rest. There is no room for ambiguity.

Not surprisingly, tensions bubble just below the surface. In the memorable words of an Arab furniture upholsterer: “Anyone who wants to get along here must be deaf, blind, and dumb; otherwise he’ll never make it.” Living together separately has several political implications. One has to do with the overriding importance of politics; in Jerusalem political passions generally determine economic behavior, not the other way around. Another has to do with the limits of Arab-Jewish co-existence. Patterns found in Jerusalem render unlikely the possibility of mutual understanding and friendship because it shows that time does not bring the two peoples together, improve their relations, or inspire mutual toleration. Still, all is not bleak. If Arabs and Jews are not coming together, they stay far enough apart that they can for the most part ignore each other. To a surprising extent, Arabs and Jews can and do live side-by-side.

Political Dictionary of the Arab World. By Yaacov Shimoni. New York: Macmillan, 1987. 520 pp. \$50.00.

The Middle East’s political prominence has made it the subject of more than its share of reference works, most of them deficient in some fundamental way. Here’s one that excels. Shimoni co-edited the very useful *Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the 20th Century* (1972); while drawing on that volume, he has this time written his own compendium, focusing on his own speciality, the Arab world.

The Dictionary’s strength lies in its intelligence and utility. In addition to the obvious geographic and biographic entries, it contains brief but ambitious surveys of topics not normally covered in reference books: “oil in the Arab countries,” “Christians in the Arab countries,” “colonialism,” “Greater Syria,” “Liberal,” and even “foreign bases.” The book’s longest entry, twenty-six pages on the Arab-Israeli conflict, is a model of concision and clarity.

Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography. By Ephraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi. New York: Free Press, 1991. 308 pp. \$22.95.

How did Saddam reach so exalted a position, what makes him tick, and what does his rule mean for Iraqis and the outside world? This is the task that Karsh and Rautsi, a husband-and-wife team, take on. They do a fine job, especially when one considers that at least part of the biography was written hastily. (The book appeared in April, yet the coverage goes through the end of the war in February 1991). And it is full of the sort of odd and telling biographi-

cal fact crucial to a biography. Here is one: Saddam not only failed to enter Iraq's Military Academy, but he graduated from high school only at the age of twenty-four years, while living in exile in Cairo.

Saddam Hussein has two problems that deserve a close look. One concerns its adherence to what might be called the Bob Woodward School of History, which permits an author to write as though privy to the inner workings of another person's mind, even when not having been directly informed by the person. Karsh and Rautsi take the method a step further, reporting what went on in Saddam's head without having ever met the man. Over and over, they offer a purportedly direct line to the ruler's thinking. The other problem concerns the authors' inconsistent presentation of Saddam's character in his early and later years. For the period 1937-1979, they draw a picture of unalloyed aggressiveness. In the second part, 1979-1991, the era of his presidency, they turn Saddam into a totally different individual. The old aggressiveness is gone, replaced by a consuming defensiveness. Nothing that happened in the past year confirms this peculiar interpretation.

EAST ASIA

By Ross H. Munro

China and the Crisis of Marxism-Leninism. By Jürgen Domes et al. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990. 214 pp. \$39.50.

Recent work on communism has focused largely on the crisis in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Now four leading scholars combine their skills to ask whether communism will also fail elsewhere in the world, or whether it will continue under another guise. They make a strong case that communism's end, at least the beginning of its end, is at hand.

The chief focus here is on China, and the authors' prognosis, though guarded, is that in time Chinese Communist ideology will be thoroughly discredited. Beijing's octogenarian leaders are determined to retain tight political control on behalf of the Party, but it is reasonable to assume they will be dead or retired within a few years. Moreover, both the old guard and its successor generation are ambivalent about what they should do to invigorate the economy. Jan Prybyla, an economist, notes the Soviet experience has already shown "marketizing reform from above (systematic change initiated by the rule elite) is not possible." Already, therefore, the younger generation in China is disenchanted with the chimera of combining dictatorship and free enterprise. According to Domes, of the University of Saarland, "Apart from the ruling elite and some orthodox stalwarts among the party cadres and members, almost nobody in the PRC believes in Marxism-Leninism anymore." As a result, the four authors conclude, Marxism-Leninism in China will erode in due course.

Ray S. Cline

China Review. Edited by Hsin-chi Kuan and Maurice Brosseau. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1991. 467 pp. U.S. \$45.00.

During the past twenty years, Hong Kong's intellectual life has come of age, as a generation of young, usually bilingual Chinese has supplanted the largely unilingual old fogies, both British and Chinese. *The China Review* and *The Other Hong Kong Report: 1990* (see below) demonstrate this new talent: in both, Hong Kong Chinese academics dominate the list of the contributors.

The *Review* fills a large gap in publications about contemporary China. In a tour d'horizon of the Chinese scene, it succinctly sums up the unresolved political, economic, and social issues in the current impasse between China's conservatives and reformers. The *Review's* specialized articles are no less helpful: though the editors emphasize their volume is interpretive, not a reference book, many of the topical contributions are as definitive as anything available and contain helpful data as well as ample footnotes to guide further inquiry. Among the standouts are Sung Yun-wing on foreign trade, Joseph Chen on foreign policy and Paul Kwong on China's demographic conundrums. Willy Wo-lap Lam makes two immediately helpful contributions: a thoughtful chronology of events and a classic content analysis of the PRC media that amounts to a valuable summary of recent political trends. T.L. Tsim, who played an important role in developing both the *Review* and the *Other*, deftly dissects the PRC's policies and actions vis-à-vis Hong Kong, adding to his consistently pessimistic (but so far justified) assessment of Hong Kong's future. If Tsim proves correct, few of the *Review's* authors will reside in Hong Kong a decade hence.

The Coming War with Japan. By George Friedman and Meredith LeBard. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. 429 pp. \$24.95.

The United States and Japan merely suspended a fundamental and ultimately inescapable rivalry during the cold war. Washington guaranteed Japan's national security, protected its seagoing foreign trade, and suffered its economic mercantilism in return for Japan's remaining a reliable bastion of anti-Soviet sentiment. Now U.S.-Japanese relations are once again on a collision course, with Japan being compelled to assert itself militarily to protect economic interests no longer safeguarded by the United States. Such are the authors' contentions in *The Coming War With Japan*. Moreover, they spin out some concomitant scenarios for Japan — domination of a fragmented China, a conflict with Korea and Taiwan, and an alliance with an increasingly militaristic India.

The authors are, as they themselves admit, "pamphleteers." Much of their writing is simplistic, deliberately provocative, and rhetorically overwrought. Their determinism — "Japan *must* return to its imperial ways" — is grating, and far too dismissive of the Japanese public's resistance to a military resurgence. Yet for a foreign policy generalist, *The Coming War With Japan* should be the one must-read book on Asia in 1991. For all its flaws, the authors excel in placing "the Japan issue" where it belongs: in the big context of twentieth-century history, global politics, and grand strategy.

Hong Kong! Hong Kong! By Dick Wilson. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990. 284 pp. £15.99.

It's no longer necessary to wade through the Hong Kong government's yearbook to get the official, optimistic line on the future of this Chinese city-state. Dick Wilson (a close friend, but no kin, of Hong Kong's Governor David Wilson) offers readers an easier alternative in *Hong Kong! Hong Kong!*, a book that regurgitates many of the myths promoted by British authorities.

For example, Wilson asserts that the emigrants fleeing Hong Kong will return as soon as they acquire foreign citizenship — a claim from which even the British are now retreating. And he recycles the old but now discredited “golden goose” theory, arguing that China values Hong Kong's economic contributions too much to undermine it. Wilson thus ignores evidence old and new that, in the crunch, China's Communist leaders will always put their political control ahead of their country's prosperity.

Still, *Hong Kong! Hong Kong!* is an enjoyable read, replete with portraits of prominent and successful Hong Kong residents whose lives give human texture to the colony's astounding success story. It is when the author turns to Britain's reprehensible record in Hong Kong since the late 1970s, and finds virtually nothing wrong with his compatriots' actions, that he stumbles and falls.

Hong Kong 1991. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Information Services, 1991. 467 pp. U.S. \$10.00. **The Other Hong Kong Report: 1990.** Edited by Richard Y.C. Wong and Joseph Y.S. Cheng. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1990. 581 pp. U.S. \$12.00.

Hong Kong would deserve our attention even if it were not embarked on its potentially tragic reversion to control by the People's Republic of China, a process that culminates legally in 1997. It is a city-state more populous, rich, and economically consequential than either Ireland or Israel. Nevertheless, the many ways in which Hong Kong is already succumbing to the PRC and its local minions is unquestionably what primarily commands our interest. Unfortunately, the government of Hong Kong is determined to play down rather than draw attention to its plight.

For this reason, the initial publication of *The Other Hong Kong Report* was widely welcomed as a balance to *Hong Kong 1991* the government's own yearbook, a highly professional and fact-filled product that nevertheless glosses over Hong Kong's many and growing problems. Like the *China Review* (see above), the *Other* ranges far beyond political and economic issues, covering matters as varied as health, religion, and demography. Nevertheless, it is with politics and economics that the *Other's* second issue really demonstrates its difference. One standout is Cheng's account of how Beijing used the drafting of the Basic Law — Hong Kong's post-1997 “constitution” — to nullify its 1984 pledge to allow Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy after Britain leaves. Another is a definitive forty-page assessment of the negative economic impact of the emigration of Hong Kong's best and brightest prior to the PRC takeover, something the government's yearbook brushes aside.

ORBIS
INDEX TO VOLUME 35
Articles, Authors, and Subjects

- African National Congress, 483-513
"ANC-Inspired Violence Poses a Threat,"
by Michael Radu, 499-513
"Apocalyptic Environmentalism," by
Robert J. Smith, 253-65
arms sales, by neutrals, 41-52
Aspin, Les, "Persian Gulf Crisis Report
Card," 120
"Averting Moscow's Baltic Coup," by Jan
Arveds Trapans, 427-39
- Bailey, Kathleen, "Can Missile Prolifera-
tion Be Reversed?" 5-14
ballistic missile proliferation, the impor-
tance of, 29-40; in the Middle East, 15-
28, possibility of reversing, 5-14
Baltic republics, 427-40
Bandow, Doug, "Foreign Policy and
Limited Government: Keep the Troops
and the Money at Home," 549-61
Bartlett, Bruce, "The Crisis of Socialism in
Israel," 53-68; response, 441-49
"Beijing, the West, and the Approaching
Sack of Hong Kong," by Bretigne
Shaffer, 327-46; response, 605-6
Berkowitz, Bruce, "Brief Reviews: War
Studies," 131-35, 295-97, 457-60, 610-
14
"Brief Book Reviews," 125-160, 287-320,
453-80, 605-34
- "Can Missile Proliferation Be Reversed?"
by Kathleen C. Bailey, 5-14
Carnovale, Marco, "Why NATO-Europe
Needs a Nuclear Trigger," 223-34
Carus, W. Seth, "Missiles in the Third
World: The 1991 Gulf War," 253-57
censorship, and U.S. television, 347-64;
and Romania, 365-76
China, and trade with Taiwan, 517-31
Clawson, Patrick, "Brief Reviews: Inter-
national Economics," 136-39, 298-302,
460-63, 614-18; "Brief Reviews: World
Politics, 607-10
- Colombia, and drug negotiations, 235-52
"Coping with Missile Proliferation in the
Middle East," by Mark A. Heller, 15-28
"Correspondence," on the German Prob-
lem, 121-24; on socialism in Israel, 441-
452; on Hong Kong, 603-4
"Could the Prague Spring Have Been
Saved?" by Jiří Valenta, 581-601
"The Crisis of Socialism in Israel," by
Bruce Bartlett, 53-68; response, 441-52
- D'Amato, James V., "How Regimes Profit
by Curbing U.S. Television News," 347-
64
"De Klerk Can Handle the Transition," by
Peter Duignan, 483-98
democracy, and Eastern Europe, 323-26;
and South Africa, 483-513
Dobriansky, Paula J., and David B.
Rivkin, Jr., "Does The Soviet Military
Oppose Perestroika?" 163-78
"Documentation," 107-20, 267-86, 427-
40, 577-97
"Does The Soviet Military Oppose
Perestroika?" by Paula J. Dobriansky
and David B. Rivkin, Jr., 163-78
drug negotiations, Colombian, 235-52
Duignan, Peter J., "Towards South Afri-
can Democracy: De Klerk Can Handle
the Transition," 483-98
Dunlop, John B., "Moscow Report:
Russia's Surprising Reactionary Alli-
ance," 423-26
- Europe, and nuclear weapons, 223-34
- "Foreign Policy and Limited Govern-
ment: Keep the Troops and the Money
at Home," by Doug Bandow, 549-61
"Foreign Policy and Limited Govern-
ment: Towards a Muscular Libertarian-
ism," by James Robbins, 533-47

Index

- Garfinkle, Adam, "Brief Reviews: World Politics," 127-31, 289-95, 455-57
- Germany, and the Soviet Union, 377-94; and the United States, 411-22
- Great Britain, foreign policy, 395-410; and the United States, 395-422
- Gross, Peter, "Restricting the Free Press in Romania," 365-76
- Heller, Mark A., "Coping with Missile Proliferation in the Middle East," 15-28
- Herspring, Dale R., "The Soviet Military Reshapes in Response to Malaise," 179-94
- Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken, "Will Inter-China Trade Change Taiwan or the Mainland?" 517-31
- Hong Kong, and Beijing, 327-36, 603-4; and the West, 327-46
- "How Much Does Missile Proliferation Matter?" by Uzi Rubin, 29-40
- "How Regimes Profit by Curbing U.S. Television News," by James V. D'Amato, 347-64
- Israel, and socialism, 53-68, 441-52
- Kanovsky, Eliyahu, "Why the Oil Crisis Won't Last," 79-92
- "Keep the Troops and the Money at Home," by Doug Bandow, 549-61
- Khashan, Hilal, "The Revival of Pan-Arabism," 107-16
- Lee, Rensselaer W., "Policy Brief: Making the Most of Colombia's Drug Negotiations," 235-52
- Leighton, Marian and Robert Rudney, "Non-Offensive Defense: Toward a Soviet-German Security Partnership?" 377-94
- Libertarianism, 533-47, 549-61
- Mahnken, Thomas, "Why Third World Space Systems Matter," 563-79
- Matthews, Ron, "The Neutrals as Gunrunners," 41-52
- McNamara, Kevin, "Brief Reviews: The United States," 139-42, 302-6, 463-66, 618-22
- Middle East, 15-28, 79-92, 107-20, 253-57
- "Missiles in the Third World: The 1991 Gulf War," by W. Seth Carus, 253-57
- Moravec, Jan, and Jiří Valenta, "Could the Prague Spring Have Been Saved?" 581-601
- "Moscow Report: Russia's Surprising Reactionary Alliance," by John B. Dunlop, 423-26
- Munro, Ross H., "Brief Reviews: Asia," 317-20; "Brief Reviews: East Asia," 632-34
- NATO, and nuclear weapons, 223-34
- "The Neutrals as Gunrunners," by Ron Matthews, 41-52
- "Non-Offensive Defense: Toward a Soviet-German Security Partnership?" by Marian Leighton and Robert Rudney, 377-94
- nuclear weapons, and NATO, 223-34
- oil crisis, 79-92
- "On the Post-Cold War Middle East," by Saddam Husayn, 117-19
- "Persian Gulf Crisis Report Card," by Les Aspin, 120
- Pipes, Daniel, "Brief Reviews: The Middle East," 149-54, 311-14, 469-72, 629-32
- "Policy Brief: Making the Most of Colombia's Drug Negotiations," by Rensselaer W. Lee, 235-52
- Radu, Michael, "Brief Reviews: Africa," 314-17, 473-75; "Brief Reviews: Latin America," 157-60, 478-80
- _____, "Towards South African Democracy: ANC-Inspired Violence Poses a Threat," 499-513
- Ramet, Sabrina P., "Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic: A Profile," 93-106
- "Restricting the Free Press in Romania," by Peter Gross, 365-76

- "Resurrecting Democracy in Eastern Europe," by Jean-François Revel, 323-26
- Revel, Jean-François, "Resurrecting Democracy in Eastern Europe," 323-26
- Rivkin, Jr., David B., and Paula J. Dobriansky, "The Soviet Military Today: Does It Oppose Perestroika? 163-78
- Robbins, James, "Foreign Policy and Limited Government: Toward a Muscular Libertarianism," 533-47
- Romania, and freedom of the press, 365-67
- Rubin, Uzi, "How Much Does Missile Proliferation Matter?" 29-40
- Rubinstein, Alvin Z., "Soviet Client-States: From Empire to Commonwealth," 69-78
- , "The USSR in Turmoil: Views from the Right, Center, and Left, 267-84
- Russia, 423-26
- Saddam Husayn, "On the Post Cold War Middle East," 117-19
- Satter, David, "Brief Reviews: The Soviet Union," 145-49
- Schweizer, Peter, "The Soviet Military Goes High-Tech," 195-206
- "Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic: A Profile," by Sabrina P. Ramet, 93-106
- Shaffer, Bretigne, "Beijing, the West, and the Approaching Sack of Hong Kong," 327-46; response, 603-4
- Shapiro, Judith, "Brief Reviews: East Asia," 475-78
- Sharp, Paul, "Thatcher's Wholly British Foreign Policy," 395-410
- Smith, Robert J., "Apocalyptic Environmentalism," 259-65
- socialism, and Israel, 53-68, 441-52
- "Soviet Client-States: From Empire to Commonwealth," by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 69-78
- Soviet military, 179-94; countering the West, 207-22; and new technology, 195-206; and perestroika, 163-78
- "The Soviet Military: Countering the West In New Ways," by Mikhail Tsypkin, 207-18
- "The Soviet Military Goes High-Tech," by Peter Schweizer, 195-206
- "The Soviet Military Reshapes in Response to Malaise," by Dale R. Herspring, 179-94
- Soviet Union, and Baltic republics, 427-40; and client-states, 69-78; and Germany, 377-94; Russia, 423-26
- space systems, and the Third World, 563-79
- Taiwan, and trade with China, 517-31
- Tellis, Ashley J., "Brief Reviews: Asia," 154-57
- Tismaneanu, Vladimir, "Brief Reviews: Eastern Europe," 143-45; "Brief Reviews: Europe," 622-25; "Brief Reviews: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," 306-11, 466-69
- "Thatcher's Wholly British Foreign Policy," by Paul Sharp, 395-410
- Third World, and space systems, 563-79
- "Towards a Muscular Libertarianism," by James Robbins, 533-47
- "Towards South African Democracy: ANC-Inspired Violence Poses a Threat," by Michael Radu, 499-513
- "Towards South African Democracy: De Klerk Can Handle the Transition," by Peter J. Duignan, 483-98
- Trapans, Jan Arved, "Averting Moscow's Baltic Coup," 427-39
- Tsypkin, Mikhail, "The Soviet Military: Countering the West in New Ways," 207-22
- United States, and Germany, 411-22; and Great Britain, 395-410, 411-22; and foreign policy, 533-61
- "The USSR in Turmoil: Views from the Right, Center, and Left," 267-84
- Valenta, Jiří, and Jan Moravec, "Could the Prague Spring Have Been Saved?" 581-601
- Vivekanandan, B. "Washington Must Rely on London, Not Bonn," 411-22

"Washington Must Rely on London, Not Bonn," by B. Vivekanandan, 411-22
 "Why NATO-Europe Needs a Nuclear Trigger," by Marco Carnovale, 223-34
 "Why the Oil Crisis Won't Last," by Eliyahu Kanovsky, 79-92

"Why Third World Military Space Systems Matter," by Thomas Mahnken, 559-75
 "Will Inter-China Trade Change Taiwan or the Mainland?" by Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, 517-31

Yugoslavia, 93-105

Brief Book Reviews

Adams, James. *Engines of War: Merchants of Death and the New Arms Race*, 133
 Adams, Michael C.C. *The Great Adventure: Male Desire and the Coming of World War I*, 290
 Alexander, Yonah, and Richard Latter, eds. *Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for Government, Journalists, and the Public*, 609
 Alexander, Yonah, and Robert Picard, eds. *In the Camera's Eye: News Coverage of Terrorist Events*, 607
 Alexeyeva, Ludmilla, and Paul Goldberg. *The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era*, 149
 Alpher, Joseph, ed. *The Middle East Military Balance, 1989-1990*, 471
 Arnett, Eric H. *Gunboat Diplomacy and the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation and the U.S. Navy*, 129
 Assiri, Abdul-Reda. *Kuwait's Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics*, 151
 Ayalon, Ami, and Haim Shaked, eds. *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII*, 1988, 313
 Baker, Daniel B., ed. *Political Quotations*, 293
 Baker, Raymond William. *Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul*, 152
 Baram, Amatzia. *Culture, History & Ideology in the Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968-89*, 469
 Bar-Zohar, Michael. *Facing a Cruel Mirror: Israel's Moment of Truth*, 629

Behr, Edward. *Kiss the Hand You Cannot Bite*, 623
 Beichman, Arnold. *The Long Pretense: Soviet Diplomacy from Lenin to Gorbachev*, 626
 Benedick, Richard Elliot. *Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet*, 456
 Ben-Zvi, Abraham. *Between Lausanne and Geneva: International Conferences and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 311
 Berkowitz, Bruce D., and Allan E. Goodman. *Strategic Intelligence for American National Security*, 613
 Berry, Nicholas O. *Foreign Policy and the Press: An Analysis of The New York Times's Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy*, 464
 Beverly, John, and Marc Zimmerman. *Literature and Politics in the Central American Revolutions*, 159
 Bhagwati, Jagdish, and Hugh Patrick, eds. *Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System*, 461
 Bialer, Uri. *Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956*, 149
 Blaker, James R. *United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of a Dilemma*, 130
 Blumenthal, Sidney. *Pledging Allegiance: The Last Campaign of the Cold War*, 305
 Bluth, Christoph. *New Thinking in Soviet Military Policy*, 147

- Bonner, Arthur. *Averting the Apocalypse: Social Movements in India Today*, 154
- Boskin, Michael, and Charles McLure, Jr., eds. *World Tax Reform: Case Studies of Developed and Developing Countries*, 618
- Brands, H.W. *Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918-1961*, 465
- Breytenbach, Jan. *They Live by Sword: 32 "Buffalo" Battalion — South Africa's Foreign Legion*, 474
- Bridgland, Fred. *The War for Africa: Twelve Months That Transformed a Continent*, 474
- Brooks, Charles, ed. *Best Editorial Cartoons of the Year: 1991 Edition*, 619
- Cairncross, Alec. *Planning in Wartime: Aircraft Production in Britain, Germany, and the USA*, 612
- Carpenter, Ted Galen, ed. *America Entangled: The Persian Gulf Crisis and Its Consequences*, 629
- Carus, W. Seth. *Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response*, 296
- Center for Investigative Reporting and Bill Moyers. *Global Dumping Ground: The International Traffic in Hazardous Waste*, 292
- Chazan, Naomi, ed. *Irredentism and International Politics*, 455
- Chiot, Daniel, ed. *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century*, 308
- Choate, Pat. *Agents of Influence*, 460
- Codrescu, Andrei. *A Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution*, 623
- Cohen, Michael. *Truman and Israel*, 153
- Cohen, Raymond. *Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf*, 150
- Cronin, Richard P. *CRS Report for Congress: Japan's Expanding Role and Influence in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 317
- Crystal, David, ed. *The Cambridge Encyclopedia*, 127
- Cullen, Robert, ed. *The Post-Containment Handbook: Key Issues in U.S.-Soviet Economic Relations*, 138
- Dahl, Robert A. *After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society*, 289
- Dahrendorf, Ralf. *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: In a Letter Intended to Be Sent to a Gentleman in Warsaw*, 467
- Dalby, Simon. *Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics*, 291
- Di Leo, David L. *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*, 464
- Dionne, E.J., Jr. *Why Americans Hate Politics: The Death of the Democratic Process*, 621
- Di Palma, Giuseppe. *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions*, 294
- Djilas, Aleksa. *The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953*, 622
- Dobson, Wendy. *Economic Policy Coordination: Requiem or Prologue?* 616
- Doder, Dusko, and Louise Branson. *Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin*, 145
- Dolling, Yolanda, et al., eds. *Who's Who in European Politics*, 291
- Domes, Jürgen, et al. *China and the Crisis of Marxism-Leninism*, 632
- Dunnigan, James F., and Albert A. Nofi. *Dirty Little Secrets: Military Information You're Not Supposed to Know*, 296
- Dunnigan, James F., and Albert A. Nofi. *Shooting Blanks: War Making That Doesn't Work*, 612
- Echikson, William. *Lighting the Night: Revolution in Eastern Europe*, 307
- Edwards, George C., III. *At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress*, 463
- Ehrenfeld, Rachel. *Narcoterrorism*, 456

Index

- Emerson, Steve, and Cristina del Sesto. *Terrorist: The Inside Story of the Highest-Ranking Iraqi Terrorist Ever to Defect to the West*, 609
- Enloe, Cynthia. *Bananas, Beaches & Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, 290
- Epstein, Joshua M. *Conventional Force Reductions: A Dynamic Assessment*, 296
- Fang, Lizhi. *Bringing Down the Great Wall*, 475
- Fauriol, Georges, and Eva Loser, eds. *Cuba: The International Dimension*, 157
- Fejtő, François. *Réquiem pour un empire défunt: Histoire de la destruction de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, 144
- Frelk, James J., and Glen E. Tait, eds. *Defending against Ballistic Missile Attacks*, 132
- Friedman, George, and Meredith LeBard. *The Coming War with Japan*, 633
- Ganguly, Shivaji. *U.S. Policy toward South Asia*, 319
- Geldenhuys, Deon. *Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis*, 455
- Gerlach, Stefan, and Peter Petri, eds. *The Economics of the Dollar Cycle*, 299
- Glade, William, ed. *Privatization of Public Enterprises in Latin America*, 301
- Glaser, Charles L. *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy*, 295
- Glenny, Misha. *The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy*, 624
- Golan, Galia. *Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev*, 309
- Golan, Galia. *The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World*, 309
- Gomulka, Stanislaw, and Antony Polonsky, eds. *Polish Paradoxes*, 144
- Gowers, Andrew, and Tony Walker. *Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution*, 311
- Gray, Colin S. *War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century*, 135
- Hagan, Kenneth J. *The People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power*, 297
- Haggard, Stephen. *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries*, 137
- Havel, Václav. *Disturbing the Peace: A Conversation with Karel Hvizdala*, 143
- Heinz, John. *U.S. Strategic Trade: An Export Control System for the 1990s*, 462
- Heitman, Helmoed-Romer. *War in Angola: The Final South African Phase*, 475
- Heller, Agnes, and Ferenc Feher. *From Yalta to Glasnost: The Dismantling of Stalin's Empire*, 307
- Heller, Michel. *Le 7e Secrétaire: Splendeur et misère de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev*, 468
- Henkin, Louis. *Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs*, 140
- Hicks, George, ed. *The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen*, 155
- Hong Kong Government Information Services. *Hong Kong 1991*, 634
- Hourani, Albert. *A History of the Arab Peoples*, 470
- Howath, Stephen. *To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775-1991*, 611
- Hudson, Heather E. *Communication Satellites: Their Development and Impact*, 608
- Hufbauer, Gary, ed. *Europe 1992: An American Perspective*, 136
- Hyland, William, ed. *Foreign Affairs Chronology: 1978-1989*, 128
- Inbar, Efraim. *War and Peace in Israeli Politics: Labor Party Positions on National Security*, 472
- Inter-American Development Bank. *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1990 Report*, 298

- The International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance, 1990-1991*, 133
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies. *Strategic Survey, 1989-1990*, 134
- The International Who's Who, 1990-91*, 291
- Ishihara, Shintaro. *The Japan That Can Say No*, 318
- Issawi, Charles. *Issawi's Laws of Social Motion*, 606
- Jalal, Ayesha. *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defense*, 156
- James, Alan. *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, 457
- Jensen, Kenneth M., ed. *Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts "Long Telegrams" of 1946*, 611
- Jicai, Feng. *Voices from the Whirlwind: An Oral History of the Cultural Revolution*, 477
- Jordan, Donald. *Changing American Assessments of the Soviet Threat in Sub-Saharan Africa: 1975-1985*, 315
- Judge, Sir Harry, and Lord Robert Blake, eds. *Oxford Illustrated Encyclopedia. Volume 3: World History from the Earliest Times to 1800*, 293
- Judge, Sir Harry, and Lord Robert Blake, eds. *Oxford Illustrated Encyclopedia. Volume 4: World History from 1800 to the Present Day*, 293
- Karsh, Ephraim, and Inari Rautsi. *Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography*, 631
- Kaufman, Natalie Hevener. *Human Rights Treaties and the Senate: A History of Opposition*, 303
- Kay, Ernest, et al., eds. *Dictionary of International Biography, 1990/91. Twenty-first Edition*, 291
- Khalil, Samir al-. *The Monument: Art, Vulgarly, and Responsibility in Iraq*, 471
- Kennett, Lee. *The First Air War, 1914-1918*, 297
- Khrushchev, Sergei. *Khrushchev on Khrushchev: An Inside Account of the Man and His Era*, 146
- Klieman, Aaron S. *Israel and the World after 40 Years*, 151
- Kornai, Janos. *The Road to a Free Economy: Shifting from a Socialist System—The Example of Hungary*, 308
- Kornai, Janos. *Vision and Reality: Market and State*, 301
- Kotkin, Stephen. *Steeltown, U.S.S.R.: Soviet Society in the Gorbachev Era*, 628
- Kott, Jan, ed. *Four Decades of Polish Essays*, 306
- Köves, András, and Paul Marer, eds. *Foreign Economic Liberalization: Transformations in Socialist and Market and Economies*, 617
- Kuan, Hsin-chi, and Maurice Brosseau, eds. *China Review*, 633
- Landau, Jacob M. *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*, 471
- Laqueur, Walter. *Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations*, 627
- Lasch, Christopher. *The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics*, 295
- Lehne, Stefan. *The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986-1989: A Turning Point in East-West Relations*, 622
- Liu Binyan. *A Higher Kind of Loyalty*, 477
- Linfield, Michael. *Freedom under Fire: U.S. Civil Liberties in Times of War*, 140
- Mackenzie, Donald. *Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance*, 458
- Mahoney, Rosemary. *The Early Arrival of Dreams: A Year in China*, 156
- Mallin, Maurice A. *Tanks, Fighters and Ships: U.S. Conventional Force Planning since World War II*, 135
- Marchenko, Anatoly. *To Live Like Everyone*, 310

- Marks, John, and Igor Beliaev, eds. *Common Ground on Terrorism*, 607
- Marshall, Andrew, J.J. Martin, and Henry S. Rowen, eds. *On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter*, 611
- Marshall, P.J. *Bengal: The British Bridgehead*, 154
- McCrea, Frances B., and Gerald E. Markle. *Minutes to Midnight: Nuclear Weapons Protest in America*, 304
- Menges, Constantine. *The Twilight Struggle: The Soviet Union vs. the United States Today*, 628
- Meyer, David S. *A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics*, 304
- Middle East Watch. *Human Rights in Iraq*. 312
- Middle East Watch. *Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime*, 630
- Miller, Judith, and Laurie Mylroie. *Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf*, 313
- Miller, Nathan. *Spying for America: The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence*, 134
- Molle, Willem. *The Economics of European Integration*, 299
- Moorcraft, Paul L. *African Nemesis: War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010*, 314
- Mosher, Steven. *China Misperceived*, 155
- Muravchik, Joshua. *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny*, 620
- Nahaylo, Bogdan, and Victor Swoboda. *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR*, 148
- Neher, Clark D., and Wiwat Mungkandi, eds. *U.S.-Thailand Relations in a New International Era*, 157
- Nolan, Janne E. *Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World*, 458
- Norval, Morgan. *Inside the ANC: The Evolution of a Terrorist Organization*, 316
- Organski, A.F.K. *The \$36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel*, 153
- Ostrovsky, Victor, and Claire Hoy. *By Way of Deception*, 312
- Oxley, Alan. *The Challenge of Free Trade*, 615
- Paul, Ellen Frankel, ed. *Totalitarianism at the Crossroads*, 310
- Persico, Joseph E. *Casey: From the OSS to the CIA*, 457
- Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr., and Jacquelyn K. Davis. *National Security Decisions: The Participants Speak*, 129
- Pipes, Richard. *The Russian Revolution*, 468
- Poitras, Guy. *The Ordeal of Hegemony: The United States and Latin America*, 159
- Potter, E.B. *Admiral Arleigh Burke: A Biography*, 131
- Powelson, John, and Richard Stock. *The Peasant Betrayed: Agriculture and Land Reform in the Third World*, 461
- Prestowitz, Clyde, Jr., Ronald Morse, and Alan Tonelson, eds. *Povernomics: Economics and Strategy after the Cold War*, 462
- Prisk, Courtney E., ed. *The Comandante Speaks: Memoirs of an El Salvadoran Guerrilla Leader*, 479
- Prosterman, Roy, Mary Temple, and Timothy Hanstad. *Agrarian Reform and Grassroots Developments*, 298
- Rachwald, Arthur R. *In Search of Poland: The Superpowers' Response to Solidarity, 1982-1989*, 143
- Radu, Michael, et al. *The New Insurgencies: Anticommunist Guerillas in the Third World*, 130
- Rapoport, Louis. *Stalin's War against the Jews: The Doctors' Plot and the Soviet Solution*, 627
- Raviv, Dan, and Yossi Melman. *Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community*, 150

- Reich, Walter, ed. *Origins of Terrorism*, 608
- Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development. *Breaking New Ground in U.S. Trade Policy*, 614
- Resnick, Philip. *Toward a Canada-Quebec Union*, 610
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. *America's Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program*, 132
- Rielly, John E., ed. *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1991*, 618
- Rizopoulos, Nicholas X., ed. *Sea-Changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed*, 141
- Roberts, Brad. *The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy*, 292
- Roberts, Paul Craig, and Karen LaFollette. *Meltdown: Inside the Soviet Economy*, 146
- Roldan, Julio. "Gonzalo": *El Mito*, 158
- Romann, Michael, and Alex Weingrod. *Living Together Separately: Arabs and Jews in Contemporary Jerusalem*, 630
- Rummel, R.J. *Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder since 1917*, 625
- Rupnik, Jacques. *The Other Europe: The Rise and Fall of Communism in East-Central Europe*, 144
- Rusk, Dean. *As I Saw It*, 139
- Russett, Bruce. *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security*, 302
- Sakharov, Andrei. *Memoirs*, 147
- Sanders, Sol. *Living Off the West — Gorbachev's Secret Agenda and Why It Will Fail*, 625
- Sater, William F. *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict*, 478
- Schmuhl, Robert. *Statecraft and Stagecraft: American Political Life in the Age of Personality*, 305
- Schulze, Reinhard. *Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der islamischen Weltliga*, 472
- Scott, Peter Dale, and Jonathan Marshall. *Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America*, 478
- Serfaty, Simon. *The Media and Foreign Policy*, 141
- Sharp, Jane, ed. *Europe after an American Withdrawal: Economic and Military Issues*, 300
- Shawcross, William. *Dubcek*, 467
- Shen, Tong and Marianne Yen. *Almost a Revolution*, 475
- Shepherd, Geoffrey, and Carlos Geraldo Langoni, eds. *Trade Reform: Lessons from Eight Countries*, 617
- Shimoni, Yaacov. *Political Dictionary of the Arab World*, 631
- Shoemaker, Christopher C. *The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council*, 621
- Shulman, Holly Cowan. *The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945*, 465
- Simon, Reeve S. *The Middle East in Crime Fiction: Mysteries, Spy Novels and Thrillers from 1916 to the 1980s*, 152
- Sirgiovanni, George. *An Undercurrent of Suspicion: Anti-Communism in America during World War II*, 142
- Smist, Frank J., Jr. *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1989*, 620
- Smith, Brian. *More than Altruism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid*, 300
- Steinberg, David Joel. *The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place*, 319
- Stokes, Gale, ed. *From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe*, 622
- Stormer, John A. *None Dare Call It Treason . . . 25 Years Later*, 304
- Sutter, Robert G. *The Cambodian Crisis and U.S. Policy Dilemmas*, 318
- Szulc, Tad. *Then and Now: How the World Has Changed Since WWII*, 294

- Tarazona-Sevillano, Gabriela. *Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism*, 480
- Taylor, S.J. *Stalin's Apologist, Walter Duranty: The New York Times's Man in Moscow*, 148
- Theobald, Robin. *Corruption, Development, and Underdevelopment*, 615
- Thomas, Raju G.C., and Bennett Ramberg, eds. *Energy and Security in the Industrializing World*, 128
- Timerman, Jacobo. *Cuba: A Journey*, 158
- Tuch, Hans N. *Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas*, 139
- Tucker, Robert C. *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941*, 469
- The United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1990*, 136
- Van Crevald, Martin. *The Transformation of War*, 614
- Varnis, Steven L. *Reluctant Aid or Aiding the Reluctant: U.S. Food Aid Policy and Ethiopian Famine Relief*, 316
- Vertzberger, Yaacov Y.I. *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking*, 131
- Wallach, Janet, and John Wallach. *Arafat: In the Eyes of the Beholder*, 311
- Who's Who in the Arab World, 1990-1991, 314
- Wiarda, Howard J. *The Democratic Revolution in Latin America*, 479
- Wilhelm, Donald. *Global Communications and Political Power*, 303
- Williamson, John, ed. *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?* 137
- Wilson, Dick. *Hong Kong! Hong Kong!* 634
- Wiseman, John A. *Democracy in Black Africa*, 315
- Wong, Richard Y.C., and Joseph Y.S. Cheng, eds. *The Other Hong Kong Report: 1991*, 632
- The World Resources Institute. *World Resources 1990-1991*, 138

Postdoctoral Fellowship for Research in International Security Studies.



The Mershon Center is seeking applicants for postdoctoral research in international security affairs. Possible areas of interest include:

- U.S. defense and foreign policy
- international conflict resolution
- military history
- civil-military relations

Preference will be given to applicants with a solid design for completing a book-length manuscript during the fellowship year. The appointment will be for up to twelve months beginning July 1, 1992. The stipend will be at approximately \$29,000 per annum. Only persons holding a doctorate awarded since June 1987 are eligible to apply.

If interested, request an application package from:

Fellowship Coordinator
Mershon Center
The Ohio State University
199 West Tenth Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201-2399
(614) 292-1681

Applications due November 15, 1991



Orbis (ISSN 0030-4387) is published quarterly by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3615 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

Submission of Articles. The editors invite submissions of articles (up to seven thousand words, reference notes included) bearing upon issues in world affairs. Please submit articles to the Editor. A brief summary should accompany the article. Manuscripts, including reference notes, should be double-spaced throughout and submitted in duplicate. Reference notes should only cite sources. Authors are requested to submit their articles in PC format or on Macintosh System 6.0 disks, supported by either MS-DOS or AppleTalk, in their own word-processing program, plus a version in ASCII or text-only format. Disks must be accompanied with hard copy. A style sheet is available on request.

Books and Publications for Review. Materials should be sent to the Book Review Editor.

Subscriptions. \$25.00 per year for individuals; \$50.00 per year for institutions. Outside U.S.A., add \$5.00 per year for surface mail, \$20.00 for air mail. Address correspondence regarding subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager (please include ZIP). *Postmaster:* Send address changes to *Orbis*, 3615 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and at additional mailing offices.

Newsstand Distribution. *Orbis* is distributed by Bernhard DeBoer, Inc., 113 East Centre Street, Nutley, New Jersey, 07110, U.S.A.

Advertising and Permissions. Correspondence should be sent to the Manuscript Editor.

Photocopies. For authorization to photocopy individual articles, contact the Copyright Clearance Center, 27 Congress Street, Salem, Mass. 01970, using item-fee code 0030-4387/91/\$1.50. For requests of more than one hundred copies per article, or for unlimited photocopying rights on an annual basis, contact the Assistant Editor of *Orbis*.

Microfilm. *Orbis* is available to subscribers on space-saving microfilm. Each volume of *Orbis* is recorded separately and is obtainable at the end of the volume year, beginning with Volume 1 (1957-58). Please address inquiries directly to the distributors: University Microfilms International, P.O. Box 1346, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106; call toll free 1-800-521-0600.

Microfiche. *Orbis* is also available on microfiche. Each volume of *Orbis* is recorded separately and is obtainable at the end of the volume year, beginning with Volume 1 (1957-58). Please address inquiries directly to the distributors: KTO Microform, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546.

Reprints and Back Issues. Back issues of *Orbis*, Volumes 1-30, are available from Kraus Reprint and Periodicals, Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546. Beginning with Volume 26, most back issues are available from the *Orbis* Circulation Manager at \$6.50 per copy (add \$1.00 per copy for shipping and handling). Bulk order prices provided on request.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute or the editors of *Orbis*. Reproduction of contents without permission is forbidden.

Copyright © 1991 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute.



Foreign Policy Research Institute

Thornton D. Hooper Fellowship in International Affairs

The Foreign Policy Research Institute is pleased to announce the eleventh annual Thornton D. Hooper Fellowship for 1992-93. The Hooper Fellowship promotes original research on international issues affecting U.S. interests. International relations specialists, political scientists, economists, historians, and members of related disciplines are invited to apply. The winning applicant will spend a year in residence at the Institute, beginning in the fall of 1992.

1992-93 Focus: East Asia

The 1992-93 Hooper Fellowship will be awarded to a specialist on East Asia. Preference will be given to applicants with a broad knowledge of the region's international politics, economics, and foreign relations. An ability to address American policy is also highly desirable.

Previous Fellows

David Satter, Arthur N. Waldron, Nicolai N. Petro, Howard J. Wiarda, Vladimir Tismaneanu, Milan Hauner, J.E. Peterson, Michael Handel.

How to Apply

Please submit the following: a curriculum vitae, three letters of recommendation, copies of three publications, and a one thousand-word research project proposal. The application deadline is December 15, 1991.

A master's degree or equivalent experience is required. The stipend is commensurate with achievements.

Please send applications to: Secretary, Hooper Fellowship Search Committee, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3615 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104.